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version of experientialism, Moral Perceptual Orientation, by arguing that we, in addition
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are curated by our background beliefs by developing a view of dialectical consciousness. I
do this by synthesizing Herbert Marcuse’s perspective on the epistemic subject with the
Phenomenological division of Feminist Affect theory using Buddhist (Mahāyānan) moral
psychology to account for the formation of those background beliefs, habits of thought,
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INTRODUCTION
In a large part, my desire to understand moral perception is motivated by the
presence of injustice, social inequality, and violence in our society. I am constantly
disturbed and unsettled by our world’s addiction to brutalization and domination and its
seeming aversion to systems and behaviors which humanize people and liberate life, human
or otherwise. Happenings in my own lifetime (e.g., 9/11, the Iraq War, the #Metoo
movement, Protests of the Keystone Pipeline, genocides in Myanmar, the continued
brutalization of the black body and community, the vilification of the immigrant, the
devastation of our planet, bullying in schools, the graduate student mental health crisis, ...)
serve as constant reminders that the human condition is plagued by senseless suffering and
surreptitious social pathologies that mutate in order to persist from generation to
generation. We are, all of us, haunted by a history of domination and brutalization which
often derails the moral arc of the universe’s progress towards justice. What is more, this
history curates the present day’s controlling social apparatus and inscribes itself upon our
individual sensibilities. In the non-ideal conditions of this life, the question of liberation,
of understanding how it can be achieved within a humanizing society, reveals itself as also
containing the problem of oppression, of understanding how structures and sentiments
supporting domination and brutalization preserve themselves over time; this, as I see it, is
the problem of our time.
As we grapple with this issue, people often attempt to understand the problem of
oppression using phrases like ‘our history makes us see something as wrong’ or ‘see it as
good’ in our attempt to offer an explanation for human behaviors, judgments, or
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apprehensions in morally pertinent situations within the backdrop of socialized history. For
example, consider the 2019 interview of Know My Name author Chanel Miller by The
Daily Show’s Trevor Noah. During a discussion of Miller’s memoir, which recounts her
sexual assault and subsequent experiences with the U.S. Justice System, Noah makes the
following observation:
“What's interesting is what you write about [your rescuers] and you say that [this
experience] made you realize [that], in all of these stories, it's not just the person that is
doing the bad thing and the person that the bad thing is being done to, but there are those
who see it and identify it as wrong and they do something about it.”
Noah’s use of perceptual language is an attempt to capture an important aspect of the moral
landscape surrounding Miller’s assault. Specifically, he highlights the relationship between
a person’s capacity to ‘see a bad thing’, ‘identify it as wrong’, and subsequently ‘do
something about it’ in virtue of the fact that it was seen as a wrong. What, then, might we
say about Miller’s assailant? Did he ‘fail to see Miller’s personhood (or dignity)’, ‘fail to
identify the moral demandingness of Miller’s personhood’ or ‘identify her as something to
be dominated’, and did he subsequently ‘do something’ as a result of those observations,
as reasons for acting? Moreover, what role did her assailant’s life, judgments, and
socialized privilege play in his apprehension of the situation?
While explanations of this kind call our attention to some important dynamics
during morally pertinent encounters, the perceptual language is unhelpful because of its
metaphorical-literal ambiguity. Granted, we should want to understand how an individual
can observe someone being sexually assaulted, or brutalized on an account of one’s race
… among other things, and ‘see’ such acts as profoundly immoral and unjust. We should
want to understand how others could ‘see’ these acts as permissible or, worse, justified.
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What is more, we should want to understand how a historicized socialization process
influences one’s discernment of the moral features of these acts and the moral status of
persons facing them. However, we should also want to understand the extent to which a
subject’s discernments during moral perception are facilitated by judgment rather than
literal perceptions because the latter are more forceful in terms of defining our beliefs about
the world than the former.
To illustrate, consider that it is incredibly difficult to be skeptical of the claim “that
chair is in the room” when one can perceptually observe the presence of ‘that chair’ in the
room (... I mean, its right there!). As Jennifer Church might put it, the justification for the
idea ‘that chair is in the room’ is built into the phenomenological character of the
experience’s contents (i.e., literally seeing the chair in the room) and, thereby, holds a place
of privilege in one’s apprehension of their experience. In the same vein, if one literally
perceives moral properties during occurrent experience then one’s justification for a moral
claim would also be built into the phenomenological character of that experience’s content,
its moral content would be perceptual in kind.
The true danger of the metaphorical-literal ambiguity in our everyday perceptual
language, and in the literature on moral perception, is that it covers up an important
question in our quest to solve the problem of oppression: are our literal perceptions of the
world potentially reinforcing, bolstering, our immediate moral viewpoints by building the
justification for those viewpoints into the phenomenal character of an experience’s
contents? Put otherwise, are we literally seeing the world’s moral dimensions in accordance
with our preexisting, yet socialized and personally developed, beliefs about the world? As
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I see it, unpacking this ambiguity would fill a gap in our understanding of the problem of
oppression. If oppression’s persistence over time includes a literal perceptual component
inasmuch as a subject’s everyday experiences include literal perceptual moral content, then
the resistance to and great refusal of an oppressive society must include a perceptual
intervention, one which radically transforms our experience of the world. As a result, the
question of liberation is, for me, one which requires a deep investigation into the nature of
moral perception.
With this in mind, the initial aim of this dissertation was to investigate a series of
three questions: (1) (the veridicality question) what does it mean to have accurate or
inaccurate moral perceptions?, (2) (the normativity question) what should my moral
perceptions of the world be like?, and (3) (the epistemological question) what
mechanisms facilitate discernment formations during moral perception and what
consequences follow from these mechanisms? However, the scope of this project in its
current form focuses squarely, and only, on (3) for both methodological and practical
reasons.
While exploring the literature regarding moral perception, broadly construed, it
became apparent that one cannot offer a satisfactory answer to (1) without first addressing
question (2) by tackling normative ethical issues. That is, an ethical-rubric from which to
measure the accuracy of a subject’s moral perceptions is required, first, before one can
make veridicality assessments of any given moral perception, whether it be a judgement or
a literal perception. However, the questions associated with (2) proved practically
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unsatisfying, and, in some cases, it felt irresponsible to pursue normative ethics in a world
plagued by non-ideal conditions and oppression.
What is more, the philosophical and methodological challenges associated with
pursuing objective ethics amongst the historicized shaping of our moral understandings
regarding freedom, life, and so on are well documented and, at this time, beyond my
practical goals as an ethical and social philosopher in service to a Marcusean style
revolution in values. It felt, during the earlier stages of the project, far more responsible to
assume a general set of ethical values based on a desire to curate conditions and ways of
relating to each other which support the amelioration of life, in the Marcusean sense, and
resist oppression’s presence in the world. As an exercise in genuineness, then, this project
starts from the assumption that life is worth living, worth affirming, and trusts the
testimonies and standpoints of oppressed peoples inasmuch as they identify society’s, as
well as my own, moral shortcomings. Given the prevalence of identity-based injustice in
the world and capitalism’s militaristic influence on the state apparatus, attending to
question (2) felt like a luxury I could not afford myself and still does, especially when
police literally have their knees on people’s throats. Thereby, a continually refined social
justice ethics has been assumed as the normative backdrop of this project resulting in its
shift away from questions (1) and (2) in favor of an attempt to unpack (3), the
epistemological questions underlying moral perception. In this sense, ‘objectivity’
regarding moral values is defined as a process, one which follows the moral arc of the
universe towards justice.
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To be clear, moral perceptions occur when a subject makes an immediate
discernment about the moral features of an occurrent experience. Notably, ‘perception’ in
this usage is not a success term as it might be used by philosophers of perception, nor does
it represent a full commitment to a perceptual way of approaching the issue. Instead, as an
object of study, the phrase ‘moral perception’ is used to sketch the borders of a yet
undefined field of philosophical inquiry, what I refer to as moral perceptual studies. This
field, broadly construed, is concerned with (i) the epistemological status of moral
perception as either a form of judgment or a literal perception, (ii) the perceptual or
judgmental mechanisms articulating one’s moral perceptions, (iii) the development of
one’s background epistemic resources which curate the moral contents of one’s moral
perceptions, (iv) the normative standards from which to judge that one’s moral perceptions
are adequate to living an ethical life, (v) the concept of veridicality as applied in moral
perceptual contexts, and (vi) the ethical consequences that follow, socially and
individually, from views on (i)-(v). Again, the scope of this project is to focus on issues (i)
- (iii), reserving (iv) - (vi) for future work.
In the first part of this project, I provide a taxonomy for categorizing theories of
moral perception into one of two types: experientialism or judgmentalism. I, then,
challenge judgmentalist views, which hold that moral perceptions are merely moral
judgments, by using phenomenal contrast methodology to argue that moral properties are
admissible contents of our perceptual experience. Notably, if moral properties are
admissible contents of experience, then moral perceptions have an experiential component
in virtue of this content’s capacity to yield perceptual moral knowledge about one’s
occurrent experience. As a result, I conclude that one’s discernments about an occurrent
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experience’s moral features are not merely a function of one’s judgment and give reasons
to believe that we have literal perceptual experiences of moral properties.
In the second part, I argue for my own view on moral perception, Moral Perceptual
Orientation (MPO). MPO asserts that how and if moral features are perceived during
occurrent experience is dependent on the collection of one’s background beliefs, ways of
thinking, and affective sensitivities, what I refer to as our background epistemic resources.
MPO gives an account of how it is that one encounters moral properties in perceptual
experience and relies on the notion that moral experiences are cognitively penetrable, that
our background non-perceptual mental states can have top-down influences on the contents
of our perceptual experience. Under this view, one’s background epistemic resources
provide the orientation by which one comes to experience the world’s moral features and,
as a result, MPO provides a framework for understanding the mechanisms underlying
moral perceptions as a synthesis of non-perceptual and perceptual mental states.
In the third part, I further develop the notion of ‘background epistemic resources’
by investigating the mechanisms by which life’s experience curates its content and
structures. To do this, I synthesize the work of Herbert Marcuse with the Phenomenological
branch of Feminist Affect theory using Buddhist (Mahāyānan) moral psychology to
construct a transdisciplinary way to understand the individual subject as engaging the world
by means of a dialectical form of consciousness. In doing this, I develop a view on
dialectical consciousness which provides a framework for conceptualizing socialization’s
ability to shape a subject’s access to the moral features of occurrent experience by
highlighting the way life’s experience has a pervasive influence on a subject’s background
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epistemic resources. As a result, I argue that, given the role of dialectical consciousness in
our lives, moral perceptions of occurrent experience are compulsory and outside one’s
immediate, willful, control. I then conclude by suggesting that a directed moral cultivation
of one’s perception is still possible by means of transformative experiences which can be
sought by the individual or curated by progressive social forces. These experiences are ones
which have the ability to alter our background epistemic resources and, thereby, reshape
the way we see the world.
The final part of the project develops a concept called ‘moral blindness’ by
investigating socialization's capacity to perpetuate forms of moral ignorance. Ignorance
amounts to the presence of persistent epistemic selectivities in one’s apprehension of a
situation or topic and it is perpetuated by oppressive modes of socialization. I argue that
oppressive socialization shapes a subject’s background epistemic resources (a.k.a., one’s
epistemic toolkit) resulting in literal selectivities in one’s moral perceptions, thereby
resulting in a kind of pathological blindness to moral reasons for socially just action. Not
only does this moral blindness threaten a subject’s autonomy, in the relational sense, I argue
that one has a moral obligation to seek out transformative experiences which emphasize
humanization and liberation over brutalization and domination. I then conclude by
suggesting that a fundamental reorientation of ourselves to the world, away from a culture
of domination, becomes imperative if we are to access reasons for executing our obligations
to others, especially where social justice and liberation are concerned.
I would like to close by noting that those interested in the phenomenon of moral
perception in one way or another (e.g., Audi, Blum, Väyrynen, Cowan, Faraci, Goldie,
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McGrath, Willett, Ahmed, and others) often pursue their investigations in accordance with
their respective academic communities and traditions. Among other reasons, I believe the
practice of staying within a theoretical neighborhood harms our understanding of moral
perception. It prevents us from appreciating the phenomenon through a variety of
theoretical lenses and, as a result, in the lives of people who feel the daily weight of these
perceptions on their ability to have lives defined by dignity and freedom. Moral perceptions
play an essential role in our lives as we make ethically pertinent decisions. Being limited
to one theoretical tradition, thereby, prevents us from seeing how literature on moral
perception, broadly construed, can impact moral life and social justice efforts.
With this in mind, I approach moral perceptual studies as a transdisciplinary field
of research and this project puts a diverse set of philosophical traditions and nonphilosophical perspectives into conversation using an interdisciplinary methodology. I
believe that this approach benefits from an intellectually inclusive and careful analysis of
moral perception by utilizing a methodological framework which enables theoretical inputs
and conceptual scoping across a variety of fields. As a result, what follows is designed to
set up a systematic way of addressing the phenomenon of moral perception by, ultimately,
laying the epistemological foundations for moral perceptual studies.
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CHAPTER 1. RECONSIDERING MORAL PERCEPTION
1.1 Introduction
In a general sense, to have a moral perception is to encounter the world (i.e., its
objects, people, spaces, and situations) and recognize which, if any, moral qualities are
present during one’s occurrent experience, accurately or otherwise. Such events are a
pervasive part of our lives and include, but are not limited to, moments where such insights
facilitate our comprehension of another’s moral status or the moral qualities of some
action. 1 The moral agent regularly faces a variety of situations that require them to
recognize the ethical dimensions of an occurrent moment in order to make morally salient
choices. As many moral theorists point out, the ability to accurately recognize moral
qualities during such situations is a precondition for reliably responding in accordance with
the demands of morality, whatever those turn out to be. 2 As a result, moral perception plays
an essential part in curating the epistemological content we use to navigate our moral lives.
For example, should someone (S) come upon a person (K) kicking an infant (I), we
hope that S has the ethical wherewithal to take I as possessing a moral status, a kind of
human dignity, incommensurate with S’s assault. 3 Among other things, we also hope that
S would take K’s actions to be immoral. Structurally speaking, the observer S encounters
situation α (K kicking I) and takes α to possess these moral features. In the given scenario,
S’s response to this situation should be facilitated by their moral perceptions of I’s dignity
and the immorality of K’s assault. This is because S’s ethical choices are contingent, at

This is especially paramount during situations where social justice issues are of central concern.
See Blum (1994), Murdoch, I. (1970), Fricker (2007), and Little (1997 & 1995). Additionally, Aristotle, MacIntyre, others in the
virtue ethics or neo-virtue ethical traditions, and those concerned with moral psychology or epistemology consistently make such
claims.
3
This case can be likened to McGrath’s (2018) case where a child is struck by an adult in a grocery store.
1
2
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least epistemologically, on the moral qualities they take to be present during their
observation of α. Assuming that S is acting rationally, unless they take α to possess a set of
moral features (m), we would not expect S to reliably respond to α in ways demanded by
m because S’s epistemic resources would not include m. 4 However, the nature of what it
means for “S takes α to possess m” is unclear.
When asked to clarify our use of take-language to describe these situations we often
resort to things like ‘S saw K’s actions as wrong’ or ‘S sees infants as possessing human
dignity’ thereby trading ambiguities in take-language for other opacities in our use of
perceptual-language. Human history contains a swath of examples where vagueness
plagues our talk of moral discernments when we come face-to-face with morally germane
events, especially those associated with instances of oppression. ‘Seeing historically
marginalized and oppressed populations as lacking moral status’ (i.e., lacking a sense of
human dignity) or ‘seeing instances of child-labor as a permissible practice’ are just a few
illustrations of how we talk about moral perception in an opaque fashion when we are
confronted with these situations.
This confusion is fueled by what we can refer to as a metaphorical-literal ambiguity
in our understanding of moral perception because the use of perceptual-language, or takelanguage, can be understood in two ways. First, it could refer to a metaphorical allusion to
a judgement formation about the presence of a moral property or, second, it can express
the literal perceptual representation of a moral property. This ambiguity is found in
everyday language and is a recurrent problem in the literature that investigates the

Provisionally, to act rationally in this sense is, minimally, to respond to the reason’s one has available in such a way that is
commensurate to the demands of rationality (i.e., to follow a rational course of action, perhaps in a syllogistic fashion).

4
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epistemological features of moral discernments about occurrent experience. 5 The question
on the table then, regarding the nature of moral perception, is this: are moral perceptions a
kind of judgment or are they literal perceptions of a situation’s moral features? 6 The
metaphorical-literal ambiguity covers up this judgement-perception question.
Moving forward, I will use “moral perception” to refer to the general practice of
taking a situation to possess some set of moral features or properties. Put formally, a subject
S has a moral perception when (i) S encounters some situation α and (ii) S recognizes,
either accurately or inaccurately, some set of moral features (m) taken, at least by S, to be
present in α. Under this working definition, if one fails to discern some feature of a situation
that it apparently possesses, I will call this a moral perceptual miss. If one discerns that a
situation possesses a moral feature that it does not, I will refer to this as a moral perceptual
misfire. Lastly, if one takes a situation to possess moral features that it actually possesses,
I will speak of this as a moral perceptual hit. 7

5
Blum (1997), Fricker (2007), Little (1995 & 1997), Murdoch (1970), Sturgeon (1986), McGrath (2018), and Willett (2014) are
examples of scholarship that does not resolve this metaphorical-literal ambiguity. Many fall into this ambiguity because they do not
address the orthodox view that perceptual knowledge “X is F” entails having a perceptual experience that represents X as F. McGrath
(2018) explicitly aims to avoid the ambiguity but ultimately seems to fall into it by specifically rejecting the orthodox view without
clarifying an alternative. It is very difficult to accept the claim that perceptual knowledge of X as F can occur in the absence of an
experience representing X as F without losing a precise sense of what it means to perceptive something or its properties. McGrath
(2018) suggests that we shouldn’t give up on, say, perceiving moral properties because, like looking at a lemon, we can still “take up
the immediate, non-inferential belief that there is a lemon on the table” if we do not have perceptual representations of lemons but
only its shape, color, texture, and other sensory contents. She writes, “If circumstances are favorable… then your belief that there is a
lemon on the table might be safe enough to quality as knowledge. Moreover, the knowledge in question, is perceptual knowledge.”
(McGrath (2018), p. 178-179). However, coming to have an non-inferential immediate belief, even in the absence of any beliefs about
the color and shape of the thing experienced, because a perception of the thing’s sensory contents “triggers your immediate belief”
sounds more like a cognitive association (see Väyrynen (2018)) or intuition (see Audi (2013)) that perceptual content of X is F rather
than a genuine perception. McGrath wishes to avoid the question of what the admissible contents of visual experience are, but this
issue is unavoidable without sacrificing theoretical clarity for ambiguities about the nature of perceptual experience. Audi (2013) use
of “intuition” carries similar difficulties.
6
Since “evaluative perception” emerged in philosophy of perception, of which moral perception is a category, this issue has the
potential to redefine how we approach moral perception and its consequences. See Bergqvist, A., & Cowan, R. (2018) for a general
introduction to evaluative perception.
7
Granted, whether we call a moral perception a miss, misfire, or hit, evaluations of our perceptions will need to be indexed according
to some situation, some metaethical view regarding moral realism or antirealism, and in the context of some ethical theory which
outlines the demands of morality. In the meantime, we can theorize about the epistemic nature of moral perception without addressing
the evaluation because of reasons discussed in footnote 7.
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It is worth noting that this definition of moral perception does not use “perception”
as a success term when discussing genuine perception or, alternatively, as a metaphorical
reference to an accurate judgement. 8 Instead, moral perceptions, in this neutral sense,
describes those occasions where S literally perceives situation α as possessing moral
features m, even if it does not, or occasions where S genuinely judges α as possessing m,
even if it does not.

9

Plainly put, moral perceptions refer to what one undergoes as a

perceptual experience or what judgement one makes whereas any assessment as to the
veridicality or accuracy of those states is an evaluation of a subject’s moral perception. 10
The nature of what one discerns during a moral perception and the adequacy of that
discernment to represent the ethical dimensions of the occurrent experience are distinct
issues. One focus of this paper is how we should approach the former.
Additionally, theories of moral perception are used to elucidate the epistemological
processes which underpin our encounters with morally pertinent occurrent experiences.
They often explore some combination of the following three questions: (1) what is the
epistemic nature of moral perception? (2) why does an agent take a situation to have moral
properties of set m1 rather than of set m2?, and (3) what role do perceptions play in moral

8
This distinction, as Wright (2007) points out, between perception as a success term verses a description of the individuals
experiences is referred to as the factive v. aspect distinction.
9
This strategy allows us to explore epistemological approaches to moral perception from a wide range of literature which explores the
topic in an implicit (Fricker (2007), Little (2001, 1997, & 1995), & Willett (2014 & 1995) and explicit fashion (Audi (2018 & 2013),
Väyrynen (2018), Cowan (2015), Faraci (2015), Church (2013), Goldie (2007), Wright (2007), & Blum (1994)) investigations of the
subject. Such literature investigates the moral epistemological facets of our immediate moral discernments which occur during our
encounters with the world. As such, authors of such work may be considered moral perceptual theorists It is worth noting that
Aristotle and others in the virtue-theory tradition or neo-virtue theory tradition are often doing this work as well. They would be
included in this category as well, as implied by Rabinoff’s (2018) Perception in Aristotle’s Ethics.
10
Evaluations of this kind evolve into robust discussions about the nature of veridicality, judgement justifications, and so on. In some
cases, especially for moral anti-realists, we come close to some version of error theory because there are no moral properties for our
moral perceptions to correspond. Given the scope of the current paper, I have chosen to table the evaluation discussion about moral
perception in favor of focusing on the epistemological nature of moral perceptions because insights into the latter seem to be a
prerequisite for an adequate investigation into the former.
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agency and autonomy? The other focus of this paper is to provide theoretical clarity for
question (1) and to address it in kind.
Given its potential influence on moral reasoning, it is vital that we approach moral
perception with a high degree of clarity. To do so is to take steps towards understanding
the nature of its role in our existence as moral epistemic agents. This paper attempts to
disentangle the way we talk about moral perceptions by fleshing out some observations
made by Blum (1994) regarding moral decision making and, using this, provide a
meaningful taxonomy for categorizing theories of moral perception into moral
perceptional experientialism (MPE) or judgmentalism (MPJ). I, then, explore the
phenomenal character of morally pertinent experiences using phenomenal contrast
methodology. From this, I argue that moral properties are admissible contents of our
perceptual experience and that discerning an occurrent situation’s moral features is not
merely a function of our moral judgments. Ultimately, what follows gives reason to believe
that we have genuine perceptual experiences of moral properties during our everyday
encounters with morally germane situations.
1.2 Talking about Moral Perception: Acquisition & Recognition
It is prudent, first, to define a framework for discussing moral perception that
precisely clarifies the aforementioned metaphorical-literal ambiguity. Blum (1994)
provides the basis for such a framework. His ‘situation-to-action-on-principle process’ is a
useful apparatus for discussing occasions where agents encounter morally germane
situations and perform morally applicable actions. 11 In Blum’s schema, agents undergo a

11

Blum 1994, p. 57-61

14

four-staged process when confronted by a morally pertinent situation. 12 In short, agents
apprehend a situation, decide whether to engage with it, make a moral judgment as to the
appropriate action, and, then, choose how to achieve that end. 13 His discussion of the latter
stages is more pertinent for an investigation of moral deliberations informed by moral
perceptions rather than the epistemic nature of such discernments. That is, the latter stages
use moral perceptions to inform ethical actions rather than take steps to define the epistemic
source of these discernments. As a result, they go beyond the scope of my current
objectives. Thus, I will forgo a detailed account of Blum’s latter stages in favor of focusing
on his breakdown of the first stage as it is relevant to the judgement-perception question.
In his description of the apprehension-stage, Blum writes, “The first step is the
accurate recognition of a situation's features. Here the situation itself is initially (as the
person/agent comes upon it) inchoate -- not even a distinct “situation” -- and the person
then takes it to be a situation of a certain character, that is, possessed of certain features.” 14
While the use of “takes” or “distinct situation” in this description is unclear, the idea
expressed here is that S approaches situation α and epistemically acquires its descriptive
features, or contents. This first step does the individuating of an experience’s contents and
is “thus providing a setting in which moral judgment carries out its task.” 15 In our
introductory case, for example, S acquires a perceptual experience of K kicking infant I
and becomes aware of I’s suffering at the hands of K, among other things. Given this, I
shall refer to this first step as the acquisition step in reference to a subject’s acquisition of

12
Blum 1994, p. 57 – Blum discusses the existence of “seven steps that take a person from a given situation to an action based on
moral principle”. For the sake of brevity, I have organized these into four stages: agents perceive a situation [steps 1 & 2], decide
whether to engage with it [steps 3 & 4, what he calls agency engagement], make a moral judgment as to the appropriate action [step 5
& 6], and, then, choose how to achieve that end [step 7].
13
Blum 1994, p. 57-61
14
Blum 1994, p. 58
15
Blum 1994, p. 42
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perceptual content which render a situation’s features as part of a subject’s perceptual
experience.
Following this, Blum writes, “the second step is to recognize the features of an
already characterized situation as morally significant”; ‘moral significance’ meaning the
possession of a morally evaluative dimension and relevant to one’s ethical deliberations. 16
In the case of K kicking I, that we perceive I’s suffering and that we take it to be morally
significant are distinct steps which occur, for Blum, in step one and two respectively. I will
refer to this second step as the recognition step in reference to a subject’s recognition that
a situation’s features possess a morally evaluative dimension. Blum summarizes, “step one
and two together yields the idea of a person coming upon a situation and perceiving its
morally salient features... together [they] can usefully be thought of as moral perception,
the second by itself might as naturally be thought of as an exercise in judgment.” 17
To note, Blum says little about whether we should take step one to be a literal act
of perception or whether it amounts to an act of judgment. He does, however, define step
two as an act of moral judgment 18 and portrays step one as a process of applying one’s
moral understanding (i.e., moral imagination and knowledge) and moral sensitivities (i.e.,
psychological capacities) to an occurrent experience. 19 He suggests that such things make
an agent aware of the morally relevant features of one’s experience. This implies that Blum
is a supporter of judgmentalism, later referred to as MPJ, even though he holds that moral
perception is distinct from moral judgments. That is, he seems to take moral perception to
Blum 1994, p. 58
Blum 1994, p. 58
18
Blum 1994, p. 41 “… principle-based traditions have generally failed to note the specific moral character of either of the following
aspects of moral judgment of particular situations: (1) knowing what counts as best exemplifying, and knowing how to apply, rules or
principles and (2) before this, recognizing given features of a situation as morally significant.”
19
Blum 1994, p. 42 “Such perception involves a different kind of, or aspect of, moral sensibility or understanding [than that of moral
judgement].”
16
17
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be a function of our capacity to form general judgments about the contents of experience
(as automatically facilitated by our understandings or psychological habits). He does not
take them to be a feature of our moral judgments which he defines as the process whereby
we form judgements about moral significance, which moral principles apply to the
situation, and applying them. 20 It seems, even given his silence on the issue, that Blum
takes moral perception and moral judgment to be distinct processes within our broader
cognitive capacity to form judgments, as I use the term. This is important to note because
I will return to Blum’s form of MPJ in a later section, after discussing judgments and
perceptions in more detail.
For now, building on Blum’s distinctions between what I have labeled acquisition
and recognition, we can describe an agent’s moral perceptions as the result of a two-step
process. 21 First, the moral agent encounters a situation facilitating the acquisition of
perceptual content. Second, said situation, rendered by the acquired content, is then
recognized as possessing properties with moral significance or, alternatively, moral
properties. This acquisition-recognition framework allows us to carefully approach
theories of moral perception by directing us to a fundamental question: what is the
relationship between acquisition and recognition during occasions of moral perception?
Can recognition happen during acquisition, and thereby give us literal perceptions of moral
properties, or is recognition always about and separate from acquired contents of
experience, and thereby a kind of judgment? Stated otherwise, are moral properties
admissible contents of our perceptual experience?

Blum 1994, p. 42 & 51
Could there be a third step? Recognition occurs as a judgment or an influence on acquired content. It is a matter of the relationship
between two steps and, because of this, the inclusion of a third synthesis step seems unnecessary.
20
21
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1.3 Theories of Moral Perception: Judgmentalism and Experientialism
With the right questions on the table, we can use the acquisition-recognition
framework to define two kinds of positions on moral perception, one which turns on
whether moral properties are judged or whether they can be literally perceived during moral
perceptions. First, Judgementalist views (Moral Perceptual Judgementalism) hold that
an experience’s moral features are recognized after the acquisition step by means of a
judgment formation about a situation’s acquired non-moral perceptual contents. Under
judgmentalism, moral perceptions are judgments based on perceptual content. 22 Put
formally,
Moral Perceptual Judgementalism (MPJ): 23 S has a moral perception of situation α
when
MPJ-I: S acquires non-moral perceptual content as of α during their encounter with
situation α;
MPJ-II: S possesses background beliefs (moral or non-moral) or affective
dispositions relevant to situation α; and
MPJ-III: S utilizes a judgement formation mechanism (i.e., inference, intuition, a
non-inferential cognitive association, a heuristic, or an affective
disposition) to judge α using the contents of II thereby allowing S to
recognize α as possessing moral properties by means of judgements about
acquired perceptual content.
The distinguishing feature of a judgementalist view of moral perception is it holding that
moral properties are recognized by means of a judgement formation mechanism.
Alternatively, Experiential Views (Moral Perceptual Experientialism) hold that
an experience’s moral features are recognized during the acquisition step (i.e., that moral
properties, and thereby a situation’s moral significance, are admissible contents of
experience). Under experiential views, moral perceptions are perceptual inasmuch as the

22
We could call moral perceptions, under this view, moral perceptual beliefs (i.e. formed moral beliefs about perceptual contents) to
better parallel the relationship between perceptions and perceptual beliefs.
23
Among judgementalist, I include Blum (1991 & 1994), Little (1995 & 1997), Goldie (2007), Willett (1995 & 2014), Audi (2018 &
2013), and Fricker (2007). These views will maintain a commitment to I and II, but will differ in regards to the details of III.
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subject literally perceives a situation’s moral features because the observer has an
experience of moral perceptual content. 24 Put formally,
Moral Perceptual Experientialism (MPE): S has a moral perception of situation α
when
MPE-I: S acquires non-moral perceptual content as of α during their encounter
with situation α;
MPE-II: S possesses background beliefs (moral or non-moral) or affective
dispositions relevant to situation α; and
MPE-III: The contents of II add to or alter the contents of I to include moral
perceptual content by means of a perception influencing mechanism
(i.e., cognitive penetration, imagination, or consciousness) thereby
allowing S to recognize α as possessing moral properties. 25
It is worth noting that there is an implausible alternative to this view which posits
that moral properties are discerned by S during the acquisition step without the influence
of MPE-II. Put formally, such a view would look something like the following:
Implausible Moral Perceptual Experientialism (I-MPE): S has a moral perception of
situation α when
I-MPE-I: S acquires non-moral perceptual content as of α during their encounter
with situation α; and
I-MPE-II: S acquires moral perceptual content by means of a moral perceptual
sense allowing S to recognize α as possessing moral properties during a
perceptual experience of α.
What makes this latter view implausible is its implication that we possess a moral
perceptual sense that functions in the same way as our sense of touch, sight, smell, hearing,
taste, proprioception, or balance. 26 What I-MPE-II suggests is that a moral perceptual sense
facilitates our perceptions of good, evil, dignity, cruelty, and so on in the same way that
other senses create perceptual states which allow for perceptions of spatial properties,
color, shape, motion and illumination. This seems ill-conceived.

Among experientialists, I include Jennifer Church (2013) and Sarah McGrath (2018).
Cowan (2015) points to cognitive penetration as a promising topic for pursing this kind of view. Church (2013) utilizes a Kantian
sense of imagination to motivate such a view. Mills (2007) seems to suggest that consciousness plays the perception influencing role
in this process.
26
McGrath (2004) and Faraci (2014) make this observation as well.
24
25
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To clarify, this idea should not be confused with positions held by moral
intuitionist, moral sentimentalists, or neighboring camps in moral epistemology or
psychology. These kinds of views often hold that our moral intuitions (non-inferential and
immediate cognitive apprehensions)

27

or sentiments (emotional or affective

apprehensions) 28 serve as vehicles for discerning the moral features of an occurrent
experience. These processes are an act of judgment in the broadest sense of the term.
Provisionally put, judgements are distinct from perceptions in that occasions of the latter
articulate the contents of our occurrent experience whereas the former, at least during moral
perceptions, are grounded on the contents of our occurrent experience.
To motivate this distinction, the reader is asked to consider Figure 1.1 which
depicts the Muller-Lyer lines (below). 29 One’s perception of the lines suggests that they

Figure 1.1 Muller-Lyer Lines
are of different length, the top line being longer. In contrast, one can come to make the
judgement that the lines are of the same length after learning how this illusion is the result
of conflicting depth cues which cause a kind of misfire in our perceptual system. The image
appears to us, we have a perception of it, and we can make judgments about that perception.
In this case, it is easy to distinguish between our judgements about the lines and our
perceptions of them because our judgment (i.e., that they are the same length) has no

Stratton-lake (2014) “Intuitionism in Ethics”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Kauppinen (2014) “Moral Sentimentalism”. SEP
29
This can be read as a parody of O’Brien’s illustration of the distinction between beliefs and perceptual beliefs. O’Brien (IEP article)
27
28
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influence on our perceptual field (i.e., that they appear to us as different lengths). 30 The
judgment and the perception are distinct from one another. 31
We can draw at least two ideas from this example. First, perceptions allow us to
acquire contents of experience by utilizing our perceptual systems to apprehend a
perceptual field. We look at the lines, acquire perceptual contents, and have an experience
of them. In contrast, judgments, among other things, are used during occurrent experiences
to draw cognitive associations between the contents of experience (e.g., contents of the
perceptual field) and other propositional content by means of quick or slow cognitive
processes. These processes include, among other things, intuition, inference, noninferential rule-like mental associations, heuristics, or affective associations. In the MullerLyer case, our perceptual systems render, for us, a perceptual field with contents (e.g., we
acquire perceptual contents). It is only after learning about the nature of these lines that
we can judge that our perceptions are an illusion and recognize the erroneousness of our
perception.
Similarly, during occasions of moral perception, judgments are non-perceptual
mental states which utilize slow or fast cognitive systems to manifest moral impressions
and beliefs about occurrent experience whereas perceptions are mental states which define
the contents of our perceptual field. 32 This observation, alone, is not an observation about

Given the implication of this paper’s on broadly construed evaluative perception, we might say that this judgment does have an
impact on our perception of the lines. Perhaps we have the perception of something unnatural or not veridical.
31
The distinction between moral perception and moral judgment or general judgments is not as clear, but that is one of the motivations
for this paper. Church (2010) describes the difference between mediated states of mind and unmediated states of mind suggesting that
the latter are clearly perceptual because they are experientially immediate to the observer and provides a kind of justificatory
immediacy in that “perceptual knowledge is immediate knowledge in the sense that it does not depend on any other knowledge for its
justification.” (Church (2010), p. 640)
32
Church (2010 & 2013) seems to draw out this distinction by describing the experientially immediate nature of perception as the kind
of thing that happens when one sees a chair or table (its in our face) and (epistemically) justificatory immediate as a source of belief
about the contents of the world (knowing that there is a chair there requires nothing more than the sight of it). Immediate, in these
contexts, seems to point to the idea that there is no other mental state needed to have a perception and take its content as indicative of
30
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the judgment-perception question, nor does it necessarily preclude the possibility that nonperceptual mental states influence or alter one’s perceptual states, as supporters of
cognitive penetration hold. Instead, as it is used here, this distinction between perception
and judgement merely motivates the idea that perceptions ground judgments about
occurrent experience, or perceptual beliefs, not the other way around. As a result of this
observation, views such as ethical intuitionism or sentimentalism amount to versions of
judgmentalism. Such views utilize a judgment formation mechanism, like intuitions and
sentiments, to motivate our apprehension of moral properties within our occurrent
experience via perceptual belief but are silent on the issue of whether these judgments
about perceptual experience alter or add to our perceptual contents.
Given I-MPE’s and MPE’s perception influencing claim, even if we briefly allow
that moral properties are admissible contents of our experience, it would be dubious to
think that such content could be acquired in an unmediated way (e.g., without aid of our
beliefs, affects, or associations) which leads to some influence of non-perceptual states on
our perceptual field. To motivate this idea in a nonmoral case, consider a shoelace. There
is, at the end of your shoelace, a hard-plastic tip used to thread the lace through a sneaker.
It is easy to have a perception of this thing comprised of whatever color-contents or shapecontents we acquire when we look upon the shoelace tip. We cannot, however, rightly
assume that we, as observers, have a literal perceptual experience of this shoelace tip as
what it is named, an aglet, until we learn about the concept “aglet”. This follows because,
otherwise, we would be expected to have a kind of perceptual-revelation experience giving

the content of the world. If there was, then such things would need to be mediated by other states. She is, however, unclear on these
matters in many places.
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us knowledge of what an aglet is and, arguably, this kind of thing does not happen. If a
literal perception of kind property “aglet” is possible, it cannot occur without the aid of our
background epistemic resources to serve as mediator. That is, F cannot perceive the
shoelace tip as an aglet without background beliefs about the concept of an aglet. 33
In the case of moral perception, if moral properties become part of our perceptual
experiences then our background beliefs or affective states will need to inform some kind
of perception influencing mechanism as suggested by MPE (or, if they are not part of
perceptual experience, a judgment influencing mechanism as suggested by MPJ). Faraci
(2015) refers to this idea as Mediation: If perceptions of X, a moral property, are grounded
(i.e., “perceptions of X track an experience as of Y even in the absence of Y”) in experiences
as of Y, then “perceptions of X produce knowledge only if they are mediated by background
knowledge of relations between X and Y.” 34 He continues,
“Mediation is highly intuitive: Suppose A’s perception of X is grounded in an experience
as of Y. But suppose A also has no reason to think there’s any relation between X and Y.
In that case, there seems to be no way A’s experience as of Y could produce knowledge [or
an experience] about X.” 35
To further motivate mediation, the reader is asked to consider Figure-1.2 (below). Imagine
that A attends a pool party to meet a new group of people. Neither person in Figure-1.2 is

Figure 1.2 Pushed in the Pool
33
It might be suggested that sensory properties are also kind properties. That literally seeing a stop sign as an octagon, such that the
octagon property is taken to be a part of ones occurrent experience, is no different than one’s sensory experience of a shape extended
in space with eight sides. Siegel (2011) draws out this distinction as a difference between content and rich content, where the former is
more sensory basic and the latter is more conceptually informed. I make the same distinction here by starting from a conceptual
perspective which follows her assumption that sensory contents are distinct from conceptual contents. In this way, seeing the stop sign
as an extended shape in space is distinct from seeing it as an octagon, at least in the phenomenological sense.
34
Faraci (2015) p. 2063
35
Faraci (2015) p. 2063
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known to A and, thereby, A has no background knowledge about them or the context that
prompted one person to push another into the pool. Assuming A has no background beliefs
or affects pertaining to people being pushed into pools, the contents of A’s perception
(perhaps even our own occurrent perception of the photo during our first read of this paper)
would be generally mundane (i.e., without morally significant content).
Now, suppose that A comes to learn that the man in the photo cannot swim, that the
pusher knows this, and, also, that they possess the belief or affective disposition to hold
that putting people in life threatening situations is morally wrong, perhaps because it does
someone a harm or violates their human dignity. Assuming MPE or I-MPE is correct, A’s
perception (and perhaps our own perception) of the situation would now be altered to
include moral contents. This background content is required to perceive this situation as
possessing an immoral quality. I-MPE is implausible because it takes moral perceptions to
be unmediated when cases like these reveal to us that any literal moral perception, just as
in the case of forming moral judgments, must be mediated by our background mental
contents or structures (i.e., beliefs, affective dispositions, non-inferential cognitive
associations, and so on) if moral contents are to become contents of perceptual experience
in the first place. 36 We are hard pressed to think that people have unmediated moral
perceptual-revelations during morally pertinent situations like those depicted in Figure1.2. Even if moral knowledge of particular situations could be a form of perceptual
knowledge, we would still need background moral knowledge about the contents of

36
Issues of high-level and low-level contents of experience are seemingly relevant to this discussion. Rather than invest my time here
trying to settle a debate about what counts as a high-level or low-level property (something I would not be able to settle here), I have
minimally drawn a boundary line between sensory-content and conceptual-content knowing that sensory-content is arguably low-level
content and conceptual-content is arguably high-level. That said, all that I am defending here is that conceptual-content, in virtue of its
conceptual grounding, could not become part of perceptual experience, if it can at all, without some kind of mediation by our
background beliefs and affects. I have taken no firm stand on what counts as high- or low-level contents. Siegel (2011) make a similar
move when distinguishing K-properties from low-level properties.

24

morality (i.e., cognitive or affective associations pertaining to moral principles, laws, or
virtues) with which to discern the moral features of the particular event in reference to an
abstract moral conception of the good. 37
That said, the distinction between MPJ and MPE turns on whether moral properties
are admissible contents of our experience. Adopting MPJ means that one commits to some
variation on the claim that the phenomenological character of such content is reducible to
a kind of judgment, as defined earlier. That is, MPJ is reductivist about our
phenomenological responses during morally pertinent experiences. 38 Väyrynen (2018), for
example, takes the phenomenal character of our moral perceptions as indicative of “an
implicit habituated transition in thought from a perceptual input to a moral representation,
owning to the way that the relevant emotional and affective dispositions have been shaped
by some relevant background moral beliefs which connect non-moral inputs with moral
classifications.” 39 In contrast, adopting MPE means that one holds that the
phenomenological character of our experiences are distinctly perceptual and, thereby, not
fully reducible to some form of judgment. As a result, an answer to the judgmentperception question (i.e., “Are moral perceptions a kind of judgment or are they literal
perceptions of a situation’s moral features?) depends on how the phenomenological
character of moral perception should be understood.

37
This is Faraci’s (2015) insightful claim about the limitation of moral perception as a source of moral knowledge. If moral
knowledge is in any way a form of perceptual knowledge it must be about moral particulars and not universals otherwise we would be
forced to admit that we have perceptual encounters of universal moral principles. As I see it, this is antithetical to the nature of what it
means to have moral perceptions of particulars. Blum’s (1994) Moral Perception and Particularity is a testament to this idea.
38
In general, judgementalism is, by default, a reductivist position in virtue of the idea that it takes our judgments to be the source of
our moral perceptions rather than entertain the possibility of literal moral perception. Faraci (2015)’s position is a little more
complicated in that while he allows for the idea that literal moral perception are viable, there is no such thing as a purely perceptual
moral epistemology in as much as moral bridge laws (i.e., moral principles that link non-moral and moral contents). For Faraci, we
have literal perceptions of moral particulars but not of moral universals. As a result, he is a judgmentalist about moral principles but an
experientialist about moral properties.
39
Väyrynen (2018) p. 123
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1.4 The Phenomenology of Moral Perception
As Siegel (2011) describes it, phenomenal contrast methodology is “a way to test
hypotheses about the contents of visual experience. Its main strategy is to find something
that the target hypothesis purports to explain, and then see whether it provides the best
explanation of that phenomenon.” 40 Schematized, the method functions by placing person
S into the position of observing some situation α and assuming that S is in epistemic state
Ψ, one which lacks background beliefs or affective dispositions usually pertinent to α. Ψ is
then altered to include beliefs or affective dispositions, usually those pertinent to α, causing
S to enter epistemic state Δ. Person S is then placed back into situation α and the
phenomenal character of S’s experience under Ψ (E-1) is compared to S’s experience under
Δ (E-2). The differences between E-1 and E-2 are classified using a target hypothesis (HT)
and this explanation is compared to alternative explanation (HA) to determine the best
possible explanation for those differences is. 41 This section employ’s this strategy in order
to address the judgment-perception question about moral perception.
The target hypothesis (HT) to be tested in the case of MPE is that moral properties
are represented by the contents of experience. Put otherwise, MPE qua HT holds that moral
properties are recognized when we acquire perceptual contents during occurrent
experience. With this in mind, the reader is asked to consider the following case while
looking at Figure 1.3.

Siegel (2011) p. 87-88
This formalization of the phenomenal contrast method is based on Siegel’s (2011) defense of the Rich Content View wherein she
uses the phenomenal contrast method to investigate our viewing of pine trees, the contrasting experience therein being what it is like
to view a grove of trees before knowing what a pine tree is and, again, after learning about pine trees. See Siegel (2011) p. 100-101.
40
41
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V-J Day Photo Case: Consider Figure 1.3. S knows nothing about this photo except that
it depicts a scene in Times Square during V-J Day, celebrating the end of WWII. In the
absence of background information about the photo, Figure 1.3 seems morally innocuous
to S (E-1). Later, after interviewing the man (George Mendonsa), S learns that he did not
know the woman (Greta Zimmer Friedman). George tells S that “If that girl did not have a
nurse's uniform on, I honestly believe that I never would have grabbed her. … [in the war]
we were transferring the wounded onto the hospital ship, and I was watching how the
nurses were taking care of the wounded … it was [her] uniform that did it.” 42 Greta goes
on to tell you, “Well, it wasn't -- it wasn't my choice to be kissed. The guy just came over
and kissed [and] grabbed.” 43 With this, S knows that this is a photo of unwanted kissing,
and, assuming that S possesses background beliefs that sexual assault is wrong and that
unwanted kissing is sexual assault, Figure 1.3 now appears to S as representing
something immoral (E-2).

Figure 1.3 Alfred Eisenstaedt's "V-J Day in Times Square"
In this case, situation α amounts to observing George kiss Greta. When S is in state Ψ,
possessing an absence of information about α, the phenomenal character of their experience
of the photo (E-1) is classified as what it is like to observe something morally innocuous.
In contrast, when S is in state Δ, possessing information about α which includes the
unwanted and forceful nature of the kiss and that such things are immoral, the phenomenal
character of their experience of the photo (E-2) is classified as what it is like to observe
something wrong. HT, which amounts to the MPE position, takes the difference between
the phenomenal character of E-1 and E-2 to be driven by a difference in perceptual content
between E-1 and E-2. Specifically, that Δ modifies S’s perceptual experience to include
“wrong” as perceptual content in E-2 when it was not present in E-1.
It is worth making a clarificatory point about this case before weighing HT against
its alternative. S’s transition from state Ψ to Δ occurs when they learn about the context of
42
43

Interview, veterans history project, https://memory.loc.gov/diglib/vhp-stories/loc.natlib.afc2001001.42868/transcript?ID=sr0001
Interview, veterans history project http://memory.loc.gov/diglib/vhp/story/loc.natlib.afc2001001.42863/transcript?ID=sr0001
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the photo (i.e., from interviews with George and Greta). It is assumed that both Ψ and Δ
include morally relevant content such as “sexual assault is wrong” and “unwanted kissing
is sexual assault”. Ψ is, therefore, similar to Δ in that S possesses the same content about
the immorality of sexual assault and can identify unwanted kissing as sexual assault in both
states. However, there are many ways we could describe the content of S’s epistemic state
which could alter S’s take on the photo in the way described. For brevities sake, I will limit
my discussion about such content to the following five items.
(a): a particular belief that image-II represents an occasion of sexual assault.
(p): a concluding belief or affective intuition which holds that this photo
represents something wrong.
(u): a context belief that Greta did not choose to be kissed and, thereby, it was
unwanted. 44 (k): a practical belief that unwanted kissing is an occasion of sexual
assault.
(w): a moral belief or affective disposition which holds that sexual assault is
wrong.
As presented, the V-J Day Photo Case assumes that states Ψ and Δ possess content (k) and
(w). After learning about the context of the case, S exits Ψ and enters state Δ because they
have acquired (u). With (u), and assuming that S is rational, it is expected that S will come
to understand (a) because (k) and (u) entail (a). From this, S should arrive at (p) because
(a) and (w) entail (p). As a result, state Ψ contains merely (k) and (w) whereas it is assumed
in this example that state Δ contains (a), (u), (k), (w), and (p). This difference between Ψ
and Δ is, seemingly, what motivates the differences between S’s experiences during E-1
and E-2.

44
One might suggest that other items should be included in this list. The description of the case as one where George grabbed Greta,
that he did not know her, and that he forced himself upon her are just some examples. However, while there may be litigious reasons
for including such a content in a court room, I have taken Greta’s claim that she did not choose to be embraced, and, thereby, that the
kiss was unwanted to be sufficient reason to draw out the conclusion that this was a case of sexual assault. The other content either
collaborate her story or makes the event just that much more shocking.
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Additionally, we should not expect a change in the phenomenological character of
S’s experience without (k), (w), and (u) in Δ. Without them, there would, it seems, not be
enough content in S’s background beliefs and affects to mediate the appreciation of any
moral features during S’s experience of the photo in situation α. This should not trouble us,
however, because what this observation reveals is an alternative scenario we could consider
when exploring the phenomenology of moral perception via contrast cases. If the former
case occurs because of a change in one’s relevant non-moral knowledge, the following
contrast occurs due to a change in one’s moral knowledge. Consider the following
alternative case.
Alternative V-J Day Photo Case: Consider image-II, again. S is an expert about this
photo. They know everything one could know about its contents, the context, and its iconic
place in history. However, S does not believe or is not affectively disposed to hold (k) or
(w) or denies that Greta did not want to be kissed (i.e., S does not believe (u)). In the
absence of background information (k), (w), or (u), Figure 1.3 seems morally innocuous
to S (AltE-1). Then, over many years, S undergoes a radical transformation in their moral
outlook and in their understanding about sexual assault. S, now, believes or affectively
holds (k), (w), and (u). With this, figure 1.3 now appears to S as representing something
immoral (AltE-2).
In the V-J Day Photo Case, S can be said to have an epistemically deficient set of
beliefs or affective attitudes about the photo given that they, in state Ψ, lack (a), (u), and
(p). In contrast, the Alternative V-J Day Photo Case seems motivated by a morally
deficient set of beliefs or attitudes from which to understand the salient moral features of
the situation. Yet, the phenomenal difference in either contrast case would be classified in
the same way by MPE’s articulation of HT: Holding (p), the concluding belief or affective
disposition which takes the photo to represent something ‘wrong’, motivates a change in
the phenomenal character of one’s experience of the photo itself. MPE takes this change
to occur because E-2 possesses different perceptual content than E-1. That is, (p) alters,
through some perception influencing mechanism, experience’s perceptual content to
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include ‘wrongness’, or something close to it, as a feature of the perceptual experience, just
like ‘table’ or ‘chair’. Under this view, S’s insensitivity to the moral features of the photo
is a moral perceptual miss fueled by S’s lack of non-moral knowledge in the V-J Day
Photo Case and by a lack of moral background knowledge in the Alternative V-J Day Photo
Case.
1.5 Unpacking a MPE’s Account of the V-J Day Photo Case
HT accounts for the phenomenological difference between E-1 and E-2, and also
AltE-1 and AltE-2, by claiming that there is moral perceptual content in the second
experience that was not present in the first. The idea here is that a difference in content is
what prompts a difference in the phenomenological character of these experiences. That is,
during E2, in contrast to E1, perceptual contents represent the photo’s moral features (i.e.,
its wrongness, cruelty, or harm) as literal contents of the experience. To reiterate, MPE’s
commitment to HT means that the view takes the recognition of the photos moral features
to have occurred during the acquisition of the experiential contents of the photo. To
illustrate, this is how Church (2013) approaches MPE.
Church holds that one gains perceptual knowledge of a situation’s morally
significant properties in the same way that one does of everyday objects. 45 She writes,
“moral perception is immediate in the same way that our perception of tables and chairs is
immediate because its justification is built into its phenomenology.” 46 A perception, in
Church’s language, occurs whenever one undergoes an experience which is both

I take this last point to be what Church (2013) means by seeing something as objective in the Kantian sense. That is, that the chair is
seen as objective is to give it the sense that the chair is an object and independent of my beliefs of it. See Church (2013) The
Possibilities of perception and Church (2010) “Seeing Reasons” for examples of this kind of reasoning.
46
Church (2013) p. 191. Emphasis added.
45
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transparent to the subject and self-justificatory about its content because she takes a
perception to occur whenever one has an experience of objectivity. 47 She explains,
“An experience is a perceptual experience precisely when the independent reality of its
object is evident from within that experience; perceptional experience is self-justifying
because it includes experience of its own objectivity. This is also (at least part of) what it
means for perception to be “transparent”: it presents its objects in such a way that one is
unaware of any distinction between how an object appears and how it is in fact.” 48
As described, “an experience of objectivity” is the central identifier for distinguishing
between perceptions and other mental states, such as judgments. 49 In the case of the MullerLyer lines, what is both transparent and self-justificatory for the onlooker is that the lines
appear to us as being of different length. We gain the perceptual belief that “these lines are
of different length”, belief l, by sole means of the experience itself. That is, our experience
of the lines is transparent to us because we are experientially unaware of any difference
between how the lines appear to us from how they are, even though we need only use a
ruler to learn that the lines are of different length. Moreover, belief l is self-justified by the
experience, albeit erroneously in this case, because our occurrent experience of the lines
supports our belief in l. 50 In an abbreviated sense, Church claims that to have a perception
is to have an experience which (1) gives us the sense that we encounter objects with
properties independent of us and (2) serves as its own justification for a belief that what is
experienced is actually the case. 51

Church (2010) p. 645
Church (2010) p. 644
49
Church (2010) p.645
50
“Justification” as an epistemic term is used, by Church, to reference that something supports a belief, not that it necessarily supports
a true belief. The classic illustration of this use of the term “justify” can be found in Gettier cases. I can have a justified belief that it is
noon by looking at a clock which, unbeknownst to me, is broken because I am a competent clock user. That belief is true when it
happens to be noon and false when it is not, but my justification is drawn from my experience of the clock. One reason Gettier-cases
are so provocative is because, among other things, they illustrate the complex nature of justification.
51
It is worth noting that Church also argues for an accuracy condition in order to distinguish perceptions from things like blind
convictions (Church, 2013, Ch. 1 & 2). While this is an important component to her views within The Possibilities of Perception, I
have forgone exploring this aspect of her project as I have abandoned the use of perception as a success term. This does not, however,
hinder our discussion about her version of MPE beyond the need to incorporate an evaluative component to my schematization of her
view in a future project. I do not do that here because, again, it would not only require us to investigate veridicality conditions but also
defend some moral theory with which to judge the veridicality of one’s experience. While important to the future of this project, these
47
48
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On the matter of how we come to have perceptions, she goes on to state that the
imagination plays an essential part of how we come to have experiences that are both
transparent and self-justificatory. She writes, “… we actively imagine alternative
perspectives whenever we experience something as an objective state of affairs” and,
thereby, experience something as knowable in a plurality of ways by virtue of our occurrent
perceptional experience and our imagined experience of its alternatives. 52 It “is our ability
to use our imaginations to synthesize a multiplicity of different perspectives and
possibilities (past and future, actual and merely possible) that enables us to perceive an
object or a sequence of events as objectively valid.” 53
Technical terminology aside, the imagination, she seems to claim, utilizes our
background understanding regarding how the world operates (i.e., our beliefs about space,
perspective, causations, and so on) and, in the case of moral perception, our understanding
of the contents of morality to produce background mental states which articulate a plurality
of alternatives to how things appear to us in an occurrent experience. Using trees as an
example, she writes,
“we perceive an object such as a tree insofar as we simultaneously imagine how it would
appear from other points of view. For it is the imagined convergence of different
perspectives around a single state of affairs that gives us the experience of its spatiality and
its objectivity... When it comes to perceiving someone as an agent—as the locus of multiply
intertwined mental states, I want to make a similar suggestion: to perceive that someone is
a person we must imagine that person in a variety of situations—some of which are actual
and many of which are merely possible, and we must discover what is invariant across
those imagined actions.” 54
On moral matters, she continues,

things, again, are beyond the scope of this paper which is simply to defend the view that moral properties can be contents of our
experience.
52
Church (2010), p. 649
53
Church (2013) p. 222
54
Church (2013) p. 199-200
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“... [imagining] is also guided by [an agent’s] implicit knowledge of what should happen....
It is not enough to direct one’s imagining with a loving attitude or a desire to do right by
others plus a good understanding of causal laws; one must also know a good deal about
what doing right by others involves, and that is where moral laws enter… in the case of
moral perception the relevant laws must include moral laws…” 55
The takeaway here is that perception is a two-part process in Church’s view. First,
one’s imaginative faculties recognize a situation’s various possibilities (both moral and
non-moral) given acquired perceptual contents. Then, one’s imagination synthesizes
recognized content with acquired perceptual content into an experience for the subject
that is both transparent and self-justificatory, a perceptual experience. Church’s (2013)
view, put formally, looks something like the following.
Church’s MPE (C-MPE): S has a moral perception of situation α when they
C-MPE-I: acquire non-moral perceptual content as of α in occurrent experience;
C-MPE-II: possess background beliefs regarding moral and non-moral issues
including the moral law and worldly operations (i.e., space, gravity, and so
on) that are relevant to α;
C-MPE-III:
imagine a multiplicity of possibilities regarding I according to the
contents of II; and
C-MPE-IV:
use the imagination to synthesize the contents of I and III into a
perceived state of affairs which includes moral and non-moral content. This
synthesis is Church’s perception influencing mechanism and is itself
facilitated by the imagination.
This view would account for the differences mentioned in the V-J Photo Cases by pointing
to how the imaginative workings of S differ when in epistemic state Ψ verses Δ. That is, S
cannot imagine a situation’s moral features because one doesn’t have enough information,
in C-MPE-II, to access them. In the alternative V-J Day Photo case, an imaginative failure
occurs because S lacks the moral knowledge to imagine relevant possibilities and, thus, the
imaginative synthesis during C-MPE-IV leaves the moral features of the situation
unrealized in S’s perceptual experience. As a result, the perceptual contents of E-1 differ

55

Church (2013) p. 218-219

33

from those in E-2 thereby resulting in a difference between each experience’s
phenomenological character.
1.6 MPJ’s Alternative Account of the V-J Day Photo Case
MPJ purports that an alternative hypothesis (HA) is preferable to MPE’s HT. HA
holds that the phenomenal character of moral perceptions attach to judgments, cognitively
or affectively articulated, rather than to the presence of perceptual contents. The difference
in phenomenological character between E-1 and E-2 (or AltE-1 and AltE-2) under HA is
accounted for as a difference in the sense one has when one figures things out. ‘Figures
things out’, in this context, means to acquire a belief by means of a judgment formation
mechanism. Common candidates for this mechanism include cognitive associations (i.e.,
inference, heuristics 56, intuitions 57, or a rule-like association between what is perceived
and a moral property 58) or invoked affective states (i.e., virtuous affects including
emotions 59, the what it is like to experience virtue’s phenomenal character 60, or an
attunement to a situation’s affect-cloud 61). Some views take both cognitive associations
and invoked affective states to be at play during moral perceptions. Other versions of MPJ
focus on one candidate over the other. Given this, three categories of MPJ are worth
mentioning. Put formally,

See Fricker (2007)
See Audi (2018 & 2013)
See Väyrynen (2018)
59
See Little (1995 & 1997)
60
See Goldie (2007)
61
See Willett (1995 & 2014)
56
57
58
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Broad Moral Perceptual Judgmentalism (BMPJ): S has a moral perception of situation
α when
BMPJ-I S acquires non-moral perceptual content as of α during their encounter with
situation α;
BMPJ-II S possesses background beliefs (moral or non-moral) or affective
dispositions relevant to situation α; and
BMPJ-III S utilizes cognitive associations and invoked affective states as
judgement formation mechanisms to judge α using the contents of II
thereby allowing S to recognize α as possessing moral properties by means
of judgements about acquired perceptual content.
Cognitive Moral Perceptual Judgmentalism (CMPJ): S has a moral perception of
situation α when
CMPJ-I S acquires non-moral perceptual content as of α during their encounter with
situation α;
CMPJ-II S possesses background beliefs (moral or non-moral) relevant to situation α;
and
CMPJ-III S utilizes cognitive associations as the judgement formation mechanism
with which to judge α using the contents of II thereby allowing S to
recognize α as possessing moral properties by means of judgements about
acquired perceptual content.
Affective Moral Perceptual Judgmentalism (AMPJ): S has a moral perception of
situation α when
AMPJ-I S acquires non-moral perceptual content as of α during their encounter with
situation α;
AMPJ-II S possesses affective dispositions relevant to situation α; and
AMPJ-III S utilizes invoked affective states as the judgement formation
mechanism with which to judge α using the contents of II thereby allowing
S to recognize α as possessing moral properties by means of judgements
about acquired perceptual content.
BMPJ is a revised version of our earlier definition of MPJ. BMPJ includes cognitive
associations and invoked affective states as specified categories of how one forms
judgments about the moral significance of perceived content. In the moral perceptual
literature, versions of CMPJ and AMPJ emphasize one of these categories, cognitive
associations and affective states respectively, in their view, usually by being silent about
the role of the other. To illustrate how each of these views might account for the
phenomenological difference in cases like the V-J Day Photo Case under HA, this section
lays out some prominent examples of each version of MPJ in preparation to assess which
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hypothesis we should endorse, MPE’s HT or MPJ’s HA, in the next section.
In Blum’s (1994) brand of BMPJ, a “failure to be in touch with part of the moral
reality which confronts” the subject is indicative of their inability to automatically be aware
of the occurrent situation’s moral features. Blum’s view marks the difference between E1 and E-2 as a difference in one’s individuation of the moral features during each of these
experiences. These individuations change from E-1 and E-2 because S transitions from
epistemic state Ψ to Δ by learning new things.
As discussed during the development of an acquisition-recognition framework, it
should be noted that Blum does state that “moral perception cannot be identified with moral
judgment.” 62 He goes on to say that in “a given situation moral perception comes on the
scene prior to moral judgment; moral perception can lead to moral action outside the
operation of [moral] judgment entirely; and, more generally, perception involves moral
capacities not encompassed by moral judgment.” 63 That is, moral judgment, for Blum,
amounts to a moral deliberation about the significance of a situation’s features and, in later
stages of his schema, is used to determine the morally demanded course of action. In
contrast, moral perception individuates moral features within an occurrent situation prior
to the operation of deliberative moral judgment. 64 While he is silent on the judgmentperception question at most times, Blum seems to categorize one’s moral judgment about
the ethical significance of a situation’s features as distinct from our discernments about the
presence of such features, in a descriptive sense, in the first place. Both capacities, he
argues, are important aspects of our moral lives.

Blum (1991) p. 702
Blum (1991) p. 702
64
Blum (1991) p. 711
62
63
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There is, given this, reason to doubt that Blum is rightly classified as supporting
BMPJ. To address this concern, I would like to suggest that Blum’s project is less interested
in determining whether moral perception is literally perceptual or a form of judgement than
in recognizing “the range of distinct moral operations and capacities involved” during
occurrent moral experiences because he claims to not rest much on his use of ‘judgement’
and ‘perception’. 65 As a result, Blum’s work falls into to the literal-metaphorical
ambiguity discussed earlier because it avoids the judgment-perception question from the
start. This does not mean, however, that we cannot explore the commitments he has made
and glean which option, BMPJ or MPE, best describes his view. Moreover, given Blum’s
influential place in the history of moral perceptual theory it is important to take up this
task.
That said, Blum’s work on moral perception expands our understanding of a
subject’s moral epistemic operations regardless of their perceptual or judgmental nature. It
challenges a historical tradition of principle-based moral theories which, he claims, have
overlooked two important features of moral judgment, “(1) knowing how to apply rules or
principles and (2) recognizing given features of a situation as a morally significant one”. 66
Additionally, he argues that there is another overlooked capacity that must be considered
if we are to make sense of moral agency. Stated plainly, Blum argues that (3) we must be
able to individuate a situation’s moral features prior to our ability to exercise (1) and (2),
that is prior to our ability to render them as morally significant. It is this capacity to
individuate a situation’s moral features that he calls moral perception. Given this, one
charitable interpretation of Blum’s work holds that it expands our conception of morally
65
66

Blum 1991, p. 711 - “Either term can be used to refer to some of the operations I have included within the other.”
Blum (1991) p. 712
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relevant judgment to include (1), (2), and (3) rather than taking a stand that (3) is a kind of
perceptual capacity.
I adopt this interpretation because Blum likens moral perceptual operations to
psychological capacities rather than perceptual processes. 67 Where moral judgements are
acts of inference for Blum, 68 ‘judgment’, generally speaking, is a broader category which
accounts for belief states which follow from our inferential and non-inferential
discernments. 69 Moreover, non-inferential, and immediate, discernments can be facilitated
by cognitive associations or affective dispositions. 70 Blum’s restriction of the conversation
to a distinction between moral judgments, defined in technical terms, and moral
perceptions, ambiguously defined, precludes him from seeing that moral perception, as a
kind of non-inferential and immediate discernment, is seemingly a sibling of moral
judgment in his view.
He writes, “... I am including within “perception” anything contributing to or
encompassed within the agent’s take on the situation - his salience-perception - prior to his
deliberating about what to do.” 71 Stated otherwise, Blum holds that an agent will be more
or less sensitive to an occurrent experience’s features in proportion with their ability to
derive non-inferential judgments from an experience’s perceptual contents because
salience-perceptions, so described, take something perceived and categorize (i.e., judge it)

Blum (1991) p. 720
Blum (1991), p. 707. Emphasis added. Referencing a racially charged situation: “Tim has to construe the situation in a certain way
in order to see it as “the cab driver passing up the woman and her child.” And her has to infer the racist motive.”
69
Put succinctly, non-inferential discernments result from a heuristic or automatic rule-like relation which associates x with y, thereby
the agent makes judgement y whenever confronted with content x. Inferential deliberations, in contrast, carry more cognitive weight
on the part of the rational faculties of the subject. Inferential deliberations can be quick, but the distinguishing feature between
inferential and non-inferential judgments is that the former has a syllogistic structure whereas the latter amount to immediately
adopting a belief because of some form of non-rational association.
70
It is worth noting briefly that this approach to affects takes them to be forms of judgment rather than perceptions, which has been
argued for by some. Given that affects respond to what is represented in perceptual experience, there is reason to believe that affects,
like emotions, are not a perceptual capacity.
71
Blum (1991) p. 707
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as morally relevant. Under this interpretation, Blum’s view seems to hold that acquisition
collects perceptual content and recognition of the salient content occurs by means of a
judgment formation mechanism wherein one individuates the features of a situation and
exercises moral judgment to discern their moral significance. As a result, Blum’s view
holds that judgment formations are central to moral perception. Overall, Blum’s view
would account for the phenomenological differences between E-1 and E-2 in our test case
as a difference in S’s judging that the photo represents sexual assault and its wrongness in
E-2 but not E-1. Stated otherwise, Blum’s approach to BMPJ would argue that there is a
difference in S’s judgment which corresponds to an awareness of a salient property, like an
act of sexual assault, and its morally evaluative dimension, like wrongness.
Alternatively, Väyrynen (2018) provides a straightforward account of BMPJ by,
again, positing that cognitive associations and affective states connect non-moral
perceptual content with moral classifications. Väyrynen’s version of BMPJ claims that HA
has all the explanatory power of HT without the complications associated with positing
perception influencing mechanisms or distinct representational abilities on the part of the
perceiver. 72 He writes,
“The rival explanation that I propose treats [different phenomenological responses] as
reflecting an implicit habituated transition in thought from a perceptual input to a moral
representation, owning to the way that the relevant emotional and affective dispositions
have been shaped by some relevant background moral beliefs which connect non-moral
inputs with moral classifications.” 73
Väyrynen argues for this view by suggesting that the difference between experiences like
E-1 and E-2 is better accounted for by views like BMPJ because the relevant change in the
phenomenology attaches to an experience’s cognitive phenomenology or one’s
72
73

Väyrynen (2018) p. 121
Väyrynen (2018) p. 123
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psychologically invoked affective phenomenology rather than by perceptual content for
three reasons. 74
First, he argues that the phenomenological difference in contrast situations can be
tracked by affective responses informed by background cognitive associations or
immediate cognitive apprehensions without the need for positing a change in perceptual
content 75, what I refer to as his Tracking Claim. Second, that this difference is often
experienced as a matter of degree rather than one of kind because such experiences
correlate to the intensity of an affective response inasmuch as it is “psychologically
immediate” and integrated with an experience’s non-evaluative inputs 76, what I refer to as
his Immediacy Claim. Lastly, he argues that his alternative account offers a simpler and
more unified account of moral experience than alternatives by positing one general
representational mechanism (i.e., representations via affective responses informed by
cognitive mechanisms) rather than two in the case of MPE (i.e., representations via
judgments and literal perceptual representations of moral content) 77, what I refer to as his
Simplicity Claim.
Overall, Väyrynen would seemingly account for the phenomenological differences
between E-1 and E-2 as a difference in S’s cognitive phenomenology of what it is like to
adopt a belief about the presence of a moral property or the affective phenomenology

Väyrynen (2018) p.123
Väyrynen (2018) p. 119 “The transition can also be psychologically immediate and bound up with the relevant emotional or
affective responses, explaining how things can ‘strike’ us as being morally a certain way. … Alternatively the relevant transition
might be more like a recognition based on taking in a pattern one isn’t able to articulate, where that patter gets recognized may be
influenced by prior training or background cognitive states.”
76
Väyrynen (2018) p. 120 – Referencing the evaluative practice of wine tasting be the expert verses the novice: “This suggests more
forcefully still that their responses differ primarily in degree: in how psychologically immediate their responses tend to be and how
integrated the non-evaluative inputs tend to be with the feelings of satisfaction that tasting a fine wine tends to produce.”
77
Väyrynen (2018) p. 121 – “Explaining these moral properties seems to require only a general capacity to represent moral properties
which is responsive to inputs from perception, imagination, supposition, and belief, and which can be psychologically immediate at
least when the inputs are reliably and closely bound up with certain and emotional and affective dispositions.”
74
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associated with an emotional response to what is understood as wrong in E-2 but not E-1.
Moreover, this version of BMPJ would seemingly suggest that this account is reinforced
by the apparent difference in each experience’s phenomenological intensity or, put
alternatively, the degree to which the cognitive or affective phenomenology is
psychologically immediate to S.
To summarize, BMPJ reduces any claim that a change in the phenomenology
between E-1 and E-2 in the V-J Day Photo case reduces to a difference in S’s cognitive or
affective phenomenologies. Put otherwise, BMPJ reduces any perceptual claims about the
presence of moral perceptual content to a claim about the presence of a judgment, cognitive
or affectively reached, on the part of the subject and the phenomenology associated with
those states. HA is taken as the preferable alternative to HT by proponents of BMPJ because
it is believed to possess more theoretical virtues (i.e., is simpler and carrying equal
explanatory power) than HT, as in the case of Väyrynen, or properly accounting for the
subject’s moral epistemic capacities, as in the case of Blum. As a result, acquisition occurs
prior to recognition in BMPJ. The same acquisition-recognition relationship is a feature
of Cognitive MPJ (CMPJ) and Affective MPJ (AMPJ).
CMPJ accounts for moral perception by emphasizing the role of cognitive
associations (i.e., inference, heuristics 78, intuitions 79, or a rule-like associations between
what is perceived and a moral property 80) in our everyday moral discernments. In general,
these views describe the immediate cognitive formation of a judgement about an occurrent
experience’s morally significant properties as prompting the phenomenological differences

See Fricker (2007)
See Audi (2018 & 2013)
80
See Väyrynen (2018)
78
79
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associated with the V-J Photo Case. Whereas Blum’s and Väyrynen’s proposals seem to
focus on ‘non-inferential forms of judgment’ and ‘transitions in thought’ in addition to
discussing the role of invoked affective states, others focus on cognitive associations in
terms of intuitions (Audi 2013) or heuristics (Fricker 2007). As in BMPJ, non-moral
perceptual content and the identification of a situation’s non-moral features occurs during
the acquisition step. These are then associatively paired with moral content during the
recognition step through one’s capacity to make cognitive associations.
For example, Audi (2013) proposes a integration model of moral perception which
ultimately holds that there is an unconscious, rule-like, pairing of non-moral perceptual
content with moral properties by means of one’s moral intuitions or, stated alternatively, a
“felt sense of connection”. 81 Under this view, the phenomenology associated with moral
experiences is akin to having a “sense of injustice", a personal intuition about the
connection between a moral property and non-moral contents. Clarifying, Audi (2018) 82
writes,
“The sense of injustice, then, a kind of impression of it, as based on, and as phenomenally
integrated with, a suitable ordinary perception of the properties on which injustice is
consequential – on which it is grounded, in a main use of that term – might serve as the
experiential element in moral perception. … call [this view] an integration theory of moral
Audi (2013), p. 37, 40-46
It is worth mentioning that Audi (2013 & 2018) draws out a distinction between what he calls “perceptibility” and “perceptuality” in
order motivate these claims. Where the former seems to be a classification for one’s cognitive phenomenology as a form of one’s
ability to articulate a kind of moral “sense”, the later refers to the level of observable properties “accessible to the five senses.” (Audi
2018, 64). It seems, given this, that one could take issue with what Audi takes perception to be in that the perceptual phenomenology
of an experience are, in an alternative view, like sensory properties in that they enter into one’s perceptual experience by means of our
apperception of the perceptual field, thereby allowing us to perceive kind properties. Both Siegel (2011) and Church (2013) hold
something akin to this view. Sensory properties, like moral properties, could be seen as equally mysterious without this kind of
synthesis suggesting that we should not reject the idea that moral properties can become contents of one’s perceptual experience, if
only through non-sensory mechanisms. However, Audi takes the non-perceptual contents route instead. Moreover, if Audi had argued
strongly that affects function to draw out this “felt sense of connection”, he would be classified as a BMPJ supporter. Instead, he
consistency holds that a non-inferential disposition to recognize perceptually observable properties as morally significant often result
in an emotional response but may not. This suggests that affective phenomenologies are more like side effects of cognitive
phenomenologies for Audi rather than integral parts of the moral perceptual process. This suggests, given my scheme, that he is
rightly categorized as a CMPJ supporter even though the affective phenomenology about the experience can play some part of his
integration model, perhaps something like Väyrynen’s claim that the intensity of an affective phenomenology. Ultimately, Audi’s
seems to suggest that moral perceptions are of the cognitive phenomenological character of taking something to fit, or not, (i.e.,
“fittingness”/”unfittingness” and “welcome rebalance”) and variations on that theme account for our sense of injustice, goodness,
wrongness, or justice suggests that this is the case.
81
82
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perception. … An important constituent in this phenomenal integration is the perceiver’s
felt sense of connection between, on the one hand, the impression of say, injustice or (on
the positive side) beneficence and, on the other hand, the properties that ground the moral
phenomena. This felt sense of connection is at least akin to what some have called the sense
of fittingness.” 83
So described, Audi’s view holds that we can have moral perceptions because we have a
non-inferential inclination to classify the non-moral perceptual contents of an occurrent
experience as indicative of some moral property or feature. 84 We sense morality by
incorporating the cognitive phenomenology of our non-inferential judgment about the
moral fitness, or unfitness, of a deed or person and a context within the overall
phenomenology of the perceptual experience. 85 He goes on to characterize these cognitive
associations as intuitions in the sense that they facilitate one’s coming to have an immediate
belief, in a way that is “significantly analogous to perception”. 86
As Cowan (2015) characterizes Audi’s view, “Integration doesn’t involve the
contents of perceptual experience being altered by the moral ‘experiential element’, but
rather, leads to the formation of an overall experience which is the amalgam of non-ethical
perceptual experience and the [moral] experiential element.” 87 As I understand it, this
integration into an overall experience incorporates a judgment formation into the moral
experience rather than reshaping the perceptual experience to include moral perceptual
content. Audi’s view is thereby not perceptual in nature, it predicts the aggregation of the
phenomenology of making a judgment with the phenomenology of a perceptual

Audi (2018) p. 63
Audi (2018) p. 63 “This sense of connection I am describing normally produces, moreover, a non-inferential disposition to attribute
the moral property of the action (or other phenomenon in question) on the basis of the property or set of properties (of that action) on
which the moral property is grounded.”
85
Audi (2018) p. 63 “Moral perception in some way embodies a phenomenal sense – which may or may not be in some way
emotional – of the moral character of the act. … In each instance of moral perception, the moral sense of wrongness, injustice or, in
the positive case, of welcome rebalancing is essentially connected to perception of non-moral p[properties on which the moral
properties are grounded.”
86
Audi (2015) “Intuition and its place in ethics”. Journal of the American Philosophical Association. 1. 57-77
87
Cowan (2015)
83
84
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experience. Audi’s view thereby describes moral perception as an acquisition of nonmoral perceptual content which gets recognized via our intuitions as possessing moral
properties.
Alternatively, Fricker (2007) seems to articulate a version of CMPJ in Epistemic
Injustice even though moral perception is not the primary topic of that work. That is, she
seems to develop a view on moral perception while investigating the epistemological
dimensions of hearers that put prejudicially driven credibility deficits on speakers facing
systemic power inequities. She writes,
“There is a form of moral cognitivism in the virtue ethical tradition which advances the
idea of moral perception. In this neo-Aristotelian tradition, the sensibility of the virtuous
subject is conceived as ‘trained’ or socially educated, so that the subject comes to see the
world in moral colour. By building an analogy with the idea of a virtuous agent’s ethical
sensibility, I hope to arrive at an account of how the responsible hearer exercises rational
sensitivity, without inference, so as to be critically open to the word of others. … The main
idea is that where a hearer gives a suitably critical reception to an interlocutor’s word
without making any inference, she does so in virtue of the perceptual deliverances of a
well-trained testimonial sensibility.” 88
And, on the matter of virtuous moral perceptual capacities, she continues,
“I think, if one bears in mind that a virtuous moral perceptual capacity is a sensitivity to
patterns of moral salience, a sensitivity to how different sorts of value configure in a new
situation, action, or person. It is a sensitivity that allows the virtuous person to see the world
in a certain light, where this has an intrinsic practical import, but where it would be
misleading to boil the sensitivity down to nothing more than an alternative to deliberation.
… A virtuous perception gives us a moral understanding of experiences, people, situations,
and events – a view of the world in moral colour, as I put it …” 89
Given this, Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice (2007), as partially a study of moral perception
during cases of testimony, investigates the phenomenological character of occurrent
experience with a specific focus on those occasions where a testimonial exchange is taking

88
89

Fricker (2007) p. 71
Fricker (2007) p. 75
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place and one makes discernments about a speaker’s credibility. 90 Her general concern,
using some of my language, is that there is something of a moral perceptual miss or
misfire at work during occasions where identity prejudices trigger a systemic credibility
deficit for a hearer about a historically marginalized or oppressed speaker. In these cases,
a speaker is often prescribed a credibility deficit (i.e., not taken to be credible) because they
are seen as incompetent or insincere due to their social identity. Moreover, these identities
are deeply embedded in a pervasive social power structure and, as such, these kind of
deficits signal, she argues, that the marginalized speaker is seen as possessing something
less than what morality suggest they do, their moral status as a rational agent or knower. 91
The hearer, in this way, can be seen as making moral discernments about the status of
agents as knowers, a morally salient assessment. 92 As a result, it seems that Fricker (2007)
develops a perceptual model of testimony in order to account for our testimonial perceptual
capacity, something she takes to be “analogous to the virtuous person's moral perceptual
capacity.” 93
Put otherwise, she argues that agents perceive a speaker’s credibility in virtue of
how one establishes the person’s epistemic trustworthiness, as exemplifying both
competence and sincerity. 94 In cases where a speaker’s competency or sincerity are
wrongfully attacked due to an identity prejudicial credibility deficit, we should understand
this as an occasion where the hearer has a moral perception of that person as possessing
Fricker (2007) p. 80-81, “The interpretation of the hearer’s phenomenology as an unreflective yet critical alertness is mad sense of
and vindicated if we accept the analogy with the moral perceptual model.”
91
Fricker (2007) p. 44, - “To be wronged in one’s capacity as a knower is to be wronged in a capacity essential to human value. When
one is undermined or otherwise wrong in a capacity essential to human value, one suffers and intrinsic injustice. The form that this
intrinsic injustice takes specifically in cases of testimonial injustice is that the subject is wronged in her capacity as a giver of
knowledge.”
92
It is worth noting that Fricker (2007) categorizes “as a knower” as a moral feature indicative of human dignity by referencing
Kantian notions of dignity and rational agents.
93
Fricker (2007) p. 72
94
Fricker (2007), p 45 – “Since epistemic trustworthiness requires the conjunction of competence and sincerity, a wrongful attack on
either component is sufficient for being wronged in that capacity.”
90
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something less than the human dignity they are due, there is the sense that this person is
“not a knower”. This might take the form of infantilizing the speaker or, among other
alternatives, taking them to be insincere. Regardless, a hearer with identity prejudicial
tendencies possesses, in her language, heuristics which discern that a socially marginalized
speaker is less deserving of credibility in virtue of the assumption that they are less than
capable of knowing or speaking sincerely about what they know. 95 In this way, one
interpretation of Epistemic Injustice is that it develops, among other things, a framework
for accounting for the kinds of moral perceptions one has of an important part of human
dignity, our status as a knower. With this in mind, we can turn to the details of her view
from the perspective that it accounts for a specific kind of moral perception because she
classifies our perceptions of people qua knowers as a kind of moral discernment during
occurrent experience of testimony. 96.
For Fricker, moral perceptions of testimony are immediate and non-inferential
cognitive activities, and these activities facilitate “knower” discernments because they are
saliently critical. 97 One’s internalized cognitive sensibilities, or heuristics, to moral patterns
in an occurrent experience facilitates a hearer’s perceptual judgments and it is common for

95
Perhaps this is the case because the hearer believes that the marginalized subject is a member of a group that is believed to be
intellectually inferior and knows nothing or that this group taken to always lie.
96
Fricker (2007) p. 72 “According to the kind of cognitivism that grows out of the virtue tradition in ethics, the virtuous agent is
marked out by his possession of a capacity for moral perceptual judgement. He is someone who, thanks to a proper moral ‘upbringing’
or (as I would prefer) a proper moral socialization, has come to see the world in moral colour. When he is confronted by an action or a
situation with a certain moral character, he does not have to work out that the action is cruel or kind or charitable or selfish; he just
sees it that way. Now this kind of perceptual judgement is spontaneous and unreflective; it involves no argumentation or inference on
the agent's part. The virtuous agent's perceptual capacity is accounted for in terms of a sensitivity to morally salient features of the
situation confronting him.”
97
Fricker (2007) p. 80-81 “The five points of parallel explored above—that moral/testimonial judgement is non‐inferential,
uncodifiable, intrinsically motivating, intrinsically reason‐giving, and typically has an emotional aspect—are all consistent with the
spontaneous, unreflective phenomenology of testimony that has provided so much impetus for non‐inferentialism. Indeed, they
explain how our phenomenology as hearers can be of an entirely unreflective and spontaneous piece of cognitive activity even while it
is critical activity. More specifically, these points of parallel fit the description of the phenomenology that I gave above to the effect
that the hearer typically has an experience of unreflective alertness to the many prompts and cues relating to her interlocutor's
trustworthiness. Granted that our everyday on‐the‐spot credibility judgements are as I have depicted them—trained, socially situated
perceptual judgements typically made spontaneously—then it is not surprising that the phenomenology should be unreflective and yet,
as I suggested, abused if characterized as plain uncritical. The interpretation of the hearer's phenomenology as an unreflective yet
critical alertness is made sense of and vindicated if we accept the analogy with the moral perceptual model.”
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an experience’s cognitive activities to trigger some kind of affective response. 98 Yet,
inasmuch as Fricker’s sense of “heuristic” is a habituated habit of thought informed by
background beliefs and dispositions, moral perceptual discernments in this view are a kind
of judgment, as I have defined the term, because the perceptual-language is more an idiom
for Fricker than a literally perceptual. Moreover, this judgement is motivated by one’s
cognitive associations (i.e., heuristics) and seemingly not a function of one’s affective
responses due to her system’s reliability on heuristics. 99 Thus, Fricker’s view on moral
perception seems to amount to a version of CMPJ. Her approach to the moral perception
of individuals as knowers holds that the acquisition of non-moral perceptual content (i.e.,
a subject’s race, gender, sexuality, and other non-socially relevant features) is being
recognized as morally significant in virtue of a perceiver's cognitive guiding, immediate,
but non-inferential heuristics.
As representative of CMPJ, Audi (2013 & 2018) and Fricker (2007) would seem to
account for the phenomenological differences between E-1 and E-2 by suggesting that they
amount to a difference in the cognitive phenomenology of the subject, a phenomenology
located on a judgement that an occurrence has this or that moral feature. In Audi’s case,
the V-J Day Photo represents sexual assault and its wrongness during E-1 but not E-2

Fricker (2007), p. 83. “Just as the experiences pertinent to the training of ethical virtues are internalized in the sensibility of the
virtuous person, so is the body of collective and individual testimonial experience internalized by the virtuous hearer, rendering it
immanent in her testimonial sensibility. It is through the broadly inductive influence of this body of experience that we may learn,
reliably enough, to assume trust when and only when it is in order. Thus our perception of speakers and their assertions comes to be
informed by a wealth of individual and collective experience relating to different sorts of speakers' trustworthiness regarding different
sorts of subject matter in different sorts of context. As hearers, our perceptions of our interlocutors are judgements conditioned by a
vast wealth of diverse testimony‐related experiences, individual and collective.”
99
Fricker (2007) p. 36 “I have already suggested that the hearer in everyday testimonial exchange (p.36) will often make use of
stereotypes as heuristics to facilitate his judgement of a speaker's credibility. Hearer and speaker are engaged in a form of social
interaction, and they inevitably trade in social perceptions of each other. Anticipating the argument for a perceptual model of
credibility judgement that I shall give in the next chapter, let us provisionally countenance the idea that in those everyday testimonial
exchanges in which the hearer does not deliberate about how far to trust the speaker, the hearer perceives the speaker as trustworthy to
this or that degree in what he is telling her. She perceives him in the light of a set of background assumptions about how far people
like him are trustworthy about things like this in relation to people like her, and I have suggested that reliable stereotypes have an
essential role to play here. This model of the interaction between speaker and hearer helps us to see the mechanism whereby identity
prejudice can distort a hearer's credibility judgement: it distorts the hearer's perception of the speaker.”
98
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because the subject judges the fitness of the deed, unwanted kissing, with the perceived
context by means of a “felt sense of connection”, or intuition. This suggests that the
phenomenology of our moral experiences of the photo attaches to the cognitive
phenomenology of the intuition. The difference between E-1 and E-2, for Audi, is
accounted for by the presence of an intuition’s phenomenology in E-2 that was not present
in E-1 because the background knowledge about the V-J Photo case was inadequate to
draw out that cognitive association in E-1. For Fricker, the difference is accounted for by
the presence of a perceptual judgment in E-2 that was not present in E-1 because there was
insufficient background knowledge about the case to inform S’s heuristic capacities or
cognitive habits. In both views, the presence of an invoked affective state during the
experience occurs as a response to one’s judgment of the occurrent situation and, as a result,
it is the cognitive phenomenology that is seemingly doing the moral perceptual work, or
making the discernment, and not an affective process even though the affect ‘piggybacks’
on the experience.
In contrast, Affective MPJ (AMPJ) takes invoked affective states to be a key
player in facilitating immediate, non-inferential, judgments about representational contents
during moral perception. These judgments can be facilitated by virtuous affects (Little 1995
& 1997), the what it is like to experience virtue’s phenomenal character (Goldie 2007), or
an attunement to a situation’s affect-cloud (Willett 1995 & 2014). In general, an invoked
affective state triggered by some morally pertinent configuration of non-moral perceptual
contents, as collected during the acquisition step, facilitates an immediate attribution of
some moral feature(s) to an experience during the recognition step by connecting
configurations of non-moral perceptual contents with moral properties. Affects, broadly
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construed, include embodied and psychological feelings associated with emotions or
general expressions of felt bodily states. Affects, as used here, amount to an immediate
form of embodied prelinguistic judgments. 100 These views account for scenarios like the
V-J Photo case by suggesting that S will come to have a different affective response to E1 than E-2. Moreover, these affects facilitate a non-inferential, immediate, judgment about
the situation’s moral features for S and possess the phenomenal character of an invoked
affective state. In AMPJ, the phenomenology of moral experience attaches to the affective
phenomenology because the justification for discerning that some moral feature is present
in occurrent experience is built into the affective phenomenology.
Little (1995 & 1997) and Willett (1995 & 2014) give separate versions of this kind
of view. Granted, like Fricker (2007), Little and Willett do not take on moral perception as
a theoretical project. Yet, Little (1995 & 1997) explores affect’s relation to perceiving the
moral landscape and Willett (1995 & 2014) develops a view which relies on the notion of
affective attunement to make one sensitive enough to read the moral environment. Each
seems to suggest that the affective character of our experiences facilitates the formation of
a non-inferential, immediate, moral judgment during occurrent experience. Given that they
do not suggest that there is a modification of an experience’s perceptual content but hold
that one can be directed to such content given an experiences affective phenomenology,
both views seem rightly classified as versions of AMPJ.
For Little (1997), affects are the collection of one’s various emotions, desires, or
dispositions which shape the affective phenomenal character of an experience. 101 She
This claim operates under the view that affects, like emotions, are judgments rather that perceptions. Moreover, the decision to take
affects to be a kind of prelinguistic judgment follows the Phenomenological Division of Feminist Affect theory, specifically those
views indebted to Tomkins, but also stands against the idea that affects are forms of perception.
101
Little (1995) p. 118
100
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argues that the possession “of certain desires and emotions turns out to be a necessary
condition of discerning moral properties, and hence must form part of even the ideal
observer’s epistemic repertoire.” 102 In this way, her view describes invoked affective
responses as the discernment mechanism for picking out the moral features of an occurrent
experience because virtuous affects carry virtuous phenomenal experiences which aid the
subject in understanding an experience’s moral features. She suggests that the virtuous
person approaches morality itself “as part of a parcel of broad, uncodifiable, practical
conception of how to live, while the non-virtuous person holds it without subsuming it.” 103
That is, the virtuous person ‘sees a situation more clearly’ than the non-virtuous person.
Where “seeing more clearly is often a matter of discerning a different gestalt of the
individual elements one already apprehends”, she argues that the ability to recognize the
moral significance of the configuration of these individual elements during moral
perceptions must be facilitated by more than non-moral knowledge, as suggested by the
contrast of S during E-1 and E-2. 104 That is, the phenomenological differences between
AltE-1 and AltE-2 illustrate, in Little’s words, that to make certain moral discernments S
must “have certain desires and emotions. Caring, being outraged, being moved to act - all
these are part of discerning moral features clearly.” 105
The difference is that S during AltE-1 has a different conception of how to live than
S at AltE-2 and, as a result, they lack the ability to discern that the photo represents a
wrongness-property during AltE-1. Without a properly attuned moral conception of how
to live informing or regulating one’s affective response, which is motivational to some
Little (1995) p. 125
Little 1997, p. 263
104
Little (1995), p. 127
105
Little (1995), p. 127
102
103
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degree, during a moral experience, one might understand that something is a case of
unwanted kissing, as in AltE-1, but fail to apprehend its moral significance, as S does in
AltE-2. All of which is, for Little, facilitated by an affective judgment, seemingly
indicating that a moral experience’s phenomenology attaches to one’s affective
phenomenology. 106
Willett (1995 & 2014), in a slightly different take on affects, suggests that one’s
affective attunement to the world facilitates our apprehension of its moral features. Willett
and Little would agree on much, I suspect, but we should keep in mind that the former uses
the notion of affect in a way that is theoretically different from the latter. Looking at parentinfant relationships, Willett writes, “Affect attunement articulates a preverbal social bond
between infant and adult based on a predominantly nonconscious immersion in the rhythms
and flows of ordinary life.” 107 This approach to affects aims to provide a complex picture
of the relation between affectively responsive bodies in an environment filled with
affective triggers. One interpretation of this, in a moral perceptual framework, is that
Willett believes affects can help us access a situation’s moral features because affects can
facilitate morally salient beliefs about, for example, the moral status of others. Approached
as a kind of communicative exchange, Willett (1995) argues that both parent and child
participate in a prelinguistic form of discourse via affective states. 108 For example, she
notes that a parent is affectively moved by the infant’s happiness and that the infant’s

Little (1995) p.135 n5. “I have helped myself to the notion of "seeing" when I talk of apprehending moral truths. Lest that usage
conjure worries stemming from its misuse by ethical intuitionists of previous centuries, let me say I am not positing any sui generis
faculty of moral perception. We explain our ability to apprehend that something is cruel in the same way we explain our ability to
apprehend that something is a table; not by appeal to any special sense organ, but by appeal to a much more familiar "faculty"-the
capacity to apply concepts correctly. Put bluntly, we apprehend that something falls under the classification "cruel" by attending to the
details at hand and making a judgment (which is not to say it is an easy skill to exercise).”
107
Willett (2014) p. 82
108
Willett (2014) p. 88 “During this early period, social interaction through crying, touching, rocking, and, after the first couple of
months, cooing and eye-to-eye contact establishes a nuanced basis for the expression and communication of affects.”
106
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happiness, expressed via giggles and smiles, is prompted by an affective response to the
presence of the parent’s affection. Instead of an exchange of words, there is, seemingly, an
exchange of affects.
At the center of this view is the concept of embodied ‘affective attunements’. These
are structured patterns of embodied dispositions that are sensitive to the affects of other
individuals or groups which permeate our environment (i.e., affect clouds). Willett takes
invoked affective responses to affect clouds as articulating a communicative capacity, an
expressivity and receptivity, whereby “visual, aural, gestural, olfactory, phenomenal, and
neurochemical transfers” intersect with social contexts to open up affective forms of
discourse. 109 As a result, Willett’s approach to affects encapsulates more than merely the
kind of virtuous affective responses we might use to discern the moral significance of
someone’s suffering in order to judge that it is a case of cruelty and respond according to
our moral conception of how to live, as in Little’s view. Instead, invoked affects, regulated
by our affective attunements, are ways for us to acquire information about an occurrent
situation because an individual or group communicates certain affects into the environment
for others to pick up on.
For example, when a parent’s affective dispositions are saliently attuned to their
child filled environment, they come to apprehend that the infant possesses a special moral
status. Moreover, this status is an important moral feature of the parent’s occurrent
experience of the child. In this way, Willett’s approach to affects seems akin to thinking of
them as a prelinguistic form of testimony or dialogue without the kind of direct categorical

Willett (2014) p. 80 “affect laden photoconversions weave substantial threads of a communicative ethics across regions of the
biosphere.”
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intentionality reserved for language. 110 This attunement to the affective states of others in
the environment and theirs to ours makes moral perceptions of others, human or nonhuman in Willett’s eyes, seemingly possible prior to the introduction of language.
However, this does not mean that she likens affects to perceptual content or that they
themselves are representations of moral content. 111
To make sense of the epistemic structure of moral perception given Willett’s view
on affects, it is important to point out that she follows the phenomenological division of
feminist affect theory and some contemporary scholarship in that field which classifies
affects as categorical (i.e., happiness, sadness, fear, anger, shame, and so on) and as
invoking a sense of vitality (i.e., energizing or elevating one’s mood). 112 As a result, a
moral perceptual experience with an affective phenomenology would provoke an affective
state with two parts in Willett’s scheme. First, one can affectively experience the intensity
of the invoked affective response, its vitality. Second, one can have an affective experience
that points to some moral category or property. 113 While not representationally intentional
in themselves, invoked affects during moral perceptions, for Willet, can be felt ways of
linking an experience to moral content because of their expressive contour (i.e., an intense
shame, an explosive benevolence, and other parings of visceral descriptor and categorical

Willett (1995) p. 91-92 “Communicative responses between infant and parent may exhibit in some sense or another identical levels
of vitality affect. Still the choice of an appropriate response required an element of imaginative interpretation. As Stern Himself points
out, without an act of imagination, music remains a series of sounds that express nothing. … Attunements occur though cross-model
correspondences that cannot be subsumed under a logic of identity, conceptual explanation, or [linguistic] intentionality.”
111
Note, it would also be unfair to read Willett as rejecting Little’s use of affect or vice versa. Rather, Willett’s notion of affect
attunement describes a preverbal sensitivity to waves of affect triggering spaces or things, what she calls “affect clouds”, in the
environment. Little seems concerned with our internal affective calibration which regulates some range of our affective response to
those stimuli. I take Willett’s overall claim to be that one’s affect attunements (i.e., a sensitivity to an environment's affect-cloud) are
the means by which one comes to have an affective experience of the world. Its just that the affective experiences we have in the
world are also a part of a larger affective discourse occurring in our everyday environments in a kind of prelinguistic form of call and
response. Both are relatively silent about the other’s work due to their differences in their philosophical traditions.
112
Willett (2014) p. 90, “Through proto-conversations, creatures with adult human logos communicate a significant range of affects.
Influenced by the work of Silvan S. Tomkins, Stern distinguishes affects into two types: (1) categorical affects … ; (2) vitality affects
and contours…”; Willett references both Stern’s The Interpersonal World of the Infant and The Forms of Vitality.
113
Willett (2014) p. 90 – “Vitality is felt profoundly, for example, when one is energized and elevated in mood. Categorical affects, on
the other hand, introduce the ethical qualities of good and bad to experience.”
110
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affect). Categorical affects include, it seems, a swath of what are commonly described as
the moral emotions which point to evaluative content.
When confronted with cases like the V-J Day Photo case, one’s affective response
to the photo is a complicated formation. It is sensitive to the affective responses of others
around us as they view the photo, the affective expectations of our social world to things
like unwanted kissing which have habituated (or tried to habituate) our affective
attunements, but also, like Little’s concern regarding virtuous character, an individual’s
affective attunement to the demands of morality which is more or less resilient to influences
by the occurrent affective discourse. 114 Maybe S’s response at E-1 is not merely due to a
lack of knowledge, but also due to their life in a world where the common response to
sexual assault has been dominated by patriarchal forces which silence any felt sense of
outrage. 115 Maybe, in E-2, S displays a particular resilience to the patriarchal affective
discourse which once ensnared them in E-1, now allowing them to experience a kind of
firm outrage to the photo.
Regardless, the phenomenological difference between E-1 and E-2 would be
accounted for by Willett as a difference in S’s affective phenomenology. Moreover, Willett
explicitly holds that affective responses do not carry the same representational content, or
intentionality, as language but still retain the ability to signal to the subject, in an immediate
non-inferential way, that something possesses an evaluative moral property like right,
wrongness, or moral considerability. 116 As a result, one charitable interpretation of her

The last item in this list references those occasions where individuals get “swept up” in a kind of group affect.
A motivational internalist, who adopts Willett’s view, could read the difference between AltE-1 and AltE-2 in this way.
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Willett (1995) p. 91-92 “Attunements occur though cross-model correspondences that cannot be subsumed under a logic of
identity, conceptual explanation, or [linguistic] intentionality.” & “Categorical affects, on the other hand, introduce the ethical
qualities of good and bad to experience.”
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view is that a moral experience’s affective phenomenology facilitates non-inferential and
immediate transitions in thought. It does this by functioning as an affective bridge (i.e., a
judgement formation mechanism) between an experience’s perceptual content and a
situation’s moral features. These judgments are immediate non-inferential ways of making
moral discernments because affects are prelinguistic, embodied, responses to our
environment which is permitted by an affective discourse. As a result, Willett adopts an
AMPJ approach to moral perception because affects operate in a judgmentalist fashion by
means of our affective attunement. As a result, the phenomenological difference between
cases like E-1 and E-2 attaches to the affective phenomenology of an affective facilitated
judgment formation. One acquires non-moral perceptual content (i.e., facial expressions,
yelps of pain, and so on) and then recognize said collections as morally salient in virtue of
the affective messaging communicated by to us by those situations and our affective
response to those messages.
1.7 The Attachment Problem of Moral Phenomenology
This paper began with the development of an acquisition-recognition framework
to pierce the metaphorical-literal ambiguity surrounding moral perceptional language.
After considering some details of moral perceptual events under this framework, it became
clear that the deeper issue facing moral perceptual theories is the need to address the
judgment-perception question. That is, are moral discernments during occurrent
perceptual experience merely the result of a judgment formation about non-moral contents
(i.e., MPJ: recognition occurs after acquisition) or, rather, is there a literal perceptual
component during these experiences wherein a situation’s moral features are perceived as
contents of perceptual experience (i.e., MPE: recognition occurs during acquisition)?
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Moreover, phenomenal contrast methodology and the taxonomy of views above illustrate
that an adequate classification of moral perception as either a judgment or a perception
depends on how we account for the phenomenology of a moral experience. If the
phenomenology of moral experience is adequately explained by a subject’s cognitive or
affective phenomenology, then MPJ seems preferable.
If, however, there is more to the picture and there is a reasonable account of that
picture in terms of perceptual content then MPE seems preferable, especially if it appears
that perceptual forms of knowledge are at play in these experiences. I will refer to this issue
as the attachment problem of moral phenomenology which, put succinctly, points out
that accounting for the phenomenology of moral perceptions is both difficult and a matter
of determining whether that phenomenology attaches to (i.e., is explained by) a subject’s
cognitive, affective, or perceptual mental states. This section seeks to address this problem.
Assuming that judgments via cognitive associations possess a phenomenal
character, it is reasonable to expect that one usually has moral perceptions accompanied by
some cognitive phenomenology because we often form immediate, often non-inferential,
perceptual judgments during moral perceptual experiences. Alternatively, if judgments via
cognitive association do not possess a phenomenal character, it would still be equally
indefensible to suggest that one never forms judgments during moral perceptual
experiences for the same reason. Additionally, subjects often have moral perceptions
accompanied by some affective phenomenology. Given this, it is important to keep in mind
that a reasonable version of MPE cannot claim that subjects do not make cognitive
associations or experience invoked affective states during moral perceptual experiences.
Forming immediate perceptual judgments about a perceptual event, reacting with some
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invoked affective response to that event, and experiencing whatever phenomenology
accompanies that event is, seemingly, a feature of our moral lives. This observation
illustrates the reason why ‘the attachment problem of moral phenomenology’ is rightly
classified as a problem. It is a challenge to determine what the moral phenomenal character
of an occurrent experience attaches to because our moral perceptual experiences are, for
lack of a better term, messy by their nature.
When looking at the V-J Day Photo (or even the swimming pool example) with the
relevant background beliefs or affective dispositions, S will inevitably be prompted by the
occurrent experience to form immediate cognitive associations and undergo some invoked
affective states. In fact, it seems that both processes aid S during their moral deliberation
about how to respond to their occurrent experience. This observation is not in dispute and
is a key motivator for adopting MPJ because these processes carry a lot of explanatory
power as it relates to moral action and epistemology. A sound argumentative landscape for
a supporter of MPE, therefore, must admit that judgments (via cognitive associations and
invoked affective responses) are present during moral perceptions and that they have their
role to play in moral agency. As a result, a supporter of MPE must acknowledge the value
and existence of judgments during moral perception but successfully argue that MPJ (and
its articulation of HA) presents an incomplete picture of moral perception rather than a fully
incorrect one to the extent that there is some perceptual phenomenology unaccounted for
by our judgment formations. To do this, I wish to return to the case of K kicking I as
presented during the introduction.
Recall that S encounters situation α, K kicking infant I, and comes to discern that
K’s actions are wrong. I will refer to this as moment-1 (M-1). Under MPJ, the phenomenal
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character of S’s encounter with this situation would be linked to S’s invoked affective
response to witnessing α or because of a cognitive association between observing α and its
classification as morally wrong. MPJ holds that S judges that K’s actions are representative
of something that is morally wrong. As Väyrynen (2018) might put it, the
phenomenological character of S’s encounter with α is tracked by S’s affective responses
or a felt sense of “figuring things out” via cognitive associations [The Tracking Claim],
it’s intensity is “psychologically immediate” and integrated with an experience’s nonevaluative inputs [The Immediacy Claim], and is a simple account with enough
explanatory power to account for the experience’s phenomenology [The Simplicity
Claim].
Yet, consider what happens if S comes to learn that K is kicking a hyper-realistic
facsimile of an infant and that there is no living, actual, infant present in situation α because
K is practicing for their part in the production of some big-budget horror film (i.e., moment
2 or M-2). It is expected, given this new information, that S will come to form a different
judgment via their cognitive association about the “wrongness” of K’s action, that it is not
representative of the wrongness of kicking babies because the thing kicked is not a real
baby. Moreover, it is true that S could still take K’s action to be representative of something
morally wrong, not as a function of their cognitive associations, but in virtue of some
invoked affective state, perhaps outrage, triggered by seeing the form of an infant
brutalized by K. So conceived, the moral phenomenology of S’s experience could not be
accounted for by the presence of a judgment via a cognitive association because S’s
cognitive judgment (and any accompanying cognitive phenomenology) diverges from the
moral perception that the experience represents something morally wrong. But, the
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affective judgment still persists and, as a result, MPJ’s candidacy as the preferred
explanation of this situation, for many, is preserved.
Now, perhaps S joins the horror movie’s cast and their invoked affective response
to seeing K kick the infant-facsimile changes over time. In fact, it changes so much that S
no longer experiences outrage when seeing K kick the form of an infant (moment 3, M-3).
The vital question, then, is this: could S reasonably be said to immediately and noninferentially take K kicking the infant facsimile as representative of something morally
wrong in the absence of (1) an invoked affective state to intuit a “morally wrong” judgment
while also (2) undergoing a cognitive association which facilitates a judgment that it does
not represent something wrong because the infant is not real? I would like to suggest that
not only is the answer to this question “yes”, but also that these kind of moments are far
more common than their quirkiness first suggests, especially given that playacting and film
scenarios are pervasive in our visual culture.
Consider that the case above aims to support the existence of moral perceptual
content by isolating an experience, holding fixed S’s perceptual experience, and
introducing controlled alternative epistemic states for S in order to conceptually test
whether judgment formations completely account for S’s moral perception of the situation.
Schematically, the argument above operates in the following way:
P1) S’s immediate and non-inferential moral belief (b) that situation α represents
the moral property “wrongness” is discerned either by means of a cognitive
association, an invoked affective state, or b is a form of perceptual knowledge
derived from perceptual contents.
P2) S during M-1 is taken to have all the background beliefs or affective
dispositions needed to acquire b in an immediate and non-inferential manner.
P3) S during M-2 is taken to gather additional background beliefs with which to
perform an immediate and non-inferential judgment via cognitive association that
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b is not the case but also seems to maintain some affective dispositions intuiting
that b is the case. [b is not acquired by cognitive associations].
P4) S during M-3 is taken to have altered, over time, their affective dispositions
such that they no longer intuit that b is the case while also performing a cognitive
association that b is not the case, but S is still understood as possessing the belief
that situation α represents the moral property “wrongness”. [b is not acquired by
invoked affective states or cognitive associations].
C) S’s immediate and non-inferential moral belief b is a form of perceptual
knowledge about moral perceptual contents of “wrongness” in S. [Disjunctive
syllogism from P1 & P4]
The thing that allows this argument to succeed is that the introduction of a new epistemic
state for S during M-3, which includes content from M-2, ought to return their perceptual
experience of K kicking an infant facsimile, one indistinguishable from a real infant, to a
state of moral mundaneness but it does not.
If, at a previous moment M-0, S lacked all background beliefs and affective
dispositions regarding the dignity of children or the harm K could inflict on infants, then S
would not discern the immediate and non-inferential belief b when seeing K kick the infant
during M-1. Once S acquires these background cognitive associations and affective
dispositions, S is apt to acquire belief b in an immediate, non-inferential, way. However, if
the phenomenal character of these cognitive or affective judgments are overridden by
countervailing judgments or by the absence of an invoked affective response and an
occurrent experience’s representational character persists, such as in M-3, the cognitive
and affective phenomenologies associated with these judgments no longer account for the
moral experience’s phenomenological character which represents something morally
wrong. As a result, we have reason to believe, and acknowledge, that the presence of
background cognitive associations and affective dispositions have a part to play in moral
perception, but not that they provide a complete picture of moral perceptual events.
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That is, they can facilitate the use of general moral principles or beliefs in our efforts
to discern the contents of particular moral situations through the process of mediation
which represents an encounter as containing moral content. However, that judgments made
by these processes can be overridden by countervailing judgments and S can still be said
to acquire a non-inferential and immediate belief b about the moral wrongness of viewing,
even in a simulated manner, K kicking an infant, indicates that b is a good candidate for
being considered a form of perceptual knowledge influenced by S’s background moral
beliefs and affective sensibilities via some kind of perception influencing mechanism. As
a result, moral perceptions appear to possess an experiential component and are not merely
forms of judgment. Thus, MPE more adequately accounts for moral perceptions than MPJ;
experientialism is preferable to judgmentalism.
1.8 Conclusion
In summary, I have argued that moral perceptions have a perceptual component. In
addition to forming moral judgments during occurrent experience, moral representations
seemingly appear during our experiences due to the presence of moral perceptual contents
which shape, at least in part, the phenomenal character of our morally pertinent occurrent
experiences. One might be concerned that this view undermines our ability to make reliable
moral verdicts about particular moral situations given our tendency to see the world
according to our current moral sensibilities, as articulated by our background epistemic
content. I call this the circularity problem. One might also argue that MPE has the
consequence of classifying all moral perceptions as illusory or hallucinatory. I refer to this
as the veridicality problem. I will close by briefly discussing these issues as areas for
future research.
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The Circularity Problem. Briefly put, if correct, MPE suggests that it would be
prima facie difficult to justify any moral experience because moral perceptions would
always be influenced by one’s beliefs or affects thereby lacking a sense of perceptual
objectivity. This objection, I believe, means that our background epistemic content stands
the risk of undermining the reliability of our moral judgments and moral perceptions.
However, I take this kind of objection to be sensitive to only half of MPE’s epistemic
consequences. It could also be the case that one’s background epistemic state can be
epistemically beneficial in cases where expertise helps us see the world more clearly. That
is, a construction safety expert is more aptly orientated to assess safety obligations towards
workers during an inspection than, say, a philosopher. She perceives the world differently
in regard to its moral features (via different perceptual contents) and this enhances rather
than undermines her access to a situation’s moral features. Given this, I take the circularity
problem to be short sighted. Rather, it is motivated by a concern that people will make
reliably inaccurate/accurate moral discernments based on moral perceptions in proportion
with their familiarity and expertise about the encountered situation or their moral character.
The objection highlights that moral deliberations based on perceptual contents requires us
to invest ourselves in the development of a sound moral epistemic foundation.
Consequently, it becomes the task of one’s moral life to cultivate a collection of
background epistemic states which allows us to reliably access, to perceive, the moral
landscape, whatever that might look like. This does not mean that we need to be an ideal
moral person. Rather, a consequence of MPE is that it defines an epistemically relevant
moral obligation to moral living: the need to cultivate beliefs, affective sensitivities, and
ways of thinking that allow one to perceive the moral world according to some wider
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conception of morality. Thus, the issue presented by this problem is not that MPE is
untenable, but rather that we need to do work to define proper parameters from which to
discern reliable from unreliable moral perceptions. What is more, this calls for an
investigation of the forces which cultivate our background epistemic resources because
these mediate our moral perceptions.
The Veridicality Problem.

It might also be suggested that experientialism

commits us to the idea that our perceptual experiences of a situation’s moral features are a
kind of illusion or hallucination, that experientialism results in a view which holds that our
moral perceptions are examples of hijacked perceptual experience. Admittedly, the
veridicality problem is a deeper issue than can be explored here but I am not inclined to
think that moral perceptual veridicality in experience is indefensible as a concept. Rather,
if being veridical is about an existing correspondence between one’s perceptions and an
actual feature of the world, then perhaps the veridicality problem is more about a concern
between our moral perceptions and the moral realities we face in the world. Under this
interpretation, the important issue here is whether our moral perceptions align with the
dictates of a defensible moral theory as it describes the conditions of the occurrent
experience. The judgment that one’s moral perceptions are veridical relies on a larger
normative ethical project. Thus, the issue presented by this problem is, again, not that MPE
is untenable but rather that being able to refer to moral perceptions as veridical requires us
to index that judgment with a justifiable normative moral theory in conjunction with some
form of correspondence view for moral perceptual veridicality.
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Taken together, neither problem seems to undermine MPE. Rather, each opens the
dialogue to deeper discussions about the robust avenue moral perceptual research can
take when we take experientialism seriously.
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CHAPTER 2. MORAL PERCEPTUAL ORIENTATION
“What's interesting is what you write about [your rescuers] and you say that it made you
realize, in all of these stories, it's not just the person that is doing the bad thing and the
person that the bad thing is being done to, but there are those who see it and identify it as
wrong and they do something about it.”
The Daily Show’s Trevor Noah to Know My Name author Chanel Miller
as she discusses her memoir recounting her sexual assault and
subsequent experiences with the U.S. Justice System.
2.1 Introduction
Whether granting insight into another’s moral status or the moral qualities of some
action, moral perceptions regularly inform ethical decision making. Moral perceptions
occur when a subject comes to form an immediate discernment about the moral features of
an occurrent experience. We should, I believe, be broadly concerned about the
epistemological nature of these events for many of the reasons gestured at during Miller’s
Daily Show interview. As we walk through life, there are innumerable moments where our
immediate experiences are accompanied by immediate discernments about their content.
Whether we encounter overt instances of racism or subtle moments of sexism, moral
perceptions curate our appreciation of an occurrent situation’s moral features, accurately
or otherwise, and guide ethical decision making.
The field of ethics is often concerned with a person’s moral status and an action’s
moral value. In a complimentary fashion, theories of moral perception aim to describe the
process by which we, as epistemic subjects, encounter morally pertinent situations and
come to recognize, or fail to recognize, the salient moral features of those moments. As
illustrated by Miller’s interview, this is incredibly important because seeing that a situation
or subject possesses some moral property (i.e., individuating some set of moral features
and recognizing them as morally substantive) is a prerequisite for responding in the way
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that morality demands, whatever those demands turn out to be. Theories of moral
perception articulate a least two things: (1) whether moral perceptions include perceptual
content (i.e., where we literally see a situation’s moral features during occurrent
experience) or, instead, are merely forms of judgment on the part of the subject, and (2)
give a framework for making sense of the epistemic mechanisms at work during moral
perceptual events.
Given these tasks, I believe that views regarding moral perception (a.k.a., ethical
perception) can be sorted into one of two categories: moral perceptual judgementalism or
moral perceptual experientialism 117. The former holds that instances of moral perception
are best explained by the subject’s propensity to form judgments about a situation’s moral
features, hence the ‘judgementalism’ label. Under this view, a subject is said to have a
moral perception of situation α because they form an immediate moral judgment about
acquired perceptual content by means of a cognitive (i.e., heuristics, inferences, cognitive
associations, …) or affective (i.e., moral emotional intuitions, a felt sense of connection,
affective responses, …) judgment formation mechanism. That is, a subject utilizes
immediate, often non-inferential, judgment formations to draw out connections between
perceptual content and some moral property or set of moral properties. In contrast,
experientialism holds that we have literal perceptual experiences of moral properties
during moral perceptual events. In addition to our propensity to form immediate moral
judgments, this view holds that a situation’s moral features are recognized as such because
moral properties are infused into perceptual experience by means of a perception
influencing mechanism. That is, the experientialist holds that “human agents can have
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perceptual experiences as of the instantiation of ethical properties, at least some of which
are veridical.” 118
In what follows, I argue for a version of experientialism which I call Moral
Perceptual Orientation (MPO). MPO asserts, among other things, that moral properties
are a part of the perceptual contents of occurrent experience and whether those features are
perceived is contingent on one’s background beliefs, ways of thinking, and affective
sensitivities (i.e., background epistemic content). MPO aims to give an account of how it
is that one encounters moral properties in perceptual experience and relies on the notion
that moral experiences are cognitively penetrable. Under this view, one’s background
epistemic content provides the orientation by which one curates their experience of the
world’s moral features. Consequently, MPO emphasizes that perceptual experience is an
important variable in understanding how we conduct our moral lives from moment to
moment because it points out that perceptual experience is not morally neutral.
I begin by introducing experientialism by drawing on moral perception’s analogous
relationship to David Chalmers’s (2017) views on cognitive orientation in cases of mirrorusage. Informed by this analogy, I define the experientialism-judgmentalism debate in
terms of perceptual processing-stages and follow, in section two, with a pair of arguments
in favor of experientialism. The first makes a non-modularity argument about the mind
using Tim Bayne’s (2010) unity thesis as it pertains to the relationship between human
non-perceptual and perceptual processing systems. The second looks to studies on the
moral pop-out effect to make an evidence-based argument that moral properties are
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seemingly infused into occurrent experience. Taken together, I argue that we have good
reason to adopt the experientialist position. In section three, I outline the cognitive
penetration approach as described by MPO and defend it as a viable alternative to an
approach proposed by Jennifer Church (2013). I argue that MPO is preferable because it
maintains a more apt distinction between the perception and imagination. I then conclude
by addressing an objection to Moral Perceptual Experientialism raised by Väyrynen
(2018).
2.2 The Mirror Analogy and the Judgmentalism-Experientialism Distinction
In “The Virtual and the Real”, Chalmers (2017) describes cognitive orientation as
that phenomenon whereby “background knowledge helps orient one to the perceived
world, giving a global interpretation of what is perceived” where ‘global interpretation’ is
used to express that one takes the whole phenomenal character of the experience as
immediate. 119 To illustrate, he asks us to consider mirror-usage and suggests that it is a
prototypical case of cognitively oriented experience, as a variety of cognitive
penetrability. That is, one’s knowledge of the mirror’s presence, familiarity with mirror
usage, expectations about mirror usage, and the experience-like naturalness with which
one uses a mirror seemingly define mirror-experiences. 120 In practice, one looks into the
rear-view mirror before shifting lanes and has a certain kind of experience of its mirrorobjects. Chalmers observes that one’s knowledge, familiarity, expectations, and sense of
naturalness engender different kinds of perceptual experiences for experienced mirrorusers than for novice mirror-users. He writes,
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“Consider a car’s rear-view mirror, as used by an experienced driver. When the driver looks
in the mirror and sees cars that are actually behind her, do the cars look to be in front of
the driver, pointing toward her? Or do they appear to be behind the driver, following behind
her vehicle? My own intuition, and those of most people I have asked about this case, is
clear. When I look in my rear-view mirror, the cars I see look to be behind me.” 121
In contrast, a novice mirror-user, perhaps a first-time user, would seemingly take the rearview mirror to be a kind of window into a world of oncoming traffic. 122 He continues,
“Now, someone who thinks that rear-view mirrors are illusory will say that we judge that
the cars are behind us, while nevertheless the cars look to be in front of us. Or perhaps they
might allow that cars look to be behind us, but only in a sense where “look” is tied to
judgment and other aspects of cognition—while at the level of visual perception, visual
experience represents the cars as being in front of us. Once again, however, I think this gets
the phenomenology of visual experience wrong.” 123
Chalmers’s observation here is that each user would, prima facie, have a
fundamentally different kind of experience of the cars in the mirror and, thereby, we get
the phenomenology wrong when we classify these differences as merely ‘differences in
judgment’. He argues that classifying these kind of contrast cases as representing merely a
difference in judgment wrongly equates the perceptual phenomenal character of what it is
like to unknowingly look into a rear-view mirror, see a car in motion, and take it to be
careening towards you with knowingly looking into a rear-view mirror and seeing the same
car. As a result, the mirror case draws our attention to experiences where our awareness,
familiarity, expectations, and an experience’s felt sense of naturalness coalesce into a
global interpretation, an experience with a unified perceptual phenomenal sense. It
highlights what one means when one claims that our background epistemic resources
influence the contents of perceptual experience. Contrast cases, like Chalmers’s mirror-
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of cases. He argues that “virtual reality need not be a second-class reality. It may be a second-level reality, in that it is contained
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p. 35)
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case or Susanna Siegel’s (2011) pine tree case, open the field for a variety of discussions
regarding the contents of perceptual experience.
As a morally pertinent example, consider the following testimony from Sara
Ahmed’s (2017) Living a Feminist Life:
“I was out jogging, just near my home. A man whirled passed on a bike and put his hand
up the back of my shorts. He did not stop; he just carried on cycling as if nothing happened,
as if he had not done anything. I stopped, shaking. … I kept on going. I began jogging
again, but it was different: I was different. I was much more nervous. Every time someone
came up behind me, I was ready, tense, waiting. I felt differently in my body, which was a
different way of encountering the world. Experiences like this: they seem to accumulate
over time, gathering like things in a bag, but the bag is your body, so that you feel like you
are carrying more and more weight.” 124
It is worth noting that Ahmed’s observations in this passage aim to motivate the idea that
‘how we encounter the world’ is as much a practice of our affective processes as mental
processes. For Ahmed, an instance of sexual assault was enough to radically change her
expectations about jogging resulting in the alteration of her immediate discernments of her
occurrent experience via her affective response to the world. A change in her background
epistemic resources seemingly results in a different global interpretation of her occurrent
experience in an analogous way to the mirror-novice v. mirror-expert case. As she selfreports, she experiences the world differently than she used to.
In parallel, what can we say about bystanders to Ahmed’s situation? In this case,
there was indeed a person doing the bad thing and a person the bad thing had been done to,
but what of those that observed this situation? How are we to make sense of their moral
perceptions? It seems to me that the mirror-case is analogous to moral perceptual events
because the relevant features driving Chalmers’s observations are seemingly relevant
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during perceptions of morally pertinent events like Ahmed’s assault. In Chalmers’s
scenario, relevant considerations included:
1)
2)
3)
4)

whether the observer knows there is a mirror in front of them,
the observer’s familiarity with mirrors,
the observer’s expectations regarding the situation, and
the observer’s felt sense of experience-like naturalness during mirror usage.

Taken together, Chalmers argues for two things: that these features define one’s cognitive
orientation and that this orientation curates the phenomenal character of one’s mirrorexperience. That is, (1) - (4) curates one’s global interpretation of what is observed.
Analogously, the following questions are epistemologically relevant to outside observers
of Ahmed’s situation:
1') Does the observer know they are confronted with a case of sexual assault?
2') Does the observer have a sense of familiarity with cases of sexual assault? What is
the character of that familiarity?
3') What are the observer’s expectations, morally or otherwise, regarding social
interactions and sexual assault?
4') Does the experience contain a felt sense of experience-like naturalness for the
observer?
Without the relevant background epistemic resources, like prudent responses to
(1’)-(4’), the observer would seemingly fail to have a global interpretation of the perceptual
event (i.e., Ahmed’s sexual assault) as an event representative of something deeply
reprehensible and immoral. In other words, the moral features of the occurrent experience
go undiscerned when one occupies an epistemically inadequate position as it pertains to
sexual assault events inasmuch as one’s background epistemic resources amount to the
set of beliefs, affective sensitivities, and ways of thinking. Given this, I take moral
perceptions to be stellar candidates for being understood as cognitively orientated
perceptual events. The phenomenal character of the experience, or global interpretation,
of the experience one has while observing morally pertinent situations like sexual assault,
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bullying, slavery, exploitation, brutalization, dehumanization, and so on are seemingly
different for those with differing background epistemic resources that are more or less
capable of orienting one to the immorality of these kinds of events.
Yet, the analogous relationship between mirror-experiences and moral perceptual
experiences is not a ‘knock-down argument’ for moral perceptual experientialism in the
form of cognitive orientation as a variety of cognitive penetration, as a form of
experientialism. 125 Instead, the mirror-analogy is rhetorically useful for opening us up to
the possibility that we literally experience moral properties in the same way that we
experience properties like ‘oncoming traffic’. There is still much work to be done to
directly support the claim that one’s background epistemic resources influence perceptual
experience during perceptual processing in morally pertinent situations. However, I would
like to suggest that the value of the mirror-case analogy is that it sharpens our
understanding of the central question at hand: (The Moral Perceptual Question) Are
moral perceptions occasions where our background epistemic resources influence
perceptual processes (experientialism) or, rather, are they merely guiding one’s belief
response to the contents of perceptual experience (judgmentalism)? That said, a
framework for distinguishing between ‘influences on perceptual processing’ and
‘influences on one’s response to perceptual experience’ is required to provide much needed
details to the experientialism-judgmentalism distinction and debate. Jenkins and Siegel
(2015) provide just this kind of framework by offering a way to “distinguish between stages
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at which perceptional experience or judgment can be influenced” by one’s background
epistemic resources. 126
As summarized in Table 2.1, views defined under moral perceptual
experientialism (MPE) hold that perceptual experience can be influenced by background
epistemic resources during perceptual processing during early vision or during the process
of rendering the contents of perceptual experience. In contrast, views defined under moral
perceptual judgmentalism (MPJ) hold that background epistemic resources influence
“what you introspectively judge the contents of your perceptual experience to be” or the
“non-introspective conclusions you draw from perceptual experience”. 127 In other words,
views categorized as moral perceptual experientialism hold that non-perceptual cognitive
states have top-down effects on perceptual states and therefore influence perceptual
experience. 128 Alternatively, MPJ views reject the presence of top-down influences or
overlook them by virtue of their silence on the subject. 129
It is clear that one’s background epistemic resources play an important role in moral
perception and the mirror-case’s analogous relationship to moral perceptual events
demonstrates the need to clarify the nature of that role. As a result of the details provided
by Table 2.1, two important questions can be used as substitutes for the moral perceptual
question and are to be addressed moving forward: (The Modularity Question) Can our
non-perceptual cognitive systems interact with our perceptual cognitive systems in an
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Rejecting top-down influence means that one believes “influence occurs exclusively in the response to the experience, rather than
in the production of the experience.” (Jenkins & Siegel, p.535)
126
127
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experience influencing way? And, (The Process Question) if influence is possible, at what
perceptual processing stage does one’s background epistemic resources seemingly
influence perceptual experience in morally pertinent cases? I address these in the next
section.
Table 2.1 Framework for distinguishing between potential stages of influence
on our discernments during moral perception. 130
Processing
Stage
Perceptual
Stage
(1) Early
Vision

Aspect
Influenced

Non-Moral
Examples

Moral Examples

shape, location,
motion, color,
intensity of
feature-based
attention

Perceiving a
grey-banana
image as
yellowtinted. 131
Unconsciously
perceiving a
rope as a snake
due to fear of
snakes, causing
you to flinch
but not know
why. 133
Consciously
perceiving a
rope as a snake
due to a fear of
snakes, causing
you to flinch.
You also know
you fear snakes
and that this is
making the
rope look like a
snake. 135

Intensified feature-based
attention of printed moral
terms like courage in
contrast to non-moral terms
like run. 132

(2)
Unconscious
Non-transparent
or preperceptual
conscious
contents
perceptual
states

(3) The
contents of
perceptual
experience

Transparent
contents of
perceptual
experience

Unconsciously perceiving
an act of sexual harassment
towards a jogger as
immoral & feeling outrage
but not knowing why. 134

View

MPE

Consciously perceiving an
act of sexual harassment
toward a jogger as
immoral, feeling outraged,
& knowing that you are
responding this way
because you believe sexual
harassment is immoral.

130 This table is based on the layout provided by Jenkins & Siegel (2015).
131
Witzel et al., 2011
132
Gantman & Van Bavel, 2014
133
Jenkin & Siegel 2015
134
Gantman & Van Bavel (2015a) introduce the ‘detection’ language which informs this interpretation of this example. “Detection”
will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.
135
Jenkin & Siegel 2015
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Table 2.1 (Continued)
Processing Stage
Responses to
Perceptual
Experience

Aspect
Influenced

(4) Introspective
Judgments about
the presences of
perceptual
contents

Perceptual
Beliefs

(5) Nonintrospective
conclusions
drawn from
perceptual
experience

Immediate
Perceptual
Judgments

Non-Moral
Examples

Veridically
perceiving some
blue berries as
green and tiny,
and, when
reflecting on the
experience later,
you judge them
to be unripe. 136
Veridically
perceiving some
blue berries as
blue and big and
immediately
judging them to
be ready to
pick. 137

Moral Examples

Veridically perceiving
someone kicking a newborn child and, when
reflecting on the
experience later, you
judge the act to be
immoral.

View

MPJ

Veridically perceiving
someone kicking a newborn child and
immediately judging the
act to be immoral. 138

2.3 Responding to the Modularity Question & the Process Question
If it is the case that one’s perceptual systems operate distinctly from non-perceptual
systems, then the moral perceptual experientialist position fails from the start. That is,
should we have reason to believe that the cognitive architecture of the mind is such that
there is never an occasion for non-perceptual background epistemic resources to interact
with or influence perceptual states, then we would need to accept that we are just not wired
in ways that facilitate influences posited at stages (1) – (3) in Table 1 during moral
perceptual events, influences which are the foundation of moral perceptual
Jenkin & Siegel 2015
Jenkin & Siegel 2015
138
It is worth noting that these examples focus on cases where the moral value of some action is the central topic of concern. I see no
reason, however, see this as a limitation. Moral perceptual events seemingly extend to discernments regarding the moral value of
people, objects, social structures, and relations.
136
137
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experientialism.

Modularity Arguments defend some version of this perspective,

referring to our information processing systems as mental ‘modules’. Among other things,
they argue that many of the mind’s cognitive mechanisms function on restricted flows of
‘information’ into those systems for processing, that they are encapsulated. 139 If perceptual
systems receive basic inputs from perceptual organs and cannot access information from
non-perceptual systems then the system in considered encapsulated. Encapsulation is the
litmus test for modularity and is, as a result, indicative of the impenetrability of perceptual
systems by non-perceptual states such as our background epistemic resources in cases of
moral perception. 140
Granted, there are some persuasive reasons to believe that our perceptual systems
are encapsulated. One case supporting the encapsulation of our visual systems from our
background epistemic resources includes examples like Müller-Lyer lines. 141 Our
perceptions of these lines represent them as of different length regardless of what we
believe, reason, or feel about this image, even if we know they are the same length. The
Müller-Lyer lines, the impossible trident, and so on give clear cases where early vision and
the contents of perception seem guided by perceptual processing mechanisms beyond any
influence by top-down cognitive influences from our background epistemic resources.
Uses of angular lines and a consistent horizon point in art regularly give the perceiver the
impression that an image, like the one below 142, has depth and does this on the basis of the

Robbins (2017), based on Fodor (1983)’s Modularity of Mind, succinctly outlines a ‘modules’ under the following categories: other
qualities include inaccessible to introspection, mandatoriness, speed, superficiality, dissociability, localizability, domain specificity,
and innateness. Should the encapsulation-test fail, these other aspects are more or less moot to the issue of top-down effects on
perception.
140
Robbins (2017). “Cognitive impenetrability is a matter of encapsulation relative to information stored in central memory,
paradigmatically in the form of beliefs and utilities.”
141
Image from Donaldson, D. and Macpherson F. (July 2017) "Müller-Lyer Illusion" The Illusions Index. Retrieved from
https://www.illusionsindex.org/ir/mueller-lyer.
142
Image from Jaurigue, L. (2019). Depth Cues. Asu.Edu. images produced for The Chalkboard at Arizona State University.
https://www.asu.edu/cfa/wwwcourses/art/SOACore/depthmain.htm
139

76

ways that our visual perceptual system processes features such as shape, environment, and
motion within the perceptual field. We often ‘play’ with this phenomenon in visual media.

Figure 2.1 Horizon Lines and Depth
Among other things, this kind of phenomenon makes three-dimensional representation on
a two-dimensional plane possible during animation. However, there are also a variety of
reasons to think that our perceptual processing systems are not encapsulated or
impenetrable even though the processes governing these kinds of spatial and depth cue
examples are compulsory and, in some sense, strict.
Macpherson (2015), while arguing for a version of cognitive penetration, points out
that dreams and hallucination have a symmetrical relationship with perceptions. Occasions
of loud noises while dreaming can change the content of a dream and partial hallucinations
seem to change the content of perceptual experience. Whether it's a thunderclap leading to
dreams of explosions or Lilliputian hallucinations leading to an experience of tiny people
in your salad, some experiences strongly suggest that dreaming and hallucination are
intertwined with perceptual processes in important ways. 143 In cases of dream-experiences,
the subject’s dream-perceptions are made possible seemingly because the perceptual
processing system gets much of its information from non-perceptual states, such as
background epistemic resources. In this way, Macpherson (2015) points out that human

143

Macpherson (2015) p. 348
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participation in dream-experiences gives us reason to think that perceptual-systems are not
encapsulated from non-perceptual systems. Similarly, hallucinatory experience, she
suggests, gives us reason to think that this happens outside of dreaming. Lilliputian
hallucinations are, prima facie, only possible if background epistemic resources, like our
memory of people, can influence perceptual processing in such a way to render tiny people
in one’s perceptual field.
Moreover, rather than thinking that these occasions of non-encapsulation are
motivated by some special set of conditions present during dreaming-experience or
hallucinatory-experience, I believe there are viable reasons to think that the synthesis of
non-perceptual and perceptual systems is a common feature of perceptual experience in
general. At its foundation, I believe the modularity question asks us to consider the nature
of our capacity to have experiences in the first place, to demystify the process by which
each of us construct a perceptual field with phenomenal content for ourselves as
consciousnesses. Do our mental processes facilitate the construction of an experience for
consciousness into a single unified perceptual field with phenomenal content as the result
of perceptual and non-perceptual processes interacting and synthesizing to form
representational content? Or, rather, do these processes operate in a more fractured sort of
way, wherein non-perceptual processes like judgment formation operate independently of
and respond to perceptual experience? The modularity question is, therefore, asking us
to consider whether perceptual experience is a unified whole or pluralistic composition.
Given this, Tim Bayne’s (2010) argument for the Unity Thesis can be read, I believe, as an
argument for the non-modularity of perceptual and non-perceptual systems and states.
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Bayne’s position is that any subject of an experience enjoys that event as an
experience because conscious states occur as a single total phenomenal state, a phenomenal
field. 144 On the Unity View, an experience is a whole over which the contents of experience
assume the status of subsumed parts. In this whole-part relation, conscious experience takes
on the phenomenal character that it does for an observing subject insofar as it is the
resulting unified synthesis of these parts rendered by perceptual and non-perceptual mental
processes. Bayne argues,
“The plausibility of the unity thesis derives largely from introspection. Consider the
structure of your overall conscious state. I suspect that you will be included to the view
that all your current experiences are phenomenally unified with each other- that they occur
as the components of a single phenomenal field: to put the same point in different
terminology, that you enjoy a single phenomenal state that subsumes them all. Call this
claim the unity judgement. … the unity of consciousness that is revealed to introspection
[and thus creates the unity judgement] is not a feature that consciousness possesses only
when one attends to its structure but is a feature that it enjoys all the time -- even when one
doesn’t (and perhaps cannot) introspect.” 145
In contrast, Bennett and Hill (2014) propose an alternative view, Unity Pluralism.
It holds that there is not one unity-making relation that provides a total or universal
phenomenal field. Instead, they suggest that “unity-making relations join fairly wide
swaths of the experiences of a subject at a time… experiences joined by one or more of our
unity-making relations do not thereby bear a part-whole relation to some larger experiential
whole, though some experience may still, by some measures(s), bear part-whole relations
to each other.” 146 That is, while watching a film results in an experience, the fact that the
phenomenal sense of sitting in a chair is distinguishable from the sense of distance between
you and the screen, they argue, is evidence for the separation, the distinctness, of these
phenomena during experience. As a result, they claim that we should understand that the
Bayne, T. (2010).
Bayne (2010), p. 75
146
Bennett & Hill (2014)
144
145
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unity of experience is actually achieved by a kind of unity pluralism rather than a single
unedifying phenomenal field. 147 In short, the response to Bayne (2010) being offered is
that there is no such ostensibly identified aspect of experience (i.e., no unifying
phenomenal field) revealed through introspection and that what is found are relations
between parts of experience with no unifying whole and, thereby, distinct modes of
perception articulate themselves independently of non-perceptual states, among other
things. They write,
“Indeed, as we’ve noted, for the unity pluralist, no significant unity-making relation by
itself unites all of the experiences of a subject at a time. Of course, various experiences of
a subject at a time will typically be linked by one or more unity-pluralist unity-making
relations - thickly, tightly, not much as all, and what have you. That is all there is to the
unity of experience, or so we suggest.” 148
Both the Unity and Unity Pluralism views seek to detail the structures of experience
in terms of cognitive relations. On this issue, I believe we should endorse Bayne’s
argument in favor of Bennett and Hill for two reasons. First, while Bennett and Hill endorse
the possible existence of unity-pluralist principles which serve the psychological
functioning of the subject, they problematically reject the existence of an overarching
singular experience. In their view, when I am in a theatre, the relation between me and my
chair is separate from my relation to the film screen and, as such, they would claim that my
experience is fractured in some way. Yet, this is not how we experience film watching. It
is not experienced as a sitting in a chair conjoined with sitting in front of a film screen,
rather my experience is a singular case of watching a film sitting down. There is a kind of
phenomenal smoothness to the experience, a unified phenomenological sense. My first

147
148

Bennett & Hill (2014), p. 237-239
Bennett & Hill (2014), p. 240
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objection then is that the unity-pluralist approach gets the phenomenology of experience
wrong and, as a result, overlooks the singular phenomenal unity of a perceptual experience.
Second, and more importantly, the very claim that there is a subject making sense
of the parts of an experience presupposes a single perspective by which those events can
be ‘made sense of together’ (i.e., synthesized) in the first place. Bayne, rather than Bennett
and Hill, seems receptive to this kind of observation perhaps because the former is sensitive
to an important distinction that the latter authors are not. As Susan Hurley (1994) describes
it:
“We can distinguish three kinds of unity. The first, unity of type or conceptual unity, is the
kind of unity involved when various objects all share some one attribute. … The second
kind of unity, unity of objects, is the kind of unity involved when various attributes all
attach to the same object. The third kind of unity, the unity of consciousness at a time, is
the kind of unity involved when various contents of consciousness at a time, including both
experiential events and propositional attitudes, are all associated with one center of
consciousness…” 149
With this distinction in mind, Bennett and Hill seem intent on claiming that type and object
unity (and perhaps others) exist as a relation between parts of experience. But, as Gullick
(2014) observes, “a conscious mental state [or experience] can exist if and only if it is
contained within a set of representations whose contents are integrated or unified in a way
that implies the existence of a single self or subject.” 150 Put otherwise, “consciousness pers
se requires at least some significant measure of representational unity or integration.” 151
Gullick (2014) and Bayne (2010) rightfully point out that consciousness integrates the parts
of an experience, perceptual and non-perceptual, into an occurrent experience for the
subject in the first place. Consciousness’s observation of perceptual experience reveals a

Hurley (1994), p. 55
Van Gullick (2014), p. 391
151
Van Gullick (2014), p. 391
149
150
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phenomenal field (akin to Chalmers’s global interpretation) rendered through the influence
of non-perceptual processes on perceptual states. What these observations amount to is
the idea that knowledge and expectations can influence perceptual experience and its
contents in important ways.
That said, we should not expect moral encounters to escape the unifying or
integrating impact of consciousness on perceptual experience. Where we take one’s
background epistemic resources to collect one’s moral beliefs, ways of thinking, and
affective sensibilities (including any senses of familiarity or moral expectations), the
unified nature of experience will seemingly synthesize the non-perceptual and perceptual
states during one’s coming to have an experience. Echoing Chalmers’s observations about
global interpretations, we should seemingly expect that our background epistemic content
will shape moral perceptual experiences by virtue of our cognitive capacity to synthesize
perceptual states and non-perceptual states into a phenomenal field of occurrent experience
for the subject. Through the influence of non-perceptual on perceptual systems, nonmodularity is supported by the notion that our systems are more integrated that we
commonly appreciate.
Moreover, there is growing evidence that there are top-down influences on
perceptual experience. As Christopher Berger (2018) observes, “The sensory information
we imagine is often treated by the brain in the same way as information streaming into us
from the outside world … Our [research] shows that what we imagine in our ‘mind’s eye’
can lead to changes in perception across our sensory systems, changing how we perceive
real information from the world around us in the future.” 152 Additionally, in non-moral
152

Berger (2018)
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considerations, Macpherson (2012 & 2015) cites the Perky effect to argue for the
possibility of cognitive penetration during perceptual experience. Describing a Perky effect
study, she writes:
“Subjects are placed facing a white wall and asked to visually imagine a certain object;
unbeknown to them, an image that is above conscious visible thresholds for normal
subjects is shown onto the wall. In these conditions, subjects subsequently report that they
had visual imagery but they deny that they saw anything. However, what they report
imagining is influenced by the image that is shone onto the wall… While the image
projected on the screen affected what was reported, indicating that perceptual processing
must have played a part in generating the experience, what was imagined affected what
was reported too. Subjects often reported elements to their experience in addition to those
present in the image that was projected onto the screen.” 153
For example, some participants in the study reported that they experienced a book with
writing when only an outline of a book was subtly projected onto the wall and others
reported that they saw a leaf with veins running through it when only a leaf outline was
projected. On other occasions where subjects were asked to imagine a city skyline and a
tomato was projected on the wall, people reported having imagined the skyline at sunset.
154

I propose that moral experiences are included in this category of cognitively penetrable

experiences.
Like the Perky effect, the prevalence of the moral pop-out effect (M-POP)
demonstrates that experiences of moral content are likely constructed by means of nonperceptual influences on perceptual processes. M-POP is the tendency for subjects to have
an enhanced perceptual experience of certain features in the perceptual environment. 155
Studies show that pop-out enhancements consistently correspond to the perceiver's moral
beliefs or dispositions and seemingly manifest both as a matter of awareness shifting and

Macpherson (2015) p. 348
Macpherson (2015) p. 348
155 Gantman & Van Bavel (2014), p. 132
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as an emphasizing of something’s phenomenal impression. Gantman’s and Van Bavel’s
(2014) study into the relationship between perceptual faculties and morally relevant stimuli
concluded that “moral concerns shape our basic awareness of perceptually ambiguous
stimuli.” 156 Where “perceptually ambiguous stimuli” includes a description of the
phenomenal character of perceptual experience, M-POP events shape experience
suggesting that perceptions mirror pre-existing moral beliefs as a consequence. Gantman
and Van Bavel (2015) go on to describe occasions of increased intensity and detection of
moral content in situations where subjects were asked to identify moral terms. In their
words, “the visual system is preferentially sensitive to moral content. Specifically, people
correctly detect moral words (e.g., kill, moral, should) with greater frequency than
nonmoral words (e.g., die, useful, could) – a phenomenon termed the ‘moral pop-out
effect’. 157
Granted, Gantman and Van Bavel seem more interested in the awareness directing
nature of moral cognition on perceptual experience than on the cognitive penetrability of
moral experiences. However, their work is persuasive evidence for adopting the
experimentalist position. Their research suggests that the non-perceptual contents of one’s
background epistemic resources influence perceptual contents during occurrent experience
in two ways, (i) by facilitating the detection of moral-features and (ii) by regulating the
intensity of a moral-feature-based attribution during occurrent experience. As it
pertains to (i), when researching our perceptual experience of moral language, they observe
that “... moral words more readily reached perceptual awareness compared with non-moral
words” and that priming observers to think that justice had been satisfied lowered the
156
157

Gantman & Van Bavel (2014), p. 29
Gantman & Van Bavel (2015a), p. 631-633
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perceptual detection threshold for injustice seemingly because they believed no injustice
was present thereby negating one’s detection of morally relevant content during occurrent
experience. 158 They write,
“When justice motives are activated (but not satiated), moral pop-out occurs on the very
first trial. Taken together, we suggest that moral content affects word detection in a way
that is sensitive to moral motives only when stimuli are perceptually ambiguous.” 159
What this passage suggests is that the ability to detect moral features in occurrent
experience and to recognize them as containing moral significance tracks the observer’s
non-perceptual cognitive states. Again, the manifestation (i.e., coming to detect) of a
feature in one’s experience, in this case a feature with moral content, corresponds to the
subject’s background epistemic resources (i.e., non-perceptual states). In this way, M-POP
is a special case of the larger Pop-out Effect phenomenon (POP). During POP events, when
imbedded within some set of homogeneous objects, one object’s difference causes it to
‘stand out’, as if to elevate its presence. 160 For example, consider the Figure 2.2 which

Figure 2.2 Color Pop-out Effect
contains a green dot placed in a field of red dots. Notably, this phenomenon is used by
advertisers to communicate with consumers. Gantman and Van Bavel’s work provides
evidence to think of morally substantive features in occurrent experience as analogous to
sensory experiences of colour, orientation, size, motion, and stereoscopic depth.

Gantman & Van Bavel (2015b), 76-77.
Gantman & Van Bavel (2016), p. 1728-1739.
For more on POP, see Treisman, AM. (1985). “Preattentive processing in vision.” Comput Vis Graph Image Proc. 1985;31:156–
177.; Wolfe, JM. (1994). “Guided Search 2.0 A revised model of visual search.” Psychon Bull Rev 1(2):202-38.; & Hsieh, P. J.,
Colas, J. T., & Kanwisher, N. (2011). “Pop-out without awareness: unseen feature singletons capture attention only when top-down
attention is available.” Psychological science, 22(9), 1220–1226.
158
159
160
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As it pertains to (ii), M-POP events in perceptual experience seemingly create a
‘‘vicious cycle’’ between beliefs and perceptions because the intensity of a moral feature
in one’s perceptual experience is often used to motivate or justify some moral judgment.
Gantman and Van Bavel (2014) write, “the enhanced perceptual awareness of moral stimuli
may help shed some light on sightings of religious and moral iconography in everyday
objects ...”. 161 Their study predicts that the character of morally pertinent experience
provides the intensification of a moral-feature’s attribution as if the feature gains a sense
of enhanced prominence in the perceptual experience and, thereby, acquires some kind of
forceful presence (i.e., like the green circle in a field of red circles). Given that these
features and their intensity in the phenomenal field correlate with an observer’s background
beliefs and affective sensitivities, one will predictably take the world to possess the moral
features that one expects it too. These experiences carry epistemic justification on the basis
of the prominence of the moral features in that occurrent moment for the subject, features
which ‘pop’ as if they possessed a kind of prominence in the perceptual field through the
intensity of a moral-feature-based attribution.
Views pertaining to socially informed modes of perception seemingly reinforce
evidence for the existence of the moral pop-out effect. 162 For example, Charles W. Mills’s
work on white ignorance. Mill’s argues that forces of white ignorance manifest a lived
social reality which shapes the way we encounter value in the world, specifically how these
realities come to hide a significant portion of that world from our observations. He argues

Gatman & Van Bavel (2014), p. 29
Adams and Kveraga (2015) report that socially relevant information pertaining to race and gender seemingly influence the
detection of things like expressed emotions and fear responses in those people we observe during occurrent experience. Specifically,
they suggest that top-down influences on shared social associations and identity categories influences our perceptions of others in
social relevant situations. It is worth noting that Jenkin and Siegel also observe that Francesco Marchi reject’s Adams & Kveraga’s
(2015) study as conclusive and turns to studies by Carroll and Russell (1996) and Levin and Banaji (2006) pertaining to race and
emotional expressions to support Adams and Kveraga (2015) proposed top-down model of social perception.
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that white ignorance is an epistemic process which systematically distorts an agent's
experiences. It does so to the extent that white ignorance articulates “... a particular pattern
of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions producing the ironic outcome that whites
will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made.” 163
Moreover, he argues that those infected by white ignorance 164 come to live in a “racial
fantasyland” wherein ignorance is the “cognitive and moral economy psychically required
for conquest, colonization, and enslavement.” 165 These agents, thereby, come to believe
that meritocracy is the prevailing law of the land even though there exists overwhelming
evidence to suggest that certain classes of the population are systematically oppressed on
the basis of race because their experiences reinforce that judgement. 166
As Mills observes, these beliefs and attitudes warp perceptions of oppression or
exploitation in ways that make such events seem ‘just’ by blinding the subject from, as
Gantman and Van Bavel might put it, detecting or perceiving belief-countervailing
contents within the experience. 167 The observer’s invested perceptual interest shapes their
encounter with the world. The very preservation of this worldview is seemingly predicated
on the idea that one’s beliefs and affective attitudes about the world impact one’s
experience of the world. Mills points to numerous cases where white privilege overrides
the needs of the marginalized as evidence of this phenomenon. In my estimation, these are
cases where two subjects can have the same perceptual contents but take the situation to
have different moral features in virtue of it having a different global interpretation for each

Mills (1997), p. 18
Mills himself claims that this infection isn’t limited to the white population and I expect that he would say the same about forms of
Male Ignorance and Heteronormative Ignorance.
165
Mills (1997), p. 18-19
166
This is seemingly also the case where class, gender, and sexuality in cases of where capitalistic economic elitism or
heteronormativity are the prevailing ideologies.
167
Alcoff (2007), p. 48
163
164
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observer given that such social perceptions track moral categories like ‘just’, ‘unjust’,
‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘fair’, ‘unfair, and ‘morally considerable’ or ‘morally non-considerable’.
Given these observations, I believe we are justified in adopting moral perceptual
experientialism for two reasons. First, in response to the modularity question, our
cognitive architecture is seemingly more integrated than encapsulated thereby providing
pathways through which top-down non-perceptual states (i.e., our background epistemic
resources) can influence our perceptual experiences during perceptual processing in salient
ways during stages (1)-(3) as described in Table 1. Second, in response to the modularity
question and the process question, the moral pop-out effect demonstrates that these
influences seemingly manifest through the detection of a morally substantive feature
during the occurrent experience as an instance of an influence on stages (2) & (3) thereby
shaping perceptual contents and through the intensity of a moral-feature-based attribute
such that the detected feature pops-out during one’s global interpretation of their perceptual
experience, as an influence on stage (1) of perceptual processing. Put informally, I believe
we should move forward by adopting the understanding that our ability to encounter moral
features during occurrent experience and to have them impress themselves upon us with
some intensity is not merely a process governed by our judgments about perceptual
experience. Rather, moral perceptions are an integral part of the process by which we have
perceptual experiences in the first place because we seem to have literal perceptual
experiences of moral properties during occurrent experience due to the unifying nature of
conscious experience and as evidenced by phenomena like M-POP. This is what it means
to adopt moral perceptual experientialism (MPE).
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2.4 Moral Perceptual Orientation: A framework for MPE
As a form of MPE, Moral Perceptual Orientation (MPO) purports that one
possesses a collection of background epistemic resources of morally relevant beliefs, ways
of thinking, and affective dispositions which can influence immediate perceptual
experience. MPO is informed by two ideas: that perception is cognitively penetrable, as
suggested by M-POP, and that experiences are constructed by a unifying perceptioncognition mechanism, as suggested by the given interpretation of Bayne’s Unity Thesis as
a kind of non-modularity argument.
In terms of the former idea, cognitive penetrability holds that cognitive states can
have top-down effects on perceptual content acquired during perceptual experience. 168 To
paraphrase Sillins’s (2016) articulation of its main thesis:
Cognitive Penetrability Thesis (CPT): if two agents share the same occurrent experience,
differ in regard to their perceptual content, and differ in regard to their background
epistemic resources, then the best explanation is that perceptual experience is cognitively
penetrable. 169
That is, perception is cognitively penetrable in terms of its perceptual content just in case
two people are the same with respect to their sensory inputs and the orientation of their
perceptual gaze but differ with respect to their perceptual experience. Given this, the
following moral corollary of CPT can be formulated:
Moral Cognitive Penetrability Thesis (MCPT): if two agents share the same occurrent
experience, take the situation to have different moral features, and differ in regard to their
background epistemic resources, then the best explanation is that moral perceptual
experience is cognitively penetrable.
That is, if two agents share an occurrent experience (i.e., share the same immediate moral
encounter), differ in regard to their observation of its moral features, and differ in regards
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Silins (2016) provides one of the clearest account of the cognitive penetration position and its epistemic consequences.
Sillins (2016), p. 27
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to their epistemic toolkits, then the suggestion is that moral perceptual experience is best
explained by the cognitive penetrability of perception, by MPE. Put this way, the previous
two sections can be read as clarifying the details and arguing in support of MCPT and
concluding that, as a thesis, it is sound given phenomena like M-POP. In this way, to adopt
MPE is to affirm MCPT and, therefore, MPO affirms MCPT.
As it pertains to the latter idea, MPO’s approach to cognitive penetration is modeled
on Macpherson’s (2012) two-step mechanism 170 as a framework for understanding the
cognitive penetrability phenomenon. 171 The first step in this mechanism “involves our
cognitive states causing some non-perceptual state with phenomenal character to come into
existence or to alter the phenomenal character of some existing non-perceptual state that
has phenomenal character.” 172 The second “involves the phenomenal character of these
non-perceptual states interacting with and affecting the phenomenal character and content
of perceptual experiences.” 173 As discussed earlier, she argues that this two-step
mechanism is observable in very common instances of imagining, hallucinations and
daydreaming suggesting that cognitive penetrability is a consequence of the integrated
nature of our cognitive faculties. 174 She writes,

170
In modeling MPO on this two-step mechanism, I am endorsing what Macpherson (2015) calls Cognitive Penetration Lite in
addition to the presumption that moral properties are importantly different than non-moral perceptual contents; moral features are not
perceivable in the same way as non-moral features. As a result, MPO follows Macpherson’s arguments for Cognitive Penetration Lite,
but commits to the idea that the perception of moral content q will not occur without a corresponding moral belief or affective
sensitivity. Additionally, it is not unlikely to expect that moral content q can be multiply realized by a swath of varying epistemic
toolkits. Moral content in perceptual experience is multiply realizable.
171
Macpherson (2015), p. 331-358
172
Macpherson (2012), p. 50-51
173
Macpherson (2012), p. 50-51
174
Macpherson (2012), p. 50. Macpherson also stated as much during a guest lecture at the University of Kentucky on September 28,
2017. As evidence, she points to the incorporation of perceptual elements into dreaming, and intertwined status of perceptual and
hallucinatory or illusory events.
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“... the processes that typically do create perceptual imagery, dreams, or hallucinations
interact with the perceptual processes to yield one state with phenomenal character. The
phenomenal character of the state is determined by the contribution of both processes:
imagery, dreaming or hallucination, on the one hand, and perception of the other.” 175
In this way, Macpherson observes that the integrated nature of our cognitive faculties plays
a formative role in our experiences. As such, MCPT gains initial support as a species of
CPT under Macpherson’s argument for the integrated nature of our cognitive faculties in a
way similarly argued for by Bayne’s unity thesis.
Using the ‘two-step mechanism’ as a guide, MPO is constructed around the idea
that experiences are rendered by a unifying perception-cognition mechanism which
serves as a perception influencing mechanism. 176 Put formally, MPO can be stated as
follows:
Moral Perceptual Orientation (MPO) 177: X has a moral perception of situation y when
I.
One acquires non-moral perceptual content as of y during a morally pertinent
occurrent experience;
II. One possesses background epistemic resources relevant to the content as of y;
III. One comes to possess a morally pertinent non-perceptual cognitive state (i.e., a
belief or an affect) or comes to alter the moral character of some existing nonperceptual state given I and II;
IV.
The non-perceptual state from III interacts with and influences the phenomenal
character and content of our perceptual experiences by means of consciousness’s
perception-cognition interface which unifies and constructs an experience with
moral contents for the observer (i.e., a perception influencing mechanism which
creates a unified experience 178). This influence takes one of two forms: (i) the
detection of a moral attribute in the contents of occurrent experience or (ii) the
increased intensity of that moral-feature-based attribute.

Macpherson (2015) p. 348
It is worth noting that this idea is neither novel nor without precedent. Kant’s manifold of apperception and the intelligibility of
experience under the intuitions (i.e., space and time) in combination with the categories of the understanding assents to the idea that
consciousness could fit such a unifying role. I do not wish to defend or endorse Kant’s views on human cognition. However, the
wherewithal to acknowledge that an experience is constructed by means of an unifying mechanism is an invaluable insight into how
we come to have experiences in the first place.
177
In modeling MPO on this two-step mechanism, I am endorsing what Macpherson (2015) calls Cognitive Penetration Lite which
holds that content q can be multiply realized in perceptual experience.
178
In Kantian terms, the best conceptual cousin to the unified experience is the manifold of apperception which represents a synthetic
unity of the manifold by means of our intuitions (i.e., time and space) and the categories. The genealogical difference here, however,
is that a unified experience need not be beholden to the Kant’s categories of the understanding so described in the Prolegomena or the
Critique of Pure Reason.
175
176
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As its name suggests, MPO takes one’s background epistemic resources to provide the
orientation by which one comes to experience a global interpretation of the world, an
interpretation with moral content.
It is worth noting that an alternative approach to moral perceptual experientialism
has been offered by Jennifer Church’s (2013) The Possibilities of Perception. 179 Church’s
brand of moral experientialism is a product of her Extended Perception Thesis. Put
succinctly, it states that the imagination plays an essential role in our ability to have
perceptual experiences inasmuch as it serves as both content producer and experience
synthesizer. As Church understands the perceptual process, the imagination plays an
essential part of how we come to have experiences in the first place. She argues that, “…
we actively imagine alternative perspectives whenever we experience something as an
objective state of affairs” and, thereby, occurrent experiences are rendered as perceptional
experience in tandem with our imagined experience of alternatives to our immediate
perceptual experience. 180 Additionally, Church holds that it “is our ability to use our
imaginations to synthesize a multiplicity of different perspectives and possibilities (past
and future, actual and merely possible) that enables us to perceive an object or a sequence
of events as objectively valid.” 181 To illustrate, consider the following examples offered by
Church:
“we perceive an object such as a tree insofar as we simultaneously imagine how it would
appear from other points of view. For it is the imagined convergence of different
perspectives around a single state of affairs that gives us the experience of its spatiality and
its objectivity... When it comes to perceiving someone as an agent—as the locus of multiply
intertwined mental states, I want to make a similar suggestion: to perceive that someone is
a person we must imagine that person in a variety of situations—some of which are actual

Macpherson (2017) seems to flirt with a similar view regarding the role of imagination as Church.
Church (2010), p. 649
181
Church (2013) p. 222, emphasis added.
179
180
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and many of which are merely possible, and we must discover what is invariant across
those imagined actions.” 182
She goes on to similarly describe our imagining of moral objects or properties in the
following way:
“... [imagining] is also guided by [an agent’s] implicit knowledge of what should happen....
It is not enough to direct one’s imagining with a loving attitude or a desire to do right by
others plus a good understanding of causal laws; one must also know a good deal about
what doing right by others involves, and that is where moral laws enter… in the case of
moral perception the relevant laws must include moral laws…” 183
This alternative and those like it, henceforth referred to in a general way as
imaginative moral perceptual experientialism (IMPE), take the imagination to serve
as a perception influencing mechanism. That is, the imagination serves as the
synthesizer of perceptual and non-perceptual cognitive states thereby rendering a
perceptual experience for the subject. In addition to its role as a contributor to our
background epistemic resources, the imagination is rendering perceptual experience in a
way that makes moral properties a feature of perceptual experience. Put formally, these
views look something like the following:
Imaginative Moral Perceptual Experientialism (IMPE): X has a moral perception of
situation y when
I.
II.
III.
IV.
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One acquires non-moral perceptual content as of y during a morally pertinent
occurrent experience;
One possesses background epistemic resources relevant to the content as of y;
One comes to possess a morally pertinent non-perceptual cognitive state (i.e., a
belief or an affect) or comes to alter the moral character of some existing nonperceptual state given I and II through the use of one’s imaginative faculties;
The non-perceptual state from III interacts with and influences the phenomenal
character and content of our perceptual experiences by means of imagination’s
role as a perception influencing mechanism which creates a unified experience
through an act of synthesis.

Church (2013) p. 199-200
Church (2013) p. 218-219

93

MPO does not rely on imagination to have the perception influencing role that
IMPE seems to do. As a kind of view, IMPE’s reliance on the imagination as an experience
generating faculty problematically blurs the distinction between perception and
imagination. That is, the imagination, when understood as a creative faculty, is
undoubtably a source of cognitive content. Yet, IMPE is also suggesting that imaginings
and perceptual experience share in an experience-like quality, a global interpretation a la
Chalmers or a phenomenal unity a la Bayne, and from this suggesting that it is the
imagination that is doing the work to construct an experience for the subject. Granted,
daydreams and mental imaginings, perhaps even dreaming itself, do seem to possess
something akin to perceptual experience, at least in the sense that we can be said to
experience a dream, a daydream, and imaginative imagery. However, rather than taking
this to indicate that the imagination serves a synthesizing role in rendering experience, I
think it should indicate to us that each of the aforementioned experience-like events is
rendered by some other experience unifying mechanism. I propose the unifying function
that consciousness serves fits this role better than the imagination.
I take this to be the case for two reasons. First, thinking that the imagination serves
a synthesizing role in our coming to have an experience given that imagining has an
experience-like quality seems ill-reasoned. By way of analogy, it would be fallacious to
conclude that the Earth is the orbit-defining determinant in a collection of planets because
we observe that Earth, Mars, and Venus have predictable orbits. It would be strange to say
that the Earth is the thing motivating clear orbital paths. Similarly, it would be fallacious
to believe that patient A is the cause of the flu because we observe that patient A, B, and C
display symptoms of the same affliction. At best, this reasoning seems like a kind of red
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herring inasmuch as it draws our attention away from the relationship between planets and
gravity or, as in the second case, people and viruses. With this in mind, it seems like a step
in a wrong direction to observe that dreams, imaginings, and perceptual experiences share
a similar experience-like quality and endorse the claim that the imagination is the
experience-synthesizing mechanism fueling our capacity to undergo experience-like
events. Instead, we are better off observing that dreams, imaginings, and perceptual
experiences share something in common and start from there.
Second, consciousness’s unifying role, as Bayne describes it, is seemingly well
suited to account for the experience-like (i.e., ‘the phenomenal unity’ or “global
interpretation”) nature of events like dreams, imaginings, and perceptual experience. As
Bayne (2007) discusses related issues, the role of ‘consciousness’ during dreaming
conceivably serves a different function for the subject than it does during waking forms of
consciousness. That is, REM dreaming’s experience-like quality manifests cognitive states
“in which the contents of consciousness derive from internal stimulation rather than
environmental input, reasoning and decision‐making is impaired, and one enjoys unusual
(at least, relative to normal waking consciousness) conscious states.” 184 Defending this
functional approach to understanding consciousness, Bayne (2007) writes,
“The functional role of a particular conscious state is, at least in part, dependent on the
background state of consciousness in which it occurs. In normal wakefulness the contents
of consciousness are available to the mechanisms associated with rationality and memory‐
consolidation in a way in which they are not available in dreaming, inebriation, hypnosis
or delirium.” 185
The takeaway here is that the function of consciousness, given this approach, is to provide
a unified phenomenal field upon which we, as subjects, are said to have experiences, in
184
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waking moments or otherwise. This is precisely the role MPO takes consciousness to have
during moral perceptions. As a result, when coupled with an appreciation of the role that
our background epistemic resources have during cognitive penetration of our experience
(at least in morally pertinent scenarios), I believe we have strong reasons to view MPO as
preferable to IMPE.
2.5 Conclusion
MPO, and experientialism in general, is not without its opponents. Most cutting
among them, perhaps, is Pekka Väyrynen. Väyrynen (2018) raises several doubts regarding
views like MPO. Generalized, his concerns center on the belief that inputs from perception,
imagination, supposition, and belief are immediate and often bound up with certain
emotional and affective dispositions; the result of a sense of inference which captures broad
transitions in thought akin to intuitions, affective connections, heuristics, associations, and
so on. 186 Generally put, those in a similar camp as Väyrynen challenges experientialist
models, like MPO, in two ways.
First, they offer the reduction response which claims that moral perceptions
during occurrent experience can easily be explained by judgementalist views rather than
by experientialists views because the former posit that ‘transitions in thought’ more simply
account for the recognition of moral features during occurrent experience. That is, a rulelike cognitive relation between perceptual experience and moral judgments can
automatically guide one to form moral discernments about occurrent experience.
Väyrynen’s claim is, then, that judgmentalism avoids the need to posit a perception
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In many ways, the kind of view Väyrynen seems to lean towards views like those in Audi (2013).
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influencing cognitive mechanism, a defining feature of experientialist views. Ultimately,
the reduction response takes moral perceptions to be reducible to moral judgements
because working with transitions in thought is believed to be simpler and more likely than
introducing a perception influencing mechanism.
Second, they offer the empty promise response, which claims that experientialist
views “add no explanatory power” above that of judgementalist views. We might observe
that subjects engaged in moral encounters cannot help having the moral impression of them
that they do. However, both automatic moral judgements (thought transitioning forms of
judgmentalism) and moral perceptual experiences (experientialism) posit a lack of volition
on the part of the epistemic agent regarding how one judges a situation or experiences it
respectively. That is, if experientialism is correct, we cannot help having the moral
perceptual experiences we do during immediate moral experience and, if judgementalism
is correct, we cannot help making the moral judgements that we do during immediate moral
experience. The empty promise response takes judgementalism to be as, if not more,
helpful when understanding the epistemology of and our obligations during moral
encounters than experientialism without the complications that come with utilizing a
perception influencing cognitive mechanism.
I want to respond to these concerns by first acknowledging that some broader sense
of inference does seem to be at play in our epistemic lives; cognitive associations are
common. Transitions in thought by means of a rule-like relation or a felt sense of
connection are indeed part of our everyday lives as epistemic agents. Miranda Fricker’s
(2007) use of heuristics in Epistemic Injustice or Robert Audi’s (2013) use of an affective
or emotional cognitive connection in Moral Perception rightly illustrate how a broader
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sense of inference can be employed to describe judgment formations during moral
encounters. Fricker uses heuristics to illustrate how automatic recognitions of moral
content about the testimony of marginalized populations amounts to a non-inferential moral
judgement formation about their credibility. 187 Likewise, Audi uses a felt sense of
connection, ‘intuitions’, between non-moral contents and moral properties to explain how
we recognize a situation’s moral features.
However, the real force of the reduction response is best illustrated if we turn to
Väyrynen’s (2018) central counter-case, the possibility of cognitive penetrability during
proton-identification.
Proton-identification case: “When Marie, a trained physicist, sees a trail of vapor bubbles
in the cloud chamber, she doesn’t need to figure anything out, she can just see that a proton
is going by.” 188
Väyrynen argues that this proton-identification case gives strong reasons to believe the
judgmentalist model, where one’s training and heuristic mechanisms facilitate judgment
formations, is more appealing because it undermines the possibility of cognitive
penetration in a more general sense. 189 That is, what might we expect Marie to be actually
experiencing when she sees the vapor bubbles? She may report that she is seeing a proton,
but the idea that Marie comes to literally see the proton is problematic. Granted, Marie, by
all accounts of perceptual sharpness, cannot come to see a literal proton because it is an
unobservable. Yet, I do not take this to be Väyrynen’s (2018) point. By trying to describe
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Fricker calls this a perceptual-model of heuristics judgment formations because the process is non-inferential, a transition in
thought.
188
Väyrynen, p. 117
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Väyrynen p. 118
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the epistemological mechanisms at play, the case asks us to endorse one of two
possibilities, either:
1) That Marie has an occurrent experience with a phenomenal character informed by
the presence of proton-representing perceptual content which grants her perceptual
knowledge of the proton’s presence, or
2) That Marie has an occurrent experience with a phenomenal character informed by
a puff of vapor which she is used to make an automatic cognitive association which
concludes that a proton is present. In this case, Marie only comes to have nonperceptual knowledge of the presence of the proton.
I believe Väyrynen’s (2018) choice to endorse (2) rather than (1) is driven by a belief that
knowledge of p, the presence of the proton, can either be a form of non-perceptual
knowledge or perceptual knowledge, but not both, in this case. Where representational
perceptual content of proton-ness is distinct from vapor-puff representational content,
Väyrynen’s endorsement (2) seems motivated by the idea that nothing in the unified
phenomenal field of the subject (i.e., their perceptual field), can properly be said to have
proton-representing perceptual content, content which yields perceptual knowledge of the
proton. Instead, one is better off endorsing the claim that a perceptual judgment about the
vapor-puff is what permits Marie to have non-perceptual knowledge of the proton’s
presence.
However, if we grant that proton-experiences are cognitively penetrable, Marie’s
knowledge of p, in cases where her training and expertise is robust in these kinds of
experiments, could be said to be secured through a two-step cognitive penetrability process.
First, logically, an immediate cognitive association occurs between the vapor-puff and the
idea of the presence of a proton in Marie’s non-transparent background epistemic
processes. Then, this non-perceptual knowledge would go on to influence Marie’s
perceptual experience through the immediate perceptual detection of a proton-
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representative property in the vapor which POPs and an intensification of the vapor’s
proton-feature attributive space in the perceptual field. Marie’s automatic, non-transparent,
and non-perceptual understanding of p manifests perceptual experiences which yield
perceptual knowledge of p. Yes, Marie’s training and background epistemic information
makes her an excellent discriminator of a proton’s presence. Yet, CPT’s claim is not that
such cognitive associations never happen, but rather that those associations play an
important part in rendering some cognitive states, like beliefs and cognitive associations,
into contents of perceptual experience for experts whose experience have a phenomenal
unity with a felt sense of naturalness. In this way, the example as it is often presented sets
up a kind of false dichotomy and, in doing so, talks past the central issue of perception
influencing mechanisms operating in tandem with judgment formation mechanisms.
Väyrynen (2018), as reductionist, favors (2) because it is simpler rather than address the
possibility that our cognitive and perceptual systems are complicated to the extent that (1)
is influenced and informed by (2). In taking this approach, the reductivist response seems
to sidestep the modularity question and the process question. In this case, simplicity is
not necessarily a theoretical virtue.
Similarly, Väyrynen (2018) also offers a parallel case with an ethical twist. It is set
up in the following way:
Cat-abuse: “If you round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a
cat and ignite it, you do not need to conclude that what they are doing is wrong you do not
need to figure anything out; you can see that it is wrong.” 190
Again, Väyrynen would have us choose between two kinds of explanations in this case:
(1’) that one gain’s knowledge of the action’s wrongness by means of perceptual
190
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knowledge or (2’) that one comes to have the immediate belief that the situation is wrong
through non-perceptual knowledge facilitated by some form of cognitive association.
Again, moral properties in this case, like proton-ness in the previous case, are seemingly
communicated to the subject because our detection and intensification of a property in
the experiences seemingly attaches to the experience because background cognitive
associations occur. By stopping at these associations, however, we are not actually
interrogating moral perceptual experiences and phenomena like M-POP because the
reduction response seemingly gets the object of study wrong or does not afford our
cognitive systems the complexity they possess.
Second, and as a result of the observations above, the empty promise response
misses the force that immediate experience has on our epistemic lives in experientialist
approaches to moral perception. Under a judgementalist position, we are restricted to the
claim that errors in one’s moral perceptions are errors in judgment. Yet, if MPO is correct,
then moral discernments about our immediate experiences can be influenced at the
experiential level rather than just the judgmental level. This has consequences for our moral
epistemological activity. That is, MPO predicts that moral perceptions will occur in such a
way that moral properties exhibit the same phenomenal qualities that non-moral objects
and properties exhibit. Properties like “goodness” would function like color or shape in an
experience of looking at a brown chair. In this way, moral perceptions under experientialist
views harbor a kind of objective-sense which is materially distinct from the kind of
justificatory sense one obtains from automatic judgments via various forms of cognitive
association. Put analogously, it is very difficult to convince someone to be skeptical that
there is a chair in front of them. As one acquires perceptual knowledge of the chair before
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them, the individual takes their justification for belief c, “that there is a chair in front of
me”, to be built into and supported by their experience of the chair. Similarly, convincing
someone that there is a ‘wrong’ in front of them when they are having an experience that
there is something ‘good’ or ‘permissible’ in front of them would be equally, if not more,
difficult.
As Church (2010) puts this kind of observation, perceptual knowledge is a more
secure, although not more reliable, source of knowledge than non-perceptual forms of
knowledge. She writes, “Knowledge that is inferential rather than perceptual will be less
secure insofar as it depends on a series of steps that may be forgotten [or disrupted] by the
time the calculation is reached.” 191 I may have reasons for making a judgment, but I might
forget or loose transparent access to those reasons. In contrast, moral perceptual knowledge
gained by a subject during occurrent experience is mediated by one’s deeply held and
worldview guiding background epistemic resources under MPO. Church’s observation is
that moral perceptual knowledge, from an experientialist perspective, would be less
susceptible to doubt because the justification for holding some moral belief m, as by moral
perceptual knowledge, gains the same kind of epistemic status as c for the observer. This,
of course, can have both positive and negative impacts on our moral life, but this
observation is in direct contradiction to the empty promise response and has a lot of
explanatory power, especially in terms of Mills’s view on things like white ignorance.
Church (2010) also observes that perceptual knowledge can be a valuable resource
for developing and acquiring new knowledge. That is, once Marie has gained the ability to
acquire p in the form of perceptual knowledge, she is granted the advantage of devoting
191
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one’s cognitive workload towards acquiring and calculating new knowledge or,
alternatively, using the ability to picture the location of a proton in rough visual space to
inform other parts of the experience. 192 In as much as personal moral progress is concerned,
the capacity to inform one’s life by means of moral perceptual knowledge gained through
acts of moral perception, as understood by MPO, would seemingly be an advantage to
moral progress. Similar observations are made by a swath of scholars influenced by neovirtue theory like Fricker’s (2007) call for ‘virtuous seeing’ in Epistemic Injustice or
Margaret Olivia Little’s (1995) description of the ‘virtuous knower’ in “Seeing and Caring:
The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology”.
Moreover, Church (2010) suggests that perceptual knowledge is more efficiently
motivating in human psychology, especially in cases of moral knowledge. Church writes,
“perceptions usually motivate us more efficiently than beliefs that depend on inference [or
judgment]. … Insofar as increased responsiveness to the world and to others is desirable,
then seeing reasons will be preferable to understanding that remains non-perceptual.” 193
That is, if MPO, or another form of experientialism, is correct then it carries the benefit of
clarifying issues related to moral motivation during occurrent experiences. Just as one is
efficiently motivated to sit in a chair they observe in the world, one can be expected to be
more motivated to meet the demands of the moral world should they acquire moral
perceptual knowledge during moral perceptions of occurrent experience.
In summary, where the reduction response to views like MPO seems to get the
object of study wrong by looking for simpler answers to make sense of our highly complex
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perceptual systems, the empty promise response seemingly overlooks the viable
explanatory points in MPOs favor. Ultimately, by taking MPO seriously, we can begin to
make sense of the role of moral perceptions by acknowledging that there are people that
do wrong things, people that have wrong things done to them, and that we need to turn our
attention to understanding what it means to say that there are people that see these wrong
things happen. More importantly, we can begin to explore why some see and others fail to
see the world’s moral features, whatever those turn out to be.
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CHAPTER 3. THE UNFREEDOM OF MORAL PERCEPTION DURING
OCCURRENT EXPERIENCE
“Human freedom is … rooted in the human sensibility.”
-

Herbert Marcuse, “Nature and Revolution”, Counterrevolution and
Revolt (1972).

“Even those whom you would think of as defeated are living beings figuring out how to
stay attached to life from within it, and to protect what optimism they have for that, at
least.”
-

Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (2011).

“The first stratification [of consciousness] is ālayavijñāna or store-consciousness, the
repository of all vāsānas (traces of past experience). The “seeds” generated by good or
bad action, are stored in the “ālaya-consciousness”. It is the realm of potentiality.”
-

Bina Gupta, “The Buddhist Schools”. An Introduction to Indian
Philosophy. (2012)

3.1 Introduction
Dominant conceptions surrounding gender, race, class, and other group striations
cover our social topography. They define guidelines that direct and discipline the social
subject according to the sensibilities of the local, and sometimes global, normative social
order. Sara Ahmed, a feminist affect theorist and social philosopher, consistently refines
our appreciation of this by showing how social sensibilities, or norms, constitute an
expected “way of living, a way of connecting with others over or around something.” 194
That is, life’s experiences are consistently shaped by dominant social sensibilities because
of their directing and disciplining power. Moreover, as black feminist theorist like Patricia
Hill Collin’s and social political theorist’s like Charles W. Mills point out, society’s
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interlocking social-political systems have the power to mold a subject’s epistemological
standpoint. 195 Life’s experiences, that is, also have the capacity to transcribe a society’s
sensibilities onto the minds and bodies of its members through a socialization process that
transforms external evaluative expectations into internal background epistemic structures
which mediate thought and knowing. As a result, one’s background epistemological
resources, and thereby one’s conscious apprehension of life’s experiences, are subject to
the same dominant social sensibilities, even when they occupy cultural and sub-cultural
spaces. Yet, what is the nature of the relationship between consciousness, a subject’s life
experiences, and their 196 background epistemic resources? What does this relationship have
to tell us about one’s moral perceptions of occurrent experience given its capacity to impact
our immediate apprehension of the world?
Moral perceptions occur whenever one comes to have an immediate discernment
about the moral features of an occurrent experience. 197 If someone is walking down the
street, it is not unreasonable to want that person to come to have the immediate belief that
their occurrent experience represents something morally wrong should they encounter, say,
someone kicking an infant. Yet, it is often the case that instances of bullying, exploitation,
sexual harassment, race or gender discrimination, and other forms of oppression are
overlooked features of occurrent experience. That is, when confronted by such events, there

See Collins (2008) & Mills (2007)
Note: ‘they’, ‘their’, and ‘them’ are used throughout this paper as a gender-neutral personal pronouns. English does not have a
gender-neutral third-person singular personal pronoun. As a result, some version of “his or her” is traditionally used instead. However,
I have chosen to adopt this convention in order to use gender inclusive language in my work. As a result, you will often see pronoun
choices which reflect the following kind of change: “Someone dropped his or her book.” written as “Someone dropped their book.”.
197
The nature of this belief, whether it is perceptual or non-perceptual, is surely relevant to this question. However, the focus of this
current piece is to investigate the source and plasticity of our background epistemic resources. These resources serve as a ground upon
which consciousness renders a morally pertinent encounter into an experience with moral features. Moral perceptions, as an
immediate discernment of a situation’s moral features, can be considered perceptual or non-perceptual, judgmental, in nature,
depending on what moral perceptual theory you endorse. Regardless of one’s preferred moral perceptual theory, a view about the
formation of our background epistemic resources is needed in order inform our understanding of how moral perceptions are mediated
by our existing moral beliefs and dispositions. In this way, the framework offered here is intended to apply to any moral perceptual
theory.
195
196
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are swaths of people that do not come to have a moral perception of a situation’s immorality
or, instead, can falsely take an oppressive act to be ‘right’ rather than ‘wrong’. Notably,
cases where one’s moral perceptions are insensitive to the moral status of the other are
especially alarming (e.g., during acts of sex trafficking, slavery, testimonial injustice, and
so on). Given this, it is important that we understand the extent to which one is free to
influence their moral perceptions because such discernments play an indispensable role in
navigating moral life.
With this in mind, the aim of this piece is to develop an interdisciplinary perspective
on the development of the background epistemic resources available to human
consciousness in order to investigate the extent to which one is free to influence their moral
perceptions. In what follows, I develop a dialectical view of consciousness in order to
conceptualize the relationship between life’s experiences and our background epistemic
resources. To do this, I synthesize the work of Herbert Marcuse with the phenomenological
branch of Feminist Affect Theory using Buddhist moral psychology, specifically work
from the Mahāyānan tradition. From this, I go on to argue that a subject’s moral perceptions
of occurrent experience are outside their immediate control because background epistemic
resources and structures cultivated through dialectical consciousness curate the contents of
such discernments. That is, I argue that we are not free to have moral perceptions in
whichever way we wish during occurrent experience because such immediate discernments
are not ours to willfully control in the moment. However, I conclude by supporting the
claim that we can influence our moral perceptions by cultivating the grounds upon which
our dialectical consciousness is rooted.
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3.2 Marcuse’s Epistemic Subject: Reason and Drives
Marcuse, a critical social philosopher from the Frankfort School of Critical Theory,
approaches the subject qua knower, henceforth referred to as the epistemic subject, with
the understanding that they seek to make sense of their world, to render it intelligible as a
consciousness in that world. In his view, life shapes consciousness and society curates life.
That is, he recognizes that society’s expectations and practices shape the epistemic
subject’s habits of thought through manipulation of a subject’s drives and ways of thinking
by means of curating life’s experiences through social sensibilities. He argues that the
rationality, one’s way of thinking and connecting with others, within advanced capitalist
industrial society is whittled down by our immersion into the happenings and sensibilities
of society. As such, a subject’s critical reflective capacities atrophy and result in a onedimensional (i.e., uncritical or merely positive) form of thought and knowing. He writes,
“The means of mass transportation and communication, the commodities of lodging, food,
and clothing, the irresistible output of the entertainment and information industry carry
with them prescribed attitudes and habits, certain intellectual and emotional reactions
which bind the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter,
to the whole. The products [and infrastructure] indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote
a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood. … it becomes a way of life.
It is a good way of life – much better than before – and as a good way of life, it militates
against qualitative change. Thus emerges a pattern of one-dimensional thought and
behavior in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the
established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this
universe. They are redefined by the rationality of the given system and of its quantitative
extension.” 198
Alternatively put, the subject, as a result of living within an advanced capitalistic
civilization, conforms to dominant sensibilities regarding value, morality, and meaning not
merely because they adopt those attitudes by means of willful practice. Instead, the ways
in which one connects and interfaces with others, social artifacts, and the material world
198
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prompts the epistemic subject to internalize society’s ‘rationality’, its way of thinking and
operating. This, in turn, governs expected forms of thought and knowing in the subject. At
the same time, the epistemic subject’s capacity to resist this process via critical, negative,
thought is undermined because the sense that the ‘world as it is’ is not also the ‘world as it
must be’ diminishes. The subject comes to believe that ‘conformity with local sensibilities’
is a rational choice in that conformity is in the subject’s best interest, inasmuch as they are
aware, where one’s life is ‘bettered’ by that system, sometimes at the expense of others.
The result is that the epistemic subject acquiesces to the value and meaning structures
governing the social world as if they were a necessity because the current social order, and
its sensibilities, defines ‘how things are done’. One-dimensional thinking, as a kind of
operational thinking, persists because the subject is directed and disciplined, he argues, by
a social system which “permeates the general consciousness” resulting in the absorption of
negative thinking into positive, one-dimensional, thinking. 199
For example, consider our relationship to automobiles. They have a certain amount
of utility inasmuch as they are useful tools for traveling. Cars can also support meaningful
relationships because they allow for visits with friends, family, and services (i.e., hospitals,
grocery stores, …) that are located outside reasonable walking distances. As a result, road
systems develop over time, cityscapes build parking garages, freeways are constructed
between cities, freeways are tolled, street parking is established, traffic officers are hired,
parking attendants are dispatched, demand for cars rise, people are hired to increase car
production, mechanics learn how to fix them, and the pedestrian is restricted to walk-ways
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and sidewalks. Cars become an integral part of contemporary life. In many places within
the United States, having a car has almost become a precondition for life’s activities.
With this example in mind, Marcuse’s observations about society and onedimensional thinking can be illustrated in the following way. Navigating society and
connecting with people through our use of cars amounts to a kind of social administration
of our lives because the performance of certain expected car-based actions and ways of
thinking are required to have relationships and access services (i.e., waiting in traffic,
finding parking, traveling on roads, …). A car-rationality, a way of thinking based on cars,
emerges and is internalized by the subject when making decisions about their life (i.e.,
which jobs to apply to, school to attend, friends to hold on to, family to visit, ways to vote,
…). In turn, the reality of the world, materially and socially, becomes not only more carfriendly but car-advocating. The world systematizes the role of cars into a ‘need’ and we,
as subjects in a world of cars, are indoctrinated to accept dominant social sensibilities about
cars. Thoughts about robust public transportation systems, pedestrian friendly cities, and
so on become valuable only in relationship to their car-supportive claims. Resistance to
car-rationality is directed and disciplined so that the subject accepts the car’s place in life.
Moreover, it becomes rational for the subject to adopt the dominant social sensibility about
cars because the world is organized to help people by car-means. Ultimately, the roadways
of the car-world shape the rational pathways of our inner-world wherever one says “I can’t
get there because I don’t have a car” when in reality one can’t get there because society
resists alternative ways of life that are not dependent on car-use (i.e., one with robust public
transportation).
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As a theoretical ground, Marcuse uses an interpretation of Freud’s psychoanalysis
to flush out his view of the epistemic subject and the influential role of social sensibilities.
He writes, “Freud’s theory reveals the biological deindividualization beneath the
sociological one… The primary instincts pertain to life and death - that is to say, to organic
matter as such. And they link organic matter back with unorganic matter and forward
within higher mental manifestations.” 200 The thought expressed in this passage, and
throughout Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization, is that the sociological forces of civilization
shape the primary life and death drives into expressions which direct our general
disposition to the world. Such dispositions are shaped to align with some ideological
guidelines of the good life, with some set of social sensibilities. Put alternatively, social
scripts, both explicit and implied, communicate expectations and provide the framework
by which society disciplines deviation from normalized standards. These standards are
internalized by one’s drives and dictate how one is drawn to or repulsed from certain
actions, objects, and peoples. Through this, one’s consciousness of the world is affectively
articulated and is reason shaping.
As an investigation into the social epistemological forces of civilization, Marcuse’s
work on the epistemic subject’s drives seeks to unpack the relationship between social
sensibilities (i.e., the rationality of the social system) and individual sense-abilities.
Marcuse’s use of ‘sensibilities’ often references normative expectations which define the
standards of appropriate rational and drive-based frameworks for social encounterresponse behaviors. However, he often uses ‘sensibilities’ in a second way. In contrast to
sensibilities, ‘sense-abilities’ reference a subject’s rational and drive-based sensitivities
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which render the moral and non-moral value landscape comprehensible to the subject. This
distinction begins to form in the following passage from Marcuse’s “Freedom and Freud’s
Theory of the Instincts”:
“The organism develops through the activity of two original basic instincts: the life instinct
[i.e. Eros] and the death instinct, the destructive instinct. While the former strives for the
binding of living substance into ever larger and more permanent units, the death instinct
desires regression to [a] condition [like that which existed] before birth, without needs and
thus without pain… Thus the psychic dynamic takes the form of a constant struggle of
three basic forces: Eros, the death instinct, and the outside world. Corresponding to these
three forces are the three basic principles which according to Freud determine the function
of the psychic apparatus: the pleasure principle, the Nirvana principle, and the reality
principle… the pleasure principle stands for the unlimited unfolding of the life instinct [for
joy and happiness], and the Nirvana principle for the regression into the painless condition
before birth [i.e. of existence without struggle or suffering], and the reality principle
signifies the totality of the modifications of those instincts compelled by the outside
world.” 201
Marcuse’s observation of the reality principle in this excerpt highlights his commitment to
the claim that subjects modify their sense-abilities in accordance with normative
parameters defined by the outside social world according to its sensibilities. The influence
of dominant sensibilities on a subject’s sense-abilities can appear wherever the subject
strategically adapts their desires and ways of thinking in order to navigate the tension that
exists between the reality principle, the pleasure principle (i.e., individual desires motivated
by the life instinct), and the Nirvana principle (i.e., the pursuit of contentment motivated
by the death instinct). Put otherwise, adaptation of one’s sense-abilities to the dominant
sensibilities occurs as a result of the directing and disciplining forces within civilization
on the subject trying to fit-in for their own sake.

201

Marcuse (1970) p. 164-165

112

Further evidence for the important role of this distinction in his work is found in
The Essay on Liberation. Here, he points out that what we take to be obscene or beautiful
is most often curated by the social order’s dominant sensibilities. 202 He argues that
obscenity is used as “a moral concept in the verbal arsenal of the Establishment, which
abuses the term by applying it, not to expressions of its own morality but to those of
another.” 203 That is, a subject’s repulsion from the obscene and attraction toward the
beautiful follow normalized standards for obscenity and beauty prescribed by society's
dominant sensibilities. By synthesizing Marxian, Hegelian, and Freudian philosophy,
Marcuse carries Freudian drive theory towards the realization that life’s experiences
cultivate individual consciousness and its apprehension of occurrent experience by shaping
a subject’s sense-abilities. In doing so, civilization utilizes socialization as a curating
device regulating one’s life experiences to direct and discipline individuals in accordance
with social sensibilities of value and meaning, both about morality and utility.
In summary, Marcuse holds the following beliefs about the epistemic subject. First,
life’s experiences shape a subject’s sense-abilities by curating their background epistemic
resources (i.e., their drives and ways of thinking). Second, socialization directs and
disciplines the subject’s sense-abilities towards the dominant sensibilities by curating life’s
experiences. Lastly, while not directly discussed in this paper, Marcuse’s focus on society’s
potential for liberation in the totality of his work 204 defines a third belief: that this process
can be resisted. 205 That is, Marcuse’s call to resist the dominating forces of society by
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means of the cultivation of a new sensibility and the participation in a ‘Great Refusal’ to
operate in an oppressive system signal his commitment to the idea that individual senseabilities can be liberated. As a result, three observations follow from Marcuse’s view of
the epistemic subject.
First, our drives and ways of thinking are semi-plastic but intransigent because
civilization/society represses, sublimates, or desublimates our sense-abilities while
maintaining an underlying set of affective and thought potentialities (i.e., Eros (the life
drive), Thanatos (the death drive) which aims for Nirvana, and the practice of reasoning
persists). Second, human instincts and ways of thinking are compulsory inasmuch as
having certain dispositions, or sense-abilities, to undergo expressions of Eros or Thanatos
manifest as an intensification of an immediate belief attitude or affective force outside the
momentary willful control of the subject. This force pulls the subject in a particular
direction, towards a particular object, or toward a certain belief rather than necessitating
that certain actions be taken. Third, that the subject strategically adapts their drives and
ways of thinking to the established culture/society and in doing so internalizes its
sensibilities thereby shaping the subject’s sense-abilities in an accidental way.
Given this, Marcuse’s view of the epistemic subject contains more than merely a
commitment to a rational consciousness, a form of being plagued by pervasive onedimensional thinking in contemporary society. Rather, it hints at a form of affective
consciousness, of being attuned to the world through one’s embodied drives for life and
death, which, unfortunately, is left underdeveloped in his work on a ‘new sensibility’ in

point of view, may well comprise the lovely elements of a different order, and may thus be an essential part of the material from which
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The Essay on Liberation and subsequent lectures due to his passing in 1979. Yet, Marcuse
begins to develop a deeper sense of consciousness through his realization that life “is
experienced as a struggle with one’s self and the environment” inasmuch as one seeks to
regulate one’s affective and rational engagement with the world in an adaptive way so as
to affirm the life instincts or death instincts with the ultimate goal of living. 206 He is
committed to the idea that human drives and ways of thinking are semi-plastic, compulsory
rather than purely volitional, and are accidental byproducts of a historical process that
never allows the subject to perfectly fit with the environment, social or otherwise.
Marcuse’s epistemic subject is defined by “man’s primary impulses and senses as
foundations of his rationality and experience” and the manipulation of these foundations
shapes our very encounters with the world. 207 Given this, I am inclined to suggest that this
view of the epistemic subject intersects with Feminist Affect Theory in many important
ways and, because of this, I argue for their compatibility in the next section.
3.3 Feminist Affect Theory and Marcuse’s Epistemic Subject
Put briefly, Feminist Affect Theory 208 takes affects to be an integral part of the
body’s engagement with the world and it articulates embodiment as “webbed in its
relations” to the world. 209 Affects are displayed in “a body’s capacity to affect and to be
affected.” 210 Donovan O. Schaefer, a professor of material religion and visual culture,
describes affect theory in Religious Affects as a field which “thematizes the way that the
world prompts us to move before the interventions of language. It calls attention to
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embodied histories that precede the advent of language -- as well as moments when
language is bound with other thick, embodied forces.” 211 By this description, Marcuse
shares a project in common with affect theory because each aims to critique power within
civilization by supplementing the linguistic, or rational, perspective on human
consciousness rather than erase it in favor of embodied forms of knowing. Both theoretical
traditions recognize that affects, or drives in Marcuse’s case, within the embodied subject
are of paramount importance for understanding the epistemic subject beyond its reduction
to a form of rational consciousness. 212 Moreover, where Marcuse lacks a fully developed
view of affective subjectivity but provides a robust view of rational subjectivity, Affect
theory provides a robust view of affective subjectivity while not treading deeply into
rational subjectivity because it is not the central object of study for that field. As a result,
if these views are compatible, we are presented with an opportunity to put these traditions
into conversation in order to develop a robust conception of consciousness with the
potential to fix what is often referred to as ‘Descartes’s error’ 213 by reunifying our
conceptions of the rational and embodied subject. In this section, I argue for this
compatibility by outlining the developmental and conceptual parallels between these two
traditions.
First, Schaefer describes affects as essentially semi-plastic but intransigent,
compulsory, and adaptively accidental. He highlights affect theory’s fusion of Freudian
drives with Darwinian evolutionary biology by describing the subject’s embodied affects
as a set of sculpted dispositions which are configured into structures in accordance with
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213
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one’s embodied experiences and cultural history (i.e., the intransigence claim).214
Additionally, these affective structures are susceptible to reconfiguration with some sense
of general consistency (i.e. the semi-plastic claim). 215 That said, it is worth recalling that
Marcuse implicitly takes the same to be true of our drives which comprise, what he calls,
our second nature.
Additionally, Schaefer’s discussion of affects as compulsory and adaptively
accidental continues to echo Marcuse’s use of Freudian drive theory. Affects are felt
intensities aimed at the world and its objects. We often think of animal affective responses
as mechanistic in kind. However, this is a misrepresentation of affect theory. Rather, the
idea is that an embodied accumulation of affected experiences and evolutions over time
configures the subject to respond affectively or rationally in particular ways to certain
environmental stimuli. It’s about embodied compulsory affective responses, not
compulsively necessary choice or action.
For example, there is an episode of the U.S. version of The Office where Jim, the
office prankster, plays a chime on his computer while offering his coworker, Dwight, a
mint. After months of creating an affective environment which linked a chime with the
taste of mint, Jim plays the chime and does not offer a mint. The result: Dwight is confused
as to why his mouth tastes bad. The explanation: “Affectivity is not optional, but
compulsory” and this compulsion is a result of having adapted one’s affective dispositions
or instincts to the environmental stimuli in an automatic way facilitated by the subject
living in that space. 216 Schaefer writes, “Affect theory offers an alternative model [to the
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merely rational framework of consciousness], in which affects have their own capacity to
articulate bodies to systems of power.” 217 Again, it is worth noting that this model echoes
Marcuse’s description of our sense-abilities towards obscenities as compulsory responses
to certain social stimuli which, in turn, influence our thoughts and knowings.
The study of affect also gives us the tools to think about bodies in terms of
“affective economies - economies driven by a complex matrix of compulsions that do not
necessarily follow predictable watercourses” 218; the dynamic accumulation of affects is a
strategic response to a myriad of environmental conditions and it is not reasonable to expect
the embodied bundle of responses to be without contradiction. There is an accidental nature
to affects during the configuration of the body whereby one cannot expect a perfect
affective-fit between the environment and the subject. This mirrors Marcuse’s commitment
to the reality principle inasmuch as our instincts are being strategically adapted to the world
in a way that permits internal contradictions. Notably, Marcuse’s belief that contradictions
in lived experience will reveal unfreedoms is also relevant to Schaefer’s point because both
suggest that the subject will never be completely ordered without countervailing affective,
and as Marcuse points out, rational structures. Thus, both theories predict the development
of internal contradictions while pointing out that oppressive systems will also attempt to
manage and defuse those contradictions.
Additionally, as Ahmed describes them, affects are sticky. “Affect is what sticks,
or what sustains or preserves the connection between ideas, values, and objects.” 219 For
example, happiness, as a form of approval and a mode of affective response, possesses an
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intentional relation to the world, according to Ahmed. Affects are taken to be intentional
to an object or person inasmuch as that affect-producing target points to a future possibility
(i.e., to be happy or unhappy) and they are taken to be evaluative inasmuch as the promise
of the ‘future possibility’ articulates a value judgement of good or bad respective to the
promise for happiness or unhappiness. 220 She writes,
“The object becomes a feeling-cause. Once an object is a feeling-cause, it can cause feeling,
so that when we feel the feeling we expect to feel we are affirmed… for a life to count as
a good life, it must return the debt of its life by taking on the direction promised as a social
good, which means imagining one’s futurity in terms of reaching certain points along a life
course.” 221
I take this to mean that affects take on a directedness toward an object and that the object
is encountered as good or bad with respect to the object's status as a feeling-cause. These
are objects which carry a bundle of affective and relational promises. If we recall Marcuse’s
discussion of obscenity and beauty as attaching to objects, actions, or peoples in the world,
then we notice that he too takes drives to possess directedness. In Marcusean terms, this
directedness communicates an evaluative component to a subject’s sense-abilities which
reveal the evaluative dimensions of the thing, moral or otherwise.
Lastly, it is also worth noting that a common Freudian ground is shared by Marcuse
and the phenomenological division of Affect Theory which guides these theoretical views
in a way that permits compatibility. This shared basis reveals the theoretical closeness of
Marcusean drives and Feminist Affects. Each holds that drive or affect structures emerge
over time, as Schaefer might put it, “as the preferred method for bodies to navigate the
ambiguity of information-rich environments. They prioritize effective strategies
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intensifying motivational forces.” 222 It is true that Marcuse’s construction of the epistemic
subject takes theoretical cues from Hegelian and Marxian theory whereas Affect Theory
takes cues from Darwinian Evolutionary Theory. However, Both Marcuse and Affect
theory hold that response mechanisms will change over time to align senseabilities/affective sensitivities with best-fit strategies for experiencing the environment
according to some functional or social standard. As a result, this difference fails to support
the idea that these views are incompatible in light of the aforementioned parallels between
affects and drives (i.e., their semi-plastic but intransigent, compulsory, directive, and
adaptively accidental nature). If anything, it suggests that each tradition developed
functionally compatible views independently and in their own traditions because the
systems offer different ways of talking about the same process for affect-structure
development, one grounded in the philosophy of evolutionary biology and the other in
Hegelian and Marxist philosophy. Thereby, I take this difference between these views to
be a non-criticism to their compatible nature given the functional and theoretical symmetry
between Feminist Affect Theory and Marcuse’s epistemic subject.
In summary, Marcuse’s view of the epistemic subject and Affect theory are
compatible traditions because each is grounded in the idea that a subject’s drives or affects
are semi-plastic but intransigent (i.e., flexibly variable within some range of defined
possibility) , compulsory (i.e., beyond one’s immediate willful control) 223, adaptively
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accidental (i.e., imperfectly attuning to fit the environment), and possess a sense of
directedness (i.e., intentionally directed towards meaningful content). Moreover, this
compatibility is grounded in a shared Freudian influence which was transformed by
different theoretical traditions which nevertheless produced functionally similar views with
analogous consequences. As a result, each tradition’s view of the epistemic subject is
positioned to complement and be complemented by the other thereby providing a holistic
picture of human consciousness, and thereby the epistemic subject, in its rational and
affective dimensions.
3.4 Synthesizing Marcuse and Affect Theory using Buddhist Philosophy
Compatibility, while useful for justifying our putting Marcuse’s epistemic subject
and Affect Theory in conversation, is merely one step towards articulating a view which
describes the extent to which life’s experiences and socialization shapes the epistemic
subject and their moral perceptions. It is worth pointing out that one aspect of this
compatibility is grounded in the compulsory nature of one’s conscious apprehension of
the world. This, itself, hints at the unfree nature of moral perception during occurrent
experience. Yet, there is still a need to synthesize these approaches into a useful framework
that provides a robust sense of the epistemic subject that is sensitive to its rational and
affective dimensions. For this, I turn to the Mahāyānan school of Buddhism, which will
henceforth be referenced using ‘Buddhist philosophy’. I make this turn because Buddhist
philosophy provides a model for understanding the mechanisms by which social
sensibilities become inscribed onto individuals in a way that emphasizes the causal role of
life’s experiences on the affective and rational aggregates of the human subject. Buddhist
philosophy develops a view of the epistemic subject which is sensitive to both Marcuse’s
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concern for the rational subject and Affect Theory’s concern for the embodied subject
because the Buddhist philosophical tradition explored here takes the human creature as an
aggregate comprised of material (i.e., the body) and mental (i.e., the mind) components. 224
In this way, Buddhist philosophy carries the potential to guide our understanding of the
epistemic subject towards this robust sense.
There are at least two concepts in Buddhist philosophy relevant to the project at
hand: store consciousness and psychological seeds. 225 Thich Nhat Hanh’s The Heart of the
Buddha’s Teaching introduces the reader to these concepts in the following way:
“In each of us, there are wholesome and unwholesome roots -- or seeds -- in the depths of
our consciousness… if the seed of betrayal is watered, you may betray even those you
love… The source of our perception, our way of seeing, lies in our store consciousness…
[what we see] depends on our mind -- our sadness, our memories, our anger. Our
perceptions carry with them all the errors of subjectivity.” 226
As demonstrated in this passage, Buddhist philosophy is sensitive to the idea that one’s
conscious encounter with or view of the world will be directed by one’s subjective store
consciousness. 227
Bina Gupta, a comparative philosopher, expands on the relationship between
consciousness and store consciousness in the following way:
“The three transformations [of consciousness] are: sensory representation, self-awareness,
and the store-house (i.e., store) consciousness where experiences at the two levels deposit
their traces as seeds which need to be actualized under appropriate conditions.” 228
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That is, store consciousness contains epistemic impressions from life’s experiences which
serve as the ground for a subject’s affective configurations, beliefs, and habits of reason.
Store consciousness serves as the source of our background epistemic resources and we
use it to turn our encounters with the world into meaningful experiences. Put
metaphorically, life’s experiences plant seeds in store consciousness. These seeds are
adaptively cultivated or repressed/neglected through our everyday experiences and choices
under salient lived conditions. Living a life of anger or hate fosters aggressive encounters
with the world and shapes your perceptions of it. Encountering systematic forms of
oppression through violence can reveal empty parking lots at night as dangerous. A life
where fear is a pervasive phenomenon, rather than a momentary occasion, will nurture
dispositions for distrust, anger, and hate that shape one’s engagement with the world.
Choosing to continue to engage in destructive behavior, even after one comes to understand
it as destructive, continues to reinforce one’s own propensity for destruction over creation.
Notably, distrust, anger, and outrage are often warranted by those facing dehumanization
and brutalization in oppressive social systems. Examples of this phenomenon are abundant.
To further illustrate the importance of seeds, or experiential potentialities, it should
be noted that Buddhists hold that right view (i.e., holding the Buddhist moral and
metaphysical outlook on life) is a fundamental step in the Buddhist path, as founded on the
Four Noble Truths. The Four Noble Truths are, briefly put, (1) human existence is
characterized by dukkha (i.e., suffering), (2) the immediate cause of dukkha and excess
dukkha exists because of our ignorance towards the nature of things as fundamentally
impermanent (i.e., suffering prompted by attachments fueled by selfish needs or desires),
(3) dukkha can be overcome, or cease, through abating the cause of dukkha, and (4) the
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pathway to overcoming dukkha is articulated by the Eightfold Noble Path 229. As part of
this path, Right View points to the philosophical weight of the first three Noble Truths and
the need to adopt a view of life which recognizes a fundamental interdependence and
interconnectedness of persons, the prevalence of surplus suffering or dukkha, and the truth
of the non-self. If this view does not curate one’s background epistemic resources, the
Buddha’s path can neither be walked nor seen. Buddhists philosophy articulates the need
for the epistemic subject to, and their ability to, cultivate a store consciousness that helps
the agent experience value in the world in a way that reveals an object, person, or relation
as helpful or as a hindrance to a life without excess suffering (dukkha). This idea will be
returned to in the conclusion of this piece.
Moreover, right view emphasizes a Buddhist’s philosophical commitment to the
existence of some set, or set of sets, of psychological seeds which should be cultivated
under a Buddhist ethics and with contextual reference. In fact, it is the promotion of the
sublime states that point to this kind of advice. The sublime states include loving-kindness
or generosity of care for others, compassion or empathy, sympathetic joy for others without
envy, and peacefulness. Each is seen as essential for epistemically navigating life's fortunes
and misfortunes. These, it is argued, would be housed within a store consciousness capable
of bringing the epistemic subject closer to seeing the world in a way that allows them to
identify dukkha and pathways to minimize it. Yet, we need not adopt a Buddhist Ethics to
use Buddhist philosophy to understand how store consciousness functions in subjectivity.

The eightfold path is broken into three essential categories of Buddhist practice and training: “(a) Ethical Conduct (Silo), (b)
Mental Discipline (Samadhi), and (c) Wisdom (Panna)” (Rāhula 1967). When following the paths categorized under (c) Panna, one
acquires wisdom through adopting the (1) right view, alternatively translated as ‘right understanding’, and practicing (2) right thought.
The features of the eightfold path categorized under (a) Silo amount to the cultivation of compassion in (3) right speech, (4) right
action, and (5) right livelihood. Under the (b) Samadhi category one finds the call for (6) right effort, (7) right mindfulness, and (8)
right concentration. For both a practical and accessible investigation of these items, see Rāhula (1967).
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Instead, to explain store consciousness and its relationship to subjective experience,
we can turn to the teachings of Ven. Dr. Walpola Rāhula. 230 The aggregate of
consciousness (vijnanaskandha) contains three distinct aspects: (1) citta (store
consciousness), (2) manas (self-consciousness), (3) vijnana (perceptual consciousness).231
Rāhula writes,
“Thus we can see that vijnana represents the simple reaction or response of the senseorgans when they come in contact with external objects. This is the uppermost or
superficial aspect or layer of the vijnanaskandha. Manas represents the aspect of its mental
functioning, thinking, reasoning, conceiving ideas, etc. Citta, which is here called
alayavijnana, represents the deepest, finest and subtlest aspect or layer of the Aggregate of
Consciousness. It contains all the traces or impressions of the past actions and all good and
bad future potentialities.” 232
Under this model, as articulated by the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism, there are
three main aspects of human consciousness. Perceptual Consciousness (vijnana) as
articulated by sensory interaction with the world and our embodied activity. SelfConsciousness (manas) amounts to our self-awareness and mental activity. But, Store
Consciousness (citta or alayavijnana) amounts to the underlying elements, concepts, ideas,
and dispositions which dialectically articulate experience and are shaped by experience
through vijnana and manas. Buddhist philosophers following this tradition point to the idea
that alayavijnana stands as a unifying principle of consciousness by which conscious
events, like seeing a bird or thinking caring thoughts about a friend, are possible and
compulsory.
As Jay Garfield, a comparative philosopher, puts it, store consciousness “is the prereflective ground of experience... it is not introspectable and is not the seat of the
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subjectivity of any particular conscious episode, but rather stands as a transcendental
condition on any awareness being conscious at all.” 233 If consciousness unifies awareness
of one’s experiences into an experience, then such an event is compulsorily shaped by store
consciousness at its very core in the Buddhist sense described here. Awareness may
precede consciousness, but experience’s inscribing of store consciousness will, for the
Buddhist, fundamentally shape our encounters with the world by organizing current and
future conscious experiences in a compulsory way. Such is also the case, as we have seen,
in both Marcuse’s view of the epistemic subject and in Affect Theory’s discussion of the
affectively embodied subject.
Within this framework, it is vital to note that one’s store consciousness changes
over time. It is just as impermanent as everything else in Buddhist metaphysics and fits as
part of the five aggregates of our being: (1) form or embodiment, (2) sensation or
affectedness, (3) perceptual awareness of external and internal happenings, (4) possessing
mental states, and (5) consciousness. Under a theory of seeds, alayavijnana becomes the
garden by which lived experience plants dispositional and cognitive seeds that grow to
shape our encounter with the world. These seeds, or beliefs and affective dispositions
within one’s background epistemic resources, are further cultivated during our encounter
with the world. Alayavijnana collects one’s affective and rational experiences (i.e., those
mental states that become seeds), and uses these to compulsorily unify experience into a
meaningful manifold, and constantly revises that manifold’s content according to
whichever seeds are nurtured or neglected. The Sautrāntika theory of seeds (bīja)
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underlying consciousness can inform our understanding of the theory of store
consciousness by articulating the process by which lived experience influences
consciousness thereby shaping our encounter with future experiences in a compulsory
way. 234
As Christian Coseru, a philosopher of mind and cross-cultural philosophy, writes,
“A ‘seed’ in this case stands for two sets of phenomena: (1) latent dispositions underlying
the karmic process; and (2) the capacity or power of certain causal chains to bring about a
given result… The theory of seeds in the mental stream thus provides a mode of talking
about causality that does not exclude the notions of latency and disposition.” 235
In this passage, Coseru points to the idea that the subject engages and encounters the world,
but more so to the idea that that world has a causal influence on the subject by shaping
involuntary compulsions rather than whole-hog freedom-denying psychological
mechanisms. Given this, he acknowledges the need for a language that avoids a fatalistic
picture of human choice. Utilizing psychological seeds to identify causally created
epistemological structures in store consciousness provides a picture of the non-determined
epistemic subject that avoids radical atomism and gives us a language to discuss life’s
influence on a subject’s perceptions of occurrent experience. The way the subject chooses
to engage the world and the way that life’s happenings influence the subject’s encounter
with the world provide a dialectically causal story regarding how the subject affectively
and rationally comprehends their lived reality and, thereby, comes to have the compulsory
moral perception that they do. Coseru continues,
“Following this process of maturation and dependence upon the repository consciousness
there evolves a reflexive awareness whose object is none other than this subliminal or
repository consciousness itself. This theory of cognitive emergence presumably provides a
better account of the role that the residual forces of past cognitions play in ‘seeding’ the
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repository consciousness. It is the dynamics of these residual forces which ultimately
generates the intentional forms of cognitive awareness that support all other forms of
cognitive activity.” 236
From this, we gather that the seeds planted by life’s experiences are gained throughout our
development, from infancy to our present existence, and guide store consciousness’s
articulation of our ‘cognitive awareness’ of the world. That is, the seeds of our experience
influence and inform our moral perceptions of the world and drive their compulsory nature.
As a result, civilization’s socialization of the subject can plant a lot of
instinctual/affective or rational seeds regarding expectations of value and normalcy thereby
shaping our experience of the world. I believe a Marcusean Affect theory can be developed
using this Buddhist approach to causality in store consciousness for three reasons. First,
there is a catalog of affective capacities currently possessed by the human being as a result
of evolutionary psychology and observed by Freudian instinct theory (the lifeinstinct/love/attraction and death-instinct/hate/aversion as base affects) which are directed
and shaped in accordance with the local environment. In Buddhist terms, the first seeds of
store consciousness possess the potentiality for hate/death-instincts or love/life-instincts
and are cultivated by life’s experiences. In this way, Buddhist philosophy articulates a
mechanism and language with which to be precise about the process wherein sensibilities
cultivate one’s background epistemic resources or sense-abilities.
Second, dynamic embodied affects or drives can be cultivated or planted in store
consciousness as the life instincts and death instincts are cultivated by life’s experiences in
the local environment. The pleasure and reality principles describe how we come to have
more complex affective abilities such as outrage, anger, lust, altruism, and so on. These
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would seemingly emerge or be repressed in accordance with socialization practices, life
choices, moments of trauma or joy, and in those moments where one makes paradigm
shifting decisions. Over time, and through natural maturation, a Buddhist theory of mind
predicts that these affects will grow effectively motivating and that modes of rational
thinking will emerge because of the dispositions and beliefs in one’s store-consciousness.
Lastly, store consciousness serves as the epistemic ground for one’s experience and
judgment of the world’s value landscape (i.e., it informs moral perceptions during
occurrent experience). This will carry the errors of subjectivity inasmuch as one’s affective
dispositions, propositional beliefs, and ways of reasoning will influence one’s engagement
with the world. According to this Buddhist infused Marcusean Affect Theory, the epistemic
subject is a triadic being whose lived experience is articulated by its store consciousness,
its interaction with the world, and the constant reshaping of store consciousness’s epistemic
resources (i.e., its affective dispositions, beliefs, and modes of rationality) by experience.
Thereby, this view results in a kind of Dialectical Consciousness (DC) which is best
articulated by the following four observations:
1) the epistemic subject affectively (i.e., via one’s sense-abilities) interacts with and
is shaped by life’s experiences,
2) the epistemic subject’s rational habits judge and are shaped by life’s experiences,
3) A subject’s moral perceptions of the world aim to make sense of perceived value
using a store consciousness comprised of these affective and rational aspects. The
human being simultaneously undergoes biological and culturally influenced
processes which shape its understanding of those experiences 237 and moral
perceptions,
4) At any given moment, one comes to have experiences that are constructed by store
consciousness thereby mediating a subject’s moral perceptions in a compulsory,
not willful, way, of the world that, at first glance, reinforce existing structures
within store consciousness. Unless the subject becomes aware of some
237
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propositional/affective contradiction or undergoes some kind of existential
transformation, they will not be pushed to challenge the very foundation of their
store consciousness because their moral perceptions reinforce their justification to
see the world as that have seen the world. Additionally, if they do not embrace a
healthy skepticism about how to resolve contradictions or existential challenges,
the subject will perceive value in the world as they have perceived value in the
world. They may also dismiss inconsistent experiences as unimportant rather than
as a signal calling for further investigation of the social world or one’s store
consciousness as a foundation for their moral perceptions.
With DC in view, there are several reasons why I believe we should accept it as an
adequate picture of the epistemic subject describing our compulsory moral perceptions.
First, it accurately predicts that certain affective dispositions and thought patterns will
emerge as a feature of socialization during child development or during adulthood. It
suggests that when socialization disciplines or controls a child’s engagement with the
world then certain affective dispositions and ways of thinking will follow from the seeds
those experiences plant when they are nurtured. For example, if we only provide boys with
toys that are physically engaging at very young ages, then boyhood preferences for physical
activity would predictably become part of (or an enhanced part of) a bundle of affective
responses to and reasoning about the world. It thereby would seem natural when young
boys do not identify with activities like reading but gravitate towards sports because of an
aversion (as an expression of Thanatos) to the former and an attraction (as an expression
of Eros) to the latter. These dispositions, as a result, lead to moral perceptions of sports as
a “moral good” inasmuch as they are seen as a conception of how to live well, as a proper
way of life for boys wherein they can ‘function’ according to the local sensibilities of a
good life. In fact, Martin’s 1998 study of preschool classrooms makes just this kind of
observation. Within the study, she interrogates hidden curriculums and claims that they
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(partially) curate embodied differences between the genders while making any correlation
between preferences and physical differences appear and feel natural. 238
Hidden curriculums, as a form of socialization, are unseen or implicit practices that
classrooms maintain which simultaneously serve as forms of socially controlling subjects.
These include practices which socialize students into privileging certain modes of
expression and these curriculums demand that students practice, she concludes, “bodily
control in congruence with the goals of the school as an institution.” 239 She writes:
“The effects of dressing-up or bodily adornment, the gendered nature of formal or relaxed
behaviors, how the different restrictions on girls’ and boys’ voices limit their physicality,
how teachers instruct girls’ and boys’ bodies, and the gendering of physical interactions
between children … suggest one way that bodies are gendered and physical differences are
constructed is through social institutions and their practices.” 240
DC also holds that if experiences of a certain kind become normalized adults will
develop affective responses and habits in reasoning about the world. For example, former
President Nixon’s illegalization of marijuana and his war on drugs consistently presented
a vilification narrative of the black body to the U.S. population. After having experiences
that associated the black body with crime, a negative affective attunement to black bodies
seems to have arguably been reinforced in our public life. As a result, the dominant political
discourse seems to rationalize policies which systematically disadvantage marginalized
populations because those “super predator” populations needed to be controlled or
punished. Many adult epistemic subjects, usually in a position of privilege and power, came
to have, or have reinforced, compulsory moral perceptions of the black body as if it were
representative of ‘wrongdoing’.
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Similarly, Vivyan Adair’s “Discipline and Punished: Poor Women, Bodily
Inscription, and Resistance Through Education” echoes this observation by describing the
systematic depiction of “Welfare Queens” as a process which disciplines our expectations
of women on welfare. As a result, political discourse often utilizes a narrative that too often
unwarrantedly punishes those who need aid. She writes,
“The welfare mother -- imagined as young, never married, and black (contrary to statistical
evidence)-- is positioned as dangerous and in need of punishment … the poor welfare
mother threatens not just her own children but all children. The Welfare Queen is made to
signify moral aberration and economic drain; her figure becomes even more impacted once
responsibility for the destruction of the “American Way of Life” is attributed to her.” 241
These are, in effect, observations about our moral perceptions of Welfare Queens as made
possible by DC. Taken together, I take Martin’s and Adair's observations (among others
who make similar observations like bell hooks, Iris Marion Young, and Angela Davis) as
offering evidence for the fecundity of DC to predict patterns in socialized consciousness
as grounded in store consciousness and the resulting moral perceptions that follow.
The second reason to accept DC is that it accounts for the vicious loop which
characterizes consciousness’s role in the articulation of our moral perceptions of occurrent
experience. Sara Ahmed emphasizes this observation in Living a Feminist Life. She writes,
“... power works as a mode of directionality, a way of orienting bodies in particular ways,
so they are facing a certain way, heading toward a future that is given as fact … A crowd
is directed. Once a crowd is directed, a crowd becomes directive. We are directed by what
is in front of us; what is in front of us depends on the direction we have already taken …
[consciousness] is a loop: we are directed by what is in front of us; what is in front of us
depends on how we are [and have been] directed.” 242
In this, Ahmed makes the observation that there is a mutually evolving relationship
between embodied subjectivity, lived experiences, socialization, and consciousness’s
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capacity to organize experience into a lived reality for the subject (i.e., to curate one’s
moral perceptions). Socialization and life’s experiences, she claims, direct our orientation
and encounter with the world. As a matter of course, objects in the world come to represent
a bundle of promises towards some end or way of being. Focusing on happiness and
sadness, Ahmed describes how social norms orientate us to approve of certain happenings
and to disapprove of others, to have defined moral perceptions. She writes,
“Happiness: what we end up doing to avoid the consequence of being sad. Happiness is a
way of being directed toward those things that would or should make you happy. Happiness
can thus also be a form of pressure. Pressure does not always feel harsh. A pressure can
begin with a light touch. A gentle encouragement…” 243
Given this, part of DC’s value, I claim, is that it captures this account of the epistemic
subject and acknowledges that how we come to encounter or judge the world (and to have
moral perceptions of it) is a function of how we have encountered or judged that world
(and our past moral perceptions of it).
3.5 The Unfreedom of Moral Perception during Occurrent Experience
DC might be objected to because it could be interpreted as fatalistic, especially if
we are trying to determine how it is that we can achieve emancipatory social change. That
is, DC emphasizes the compulsory nature of our conscious apprehension of the world and,
thereby, the unfree nature of our moral perceptions of occurrent experience. Yet, this
strikes me as an unnecessary interpretation of DC. Instead, DC forces us to take seriously
the complexities of moral agency and responsibility given that store consciousness directly
impacts our moral perceptions of the world’s moral features which, in turn, impacts store
consciousness. DC does not predict that one cannot ever modify or reorient oneself to the
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world, to come to have different moral perceptions that one currently does. In fact, this is
a fundamental part of Buddhist philosophy and a virtue of using Buddhism to synthesize
Marcuse and Affect Theory. It keeps open the possibility for liberation. Ultimately, DC’s
value is a function of its ability to provide a model for understanding socialization’s
oppressive potential while opening up a future possibility for seeing the world differently,
for our liberation from domination, brutalization, and oppression. Our liberation from
dukkha.
Specifically, it highlights society’s power to limit our capacity to freely shape our
moral perception by showing the extent to which life’s experiences can influence our
rational and affective parts, both of which shape the epistemic resources which prompt us
to have the moral perceptions that we do. DC pushes us to re-interrogate the relationship
between rationality, affective dispositions, and moral perceptions. In doing so, it forces us
to take seriously the available reasons, rendered by our moral perceptions, one uses during
moral decision making in our lives as moral agents.
It does this by making explicit the scope of our unfreedom. As ether a consequence
of our attachment to radical individualism or the influence of scientific ideology, we often
think ourselves capable of easily overcoming the influence of the lived world and that our
experiences are independent of our moral judgments. Sartre’s belief that we are condemned
to be free was itself a commitment to the belief that the subject is equipped with an everpresent capacity to transform any experience into an expression of one’s freedom to
choose. However, social striations across our lived world exist as epistemological
gatekeepers for epistemic agents and signpost that world with morally evaluative content.
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The epistemic dimensions of the U.S.’s culture of silence regarding sexual violence against
women is a prime example of this phenomenon.
Although we have seen some reform to this of late, the atmosphere of silence
surrounding sexual violence against women is still pervasive and especially disturbing
given that such events are fundamentally antithetical to the dignity of women qua persons.
A world where this is pervasive, on top of devaluing and harming women, also limits one’s
moral perceptions of personhood when seeing women. Similarly upsetting, many men
maintain epistemically problematic dispositions towards this reality or, at worst, are
presently incapable of having alternative moral perceptions of it. As bell hooks, a black
feminist philosopher, puts it, socialization in patriarchy becomes a tool used to forge people
into expressions of masculine or feminine subjectivity under the guiding hand of a culture
of domination. As a result, women come to fear men as an origin of violence, to have moral
perception of them as ‘cruel’ or ‘violent’, and, hooks claims, men also come to fear that
same violent potential. 244 The perpetuation of the “wait until your father comes home”
narrative among other things communicates the idea that masculinity is about power,
domination, and fear. Hooks writes,
“Patriarchy is a political-social system that insists that males are inherently dominating,
superior to everything and everyone deemed weak, especially females, and endowed with
the right to dominate and rule over the weak and to maintain that dominance through
various forms of psychological terrorism and violence.” 245
She points out that patriarchal masculinity “teaches men that their selfhood has meaning
only in relation to the pursuit of external power; such masculinity is a subtext of the
dominator [social] model” 246 where men achieve manhood, the ideal of meaning, only if
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they dominate. Hegemonic boyhood socialization, thereby, becomes defined by the
expression of violence, emotional distance, and coming to see any intimate or genuine form
of emotional connection with another as alien or, at worst, obscene. Granted, men and
women have vastly different reasons to fear the patriarchal agent and to have the moral
perceptions of the other as they do. The violence experienced by each intersectional subject
will vary. Yet, it is seemingly the case that fear pervades our lives as a result of our
embeddedness in a society that perpetuates an ideology of domination. We are afraid of
being dominated and this fear shapes our moral perceptions in a compulsory way by
defining the epistemic grounds upon which those perceptions are formed, by shaping our
store consciousness.
Patriarchy, thereby, enforces an oppressive form of socialization. It systematically
oppresses and harms because it makes intersubjective modes of fear an ever present reality
rather than a passing moment in life. 247 Where women are taught to systematically fear
men because of the emotional or physical violence perpetrated by patriarchy’s domination
of them qua women, it seems that men, myself included, appear to systematically fear other
men. According to hooks, this fear results from the knowledge that failing to meet the
demands of hegemonic masculinity makes you the target of male violence: a kind of
violence that men are also aware of because they experience hegemonic masculinity’s
curriculum of practiced violence, bullying, and abuse. Again, this sense of fear will be
realized across various social identities in both content and intensity because, for example,
the black male subject, the immigrant, and white male subject have different reasons to
fear a routine traffic stop. Yet, as hooks points out, we are all afraid. She writes, “this is
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the big secret we all keep together-the fear of patriarchal maleness that binds everyone in
our culture.” 248 Fear, in this sense, pushes us away from each other, it interrupts our
connections to the other and disrupts our access to liberating moral perceptions.
Socialization has the ability to influence the epistemic subject through hidden or
explicit curriculums that shape store consciousness, and thereby our moral perceptions.
DC, under a Marcusean-Buddhist Affect Theory, shows how such systems are reinforced.
Taken together, the nature of our immediate moral perceptions of the value landscape is
marked by unfreedom: our inability to choose how we perceive the moral features of the
world during occurrent experience.
To further motivate this idea that we are not as free as we wish we were, consider
the following scenario. Phil loves his son (Sam) and takes his role as a father very seriously.
Committed to his “manhood”, Phil expresses his masculinity through conventional
activities by participating in sporting rituals, his work as a mechanic, and by teaching Sam
how to fish and hunt. As Sam gets older, Phil begins to bond with Sam by rebuilding a
truck together in preparation for his senior year of high school. Sam picks up on the skills
quickly and soon expresses the desire to follow in Phil’s footsteps. For Phil, being with
Sam is an experience filled with joy and, as Ahmed might put it, an encounter with Sam is
a happy experience. Phil has moral perceptions of Sam which represent Sam’s moral value
as a person, his dignity. One day, at dinner, Sam sits with his family (mom, dad, and his
sister) and says that he’s not happy. Sam then comes out to his family. Phil’s beliefs about
the moral status of homosexuality (i.e., that it is a moral wrong according to his religious
views) results in a huge fight. Over time, Phil fails to reconcile his moral values, his life
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with Sam, and this new information regarding Sam’s sexual identity. Experiences with Sam
are no longer happy for Phil and Phil’s compulsory moral perceptions of Sam change into
taking Sam to be representative of something ‘wrong’.
There are many ways this scenario could have played out and it is not the intention
of this example to provide a one-dimensional account of the coming-out process nor how
one expresses any religious values. Instead, the Phil-scenario represents a contrast case
indicative of how the unfreedom of our moral perceptions during occurrent experience can
manifest in our lives. Phil, as a subject, is not free to experience Sam any way he wishes at
any singular moment. Instead, his moral perceptions are compulsory and rendered
meaningful for him by means of his store consciousness. Yet, the contents of store
consciousness can change during transformative moments, those times which have
significance or existential import for the subject thereby reshaping, nursing, or planting
seeds within one’s store consciousness. In Phil’s case, we can easily contrast his pre-Samcoming-out experiences with his post-Sam-coming-out experiences and, in doing so, see
that Sam’s coming out was a transformative moment for Phil. Phil’s paternal attraction to
Sam (as an mode of affectively expressing Eros) has been reshaped into a repulsion (as a
mode of affectively expressing Thanatos). DC’s Buddhist synthesis of Marcuse and Affect
theory allows us to catalogue the shift in Phil’s moral perceptions of Sam while
appreciating the conditions required for that shift because both Phil’s ways of thinking
about Sam and the embodied affects experienced when looking at Sam point to the
epistemological mechanisms underlying Phil’s occurrent experience. That is, Phil’s moral
perceptions of Sam track shifts in Phil’s knowledge about Sam in conjunction with the
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background beliefs and affective dispositions Phil as accumulated over his lifetime
pertaining to homosexuality.
Developing a Marcusean Affect theory by means of Buddhist concepts allows us
to unpack our everyday moral perceptions. We can conceive of them as being founded
upon one’s store consciousness as the background epistemic resource by which a subject
comes to see the world as having a value landscape. This perceptual ability carries the
errors of subjectivity inasmuch as one’s affective disposition, beliefs, and ways of thinking
(i.e. one’s sense-abilities) about the world influence one’s moral perceptions of the world
in an essentially compulsory way. This is the corner stone of DC.
DC articulates a complex model for understanding the epistemic subject as both
affectively and rationally engaged in the world. Epistemic subjects exist in an information
rich environment and, thereby, cannot be limited to the confines of contemporary theories
of knowledge which exclude affects in favor of propositional knowledge. Affects reveal
vital information about the world and how we come to see it. Moreover, DC amplifies and
echoes claims made by Patricia Hill Collin’s Black Feminist Epistemology. That is, lived
experiences shape consciousnesses with epistemic access to concepts and modes of
knowing that reveal dimensions of reality (i.e., through moral perceptions) initially unseen
or overlooked by those outside that standpoint. Presumably, individuals who exist in
intersectional epistemic locations are, by definition, exposed to affective forces and,
thereby, would be expected to adapt one’s accumulated affects and ways of thinking to the
local environment.
DC also points to a deeper need to understand that freedom is not synonymous with
being affect-free or existing as a purely transcendental subject. Marcuse makes this
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observation in his lecture on “Nature and Revolution” and in An Essay on Liberation. In
the former, he writes,
“... freedom is rooted in the primary drives of men and women, it is the vital need to
enhance their life instincts. Prerequisite is the capacity of the senses to experience not only
the “given” but also the “hidden” qualities of things which would make for the betterment
of life … the senses are not only the basis for the epistemological constitution of reality,
but also for its transformation, its subversion in the interest of liberation.” 249
Moreover, this echoes his earlier claims in the latter as he writes
“new sensibility, which expresses the ascent of the life instincts over aggressiveness and
guilt, would foster, on a social scale, the vital need for the abolition of injustice and misery
and would shape the further evolution of the “standard of living” … [the] affirmation of
the right to build a society in which the abolition of poverty and toil terminates in a universe
where the sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful become forms of existence and
thereby the Form of the society itself.” 250
Given DC, the liberation of the human creature’s moral perceptions depends,
essentially, on the cultivation of store consciousness which expose the cruelty of objects
which do not actually carry the promises they appear to have as cause-objects. The cruel
optimism of neoliberal capitalist sensibilities regarding the good life must be undercut by
an affective disposition which identifies such things as life-hindering rather than lifeaffirming. Our affective and rational attachment to neoliberal objects of value are, as
Marcuse puts it, forms of domination inasmuch they are mediated by the market’s depiction
of false consumer needs or by the dominant class for the sake of maintaining existing power
structures. We might say that these objects engender a cruel optimism in the Marcusean
subject. As Berlant, a feminist affect theorist, puts it, this “optimism is cruel when it takes
shape as an affectively stunning double bind: a binding to fantasies that block the
satisfaction they offer, and a binding to the promise of optimism as such that the fantasies
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have come to represent.” 251 Or, as Ahmed puts it, “The promise of happiness takes this
form: that if you have this or have that or do this or do that, then happiness is what
follows.” 252
Notably, Marcuse’s call for a new sensibility, in response to these epistemic
obstacles, becomes a praxis by which the individual takes freedom to be a biological
necessity. This is a mode of store consciousness wherein one experiences the world in ways
that are incapable of tolerating surplus repression and demands no other forms of repression
other than that required for the “amelioration of life.” 253 Marcuse’s new sensibility is, in
this way, a call for a new form of experiential expression via our compulsory moral
perceptions of occurrent experience and requires a renovation and cultivation of a new, life
affirming, form of store consciousness. That is, it requires a revision and reinvestment into
the praxis of cultivating life affirming sense-abilities.
3.6 Conclusion: Marcuse’s New Sensibility and Buddhist Ethical Concepts
As a last takeaway, I would like to suggest that the dimensions of a new sensibility
cultivated within a Marcusean version of Affect Theory and informed by Buddhist
philosophy must adopt and cultivate positive dispositions to at least three Buddhist
philosophical concepts. 254 This new sensibility requires us to cultivate a store
consciousness which emphasizes (1) the dependent origination/interdependent co-arising
of our world, (2) the existence of dukkha and excess dukkha in our world, and (3) the
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essential role of compassion as an affect and way of thinking in the understanding of (1)
and alleviation of excess dukkha.
To the first point, (1) articulates a new sensibility which acknowledges that the
world is fundamentally relational and that one antinomy of action is that the world comes
to be though the collective action of individuals together. We arise together and create the
world we live in as a collective activity. A new sensibility which acknowledges (1) adopts
a life-affirming affect towards the interest of individuals which make up a collective
because, as the Dalai Lama writes, “it is in everyone’s interest to do what leads to happiness
and avoid that which leads to suffering. And because, as we have seen, our interests are
inextricably linked, we are compelled to accept ethics as an indispensable interface
between my desire to be happy and yours.” 255
To the second and third points, (2) seems clearly supported by current times.
Suffering exists and there is excess suffering both in the form of physical suffering and in
the surplus repression of the psyche to adopt forms of cruel optimism and dispositions of
happiness towards harmful behaviors. (3) seems to articulate at least one affective force or
personal affect which can grant epistemic access to identifying, via moral perception, the
various forms of excess dukkha (physical or repressive). As an expression of Eros, the life
drive, compassion can manifest either as self-love or the love of others. In this way,
compassion articulates an essential tool for capturing unhappy affects and to intensify one’s
motivational force to change the conditions which create such sufferings.
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Relatedly, Ahmed writes, “I think it is the very exposure of these unhappy effects
[perhaps by the feminist killjoy] that is affirmative, that gives us an alternative set of
imaginings of what might count as a good or better life. If injustice does have unhappy
affects, then the story does not end there…. we might want to reread melancholic subjects,
the ones who refuse to let go of suffering, who are even prepared to kill some forms of joy,
as an alternative model of the social good.” 256 As I interpret this passage, it seems that
through an expression of enlightened compassion, a sustained engagement with the
suffering of others and ourselves, we can wrestle with sources of excess suffering in the
world in order to open up the possibility for liberation. By refusing to accommodate or
identify with systems of oppression, perhaps by refusing to express our compassion in ways
prescribed by those systems, we can reject those systems and express compassion towards
people in those systems. In this respect, I take being a Killjoy to be an act of intense
compassion which acknowledges humanization and liberation over brutalization and
domination.
I take what has been presented here as the beginning of a process by which we can
start to use the notion of the epistemic subject as a duality, as embodied and cerebral, to
the advantage of social justice efforts because DC makes explicit the unfreedom of moral
perception. This unfreedom must be addressed if we are to overcome the oppressive way
our current society, and its members, facilitates false moral perceptions which take
oppressive forms of life to be life affirming. Embodied affects and ways of thinking must
not always serve the ends of neoliberal capitalist sensibilities. Rather, cultivating
enlightened seeds of compassion, recognizing surplus dukkha in its physical and repressive
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forms, and coming to see the deeply intersubjective nature of our existence can begin to
shape one’s store consciousness to see the world, not just as it is, but as it could be. Moral
perceptions prompted from this position could be truly liberating.
Yet, how we respond to immediate experience may be prone to hegemony if we do
not exercise a healthy amount of skepticism about our moral perceptions of occurrent
experience because they are compulsory forms of knowing. In this way, there is hope
because we do seem to have the capacity to influence our store consciousness by seeking
out experiences and practicing ways of thinking which emphasize humanization and
liberation over brutalization and domination. This capacity is the cornerstone to expressing
our freedoms during immediate experience. To see suffering, to see its source, and to see
the path to liberation we must begin by acknowledging that our immediate moral
perceptions of the world are expressions of our unfreedom.
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CHAPTER 4. MORAL BLINDNESS AND MORAL REASONS
4.1 Introduction
The ability to access moral reasons during an encounter with an ethically pertinent
moment is an essential dimension of moral living by virtue of its impact on our ethical
reasoning. Without reliable access to moral reasons, a subject navigates immediate ethical
situations with neither sign nor signal to act in ways which meet the demands of morality,
whatever those demands turn out to be. 257 Accessing reasons for moral actions in
immediate experience is essential to our existence as moral agents and, thereby, it should
be troubling to us when we encounter those who seem incapable of accessing reasons for
moral action in situations laden with oppressive potential. In a world where colonialism,
racism, sexism, patriarchy, and other immoral social structures have resulted in an
oppressive reality for many and where others invalidate or overlook reasons to repair those
conditions, we should ask: what enables or maintains a subject’s immediate insensitivity
to those moral reasons which motivate humanization and liberation as antidotes to
brutalization and domination?
In what follows, I investigate how socialization shapes subjective moral ignorances
and thereby undermines a person's’ ability to access (i.e., epistemically grasp) moral
reasons in immediate perceptual experience. I argue that oppressive modes of socialization
enable the cultivation of moral ignorance regarding the dignity and suffering of the other
or self. That is, oppressive socialization coerces subjects to internalize normative
expectations about the social world which causes pathological blindness to reasons (i.e., it
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causes moral blindness) consequently threatening a subject’s autonomy. In making this
argument, I unpack and defend the epistemic foundation supporting relational views of
autonomy. Given this, I end by suggesting that a fundamental reorientation of ourselves to
the world’s moral dimensions becomes imperative if we are to reliably access moral
reasons during our immediate experiences of the world, reasons which motivate us to
follow through on our obligations to others and foster conditions hospitable to moral
autonomy.
4.2 Immediate Experiences, Moral Reasons, and Autonomy
Under some accounts of autonomy, one is autonomous if and only if one’s actions
are self-regulated and where one chooses in accordance with the demands of reason by
means of a self-driven deliberative procedure. This family of views are referred to as
proceduralist views of autonomy. We have, among many others, Kant and, more recently,
Gerald Dworkin to thank for this model of autonomy. Models of this kind stress the
importance of self-reflection and procedural independence from coercive manipulation
during choice-making processes in assessing the autonomous status of an agent. Dworkin
(1989) adopts this view because, he claims, it ensures that the assessment of one’s
autonomy is independent from conceptions of value. 258
It is worth noting that such views are often silent on what reasons are available to
the agent during deliberation, relying on standards like competency or the authenticity of
the held belief to define the subject’s relationship to the epistemic environment. 259 As a
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result, those in heavily oppressive social situations who are competent thinkers that
genuinely hold some set of beliefs can be described as adequately deliberating within the
boundaries of those beliefs and thereby be referred to as autonomous agents. However, this
idealization of autonomy as a socially-isolated procedural activity is problematic for
reasons that Charles Mills brought to our attention during his critique of ideal ethical
theories. They are “in crucial respects obfuscatory, and can indeed be thought of as in part
ideological, in the pejorative sense of a set of group ideas that reflect, and contribute to
perpetuating, illicit group privilege.” 260 As a result, proceduralist views seemed prone to
overlook an essential component to autonomous living: those lived conditions which make
autonomy possible in the first place. Afterall, as Axel Honneth points out, recognition in
the form of acknowledged social, legal, and material needs is a precondition for the
possibility of autonomy. 261 Procedural views of the concept often overlook the
interdependent nature of our epistemic faculties in favor of idealizing our capacity for
independent thinking by minimizing the impact of socialization and life’s experience on
one’s agential existence. These views pull the subject out of their lived conditions and, in
doing so, rob us of appreciating the fact that autonomy is practiced within lived contexts,
often within a world shaped by an ideology of domination. 262
In contrast, works by bell hooks, Patricia Hill Collins, or Paul Benson’s “Autonomy
and Oppressive Socialization” challenge this perspective by addressing issues related to
what reasons are available to an agent. 263 These kind of views support self-reflection and
procedural independence but also argue for some kind of substantive interdependence
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condition in their views on autonomy; these are relational views of autonomy. 264 Using
Benson’s work as an example, relational views challenge proceduralist views utilizing the
following kind of observation:
“In some prominent cases, the general means by which oppressive socialization operates
are no different than those which benign socialization takes effect. This indicates that the
role of critical reflection in the will of agents whose autonomy is diminished could be
largely the same as its role in the wills of those who enjoy greater autonomy. If this is true,
then the sensitivity of conduct to critical reflection cannot be the sole determinant of
autonomy.” 265
The point is, simply put, that it is dubious for us to claim that two agents (A and B)
are both autonomous when A and B are equal in their critical reflective capacity but have
disparate access to reasons in an epistemic environment shaped by oppressive structures.
This is to suggest that cages of oppression create striations in the environment which serve
as autonomy-limiting boundaries for epistemic agents. For example, imagine that Jack and
Pat work at a machine shop. Jack, a white male with a modest socioeconomic upbringing,
wakes up one morning with a moderate headache. He decides to take a sick day because,
upon reflection, he realizes he has an abundance of sick days, he can stay home today
without expecting much decline in his social capital at work, and so on. Given the two
options, work or stay home, he decides to stay home because the immediate reasons in his
experience for doing so are evidently more persuasive inasmuch as he sees few reasons to
reject the belief that sick days are to be used for self-care. He takes his headache experience
to contain reasons to stay home that outweigh his non-experiential immediate reasons for
going to work.
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In contrast, Pat, a white female from a modest socioeconomic upbringing, wakes
up with a moderate headache. She is also aware that she has an abundance of sick days,
that she could stay home today without expecting much decline in her social capital at
work, and so on. Yet, she also believes, unlike Jack, that taking a sick day in this case
would be a selfish expression of self-care. This last idea, that “self-care is self-indulgence”,
is itself a socialized feature of Pat’s epistemic life and it has immediate justificatory import
on her experience of her headache. It shapes the immediate experience she is having of her
headache in such a way that devalues its importance when compared to those nonexperiential reasons (i.e., those propositional reasons) to go to work. As a result, she goes
to work. We should take note that Pat possesses the same critically reflective capacities as
Jack, she is responsive to the demands of reason, and is deliberatively competent, but
nonetheless chooses to go to work because she takes self-care to be self-indulgence rather
than an act of self-preservation. At first glance, Pat’s socialization undercuts her capacity
to access or appreciate immediate reasons which prompt her to experience the need for
self-care as justificationally immediate moral evidence for taking care of one’s self. 266 Pat,
under a relational view of autonomy, would be said to deploy her agency utilizing a limited
exercise of autonomy whereas Jack seemingly enjoys a wider kind of autonomy. In
contrast, under a proceduralist view, both Pat and Jack would be considered fully
autonomous agents.
As used here, socialization should be understood as an epistemic process which
motivates an agent to internalize some set of social sensibilities, or norms, so that these
standards become an essential part of how that person encounters and interprets themselves
As Audre Lorde puts it in A Burst of Light, “Caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation, and that is an act of
political warfare.”
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and the world. Focusing on appearance narratives for women, Benson observes that this
“is why socialization of feminine appearance does not rely solely upon [explicit] coercion
for its effectiveness.” 267 Benson rightly points out that a feature of oppressive socialization
is that it indoctrinates targets to believe in false standards to the detriment of their epistemic
worldview. Referencing cases of personal adornment, he writes “It is not true that feminine
appearance is a necessary ingredient of a woman’s personal worth.” 268 Oppressive forms
of socialization can systematically lead agents to “misconstrue many of the reasons there
are for them to act” and, Benson claims, this operates to impair autonomy. 269 Put simply,
it undermines autonomy because it undercuts the agent’s ability to see the self-evident force
of reasons to act in morally salient ways, as seeing some reason as an efficaciously
immediate justified reason-for-them.
It is worth observing that socialization inscribes epistemic sensitivities into the
subject by means of life’s experiences. Life’s events sculpt our epistemic sensitivities by
providing definition to our affective dispositions, habits of thought, and shaping our beliefs.
These epistemic foundations are used to render our immediate experiences intelligible
thereby materializing a set of reasons for the agent. Benson echoes this observation in the
following passage,
“... feminine socialization gains much of its power by operating to deceive many women
about the significance that cultivating an appearance which pleases men has for women’s
worth as persons. Women’s autonomy is reduced to the extent that they are socially trained
to be blind to the reasons there are for them to regard their appearance differently from the
norms of femininity recommended. But, by the same token, men who develop their gender
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identity in societies that oppressively socialize women are also liable to be blinded
systematically to important reasons there are for them to treat women different.” 270
While Benson makes no claim about the perceptual nature of these reasons, I argue in other
pieces that access to reasons in immediate perceptual experience is shaped by forces of
socialization. As such, “to have access to moral reasons” signaling one to act in some
morally demanding way, in my view, is an activity fueled by immediate moral perceptual
experience (i.e., the moral perceptual experientialist view). However, if one takes
immediate moral reasons to be judgements of morally neutral perceptual experience, then
to have access to such reasons would be a function of one’s ability to infer, automatically
or deliberately, moral judgements from morally neutral perceptual content (i.e., the moral
perceptual judgementalist view). While I write from the experientialist perspective moving
forward, I suspect that the judgementalist can read what follows as compatible with their
views. However, the sense in which I claim later that one becomes morally blind to reasons
in the experientialist view is itself not a metaphor as it would be in the judgementalist view.
I will return to this later.
It is worth noting that there is something fundamentally disturbing about cases
where there are reasons to do X in the world (say to treat women with respect) and an agent
is experientially cut off from that reason as a reason-for-them (i.e., where it is encountered
as having immediate self-evident justification for responding X-ly) in either the affective
or cognitive sense. In cases relevant to this project, the disturbing nature of this scenario is
seemingly a function of oppressive socialization’s propensity to systematically blind
people to important reasons to act in certain ways.

Benson, p. 403. It is important to note here that Benson is not claiming that men and women are equally oppressed under
patriarchy. He makes this explicit in the paragraphs the follow this point.
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Salient moral reasons for acting X-ly may include the dignity of persons, the pain
of others, thick evaluative content associated with certain terms like Courage or Violence,
the future possibility of a more just world, or some other property presumably present
during our engagements with the lived world. Regardless of kind, the opaqueness or
absence of reasons in one’s experience appears to correlate with how our epistemic
sensitivities are fundamentally shaped by our rational habits, affective dispositions, and
beliefs (i.e., by our moral perceptual orientation). That is, we come to make sense of our
reality and this can, in cases where oppressive socialization occurs, limit or warp the set of
immediate moral reasons available to us when making decisions. It is for this reason that
Benson argues that oppressive socialization leads to a systematic undermining of autonomy
in the relational sense of the concept.
That said, the goal of this section is not to produce a hard and fast defense of
relational autonomy. The purpose of this interlude is to motivate our interest in the
fundamental relationship between our ability to access moral reasons, ethical life, and
socialization. Instead, this paper is intended to provide a framework for understanding the
kind of phenomenon which often motivates relational views of autonomy. The aim is to
provide a framework for understanding the moral epistemological foundations underlying
relational views of autonomy. This should make clear why it is dubious to claim that two
agents (A and B) are both autonomous when A and B are equal in their critical reflective
capacity but have disparate access to reasons in the epistemic environment due to
oppressive conditions that result in a shifting of the perceived experiential landscape. In
this sense, to have disparate access to reasons means that A and B will have different access
to reasons in the epistemic landscape because of one’s access-enabling epistemic position
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(i.e., one informed by an access-granting lived experience, bit of knowledge, affective
disposition, and so on as argued by Patricia Hill Collin’s postmodern yet intersectional
articulation of standpoint epistemology) and the other’s access-disabling position (i.e., an
access-undermining lived experience, bit of knowledge, affective disposition, and so on).
I develop this framework in what follows by first developing a conception of moral
ignorance and then arguing that moral blindness to reasons is the result of oppressive
socialization’s capacity to construct modes of subjectivity marked by moral ignorance.
Moral blindness is, at its core, a pathology spread by modes of socialization which
perpetrate an ideology of domination through the reinforcement and replication of a
society’s webs of domination.
4.3 Models of Ignorance
Linda Martin Alcoff describes models of ignorance as giving an account of “a type
of subjectivity that forms patterns of perceptual attentiveness and supplies beliefinfluencing premises” which give the subject an incomplete account of reality. 271 Given
this, any epistemology of ignorance should be understood as articulating a way of
epistemically encountering the world that creates selectivities and blind spots in a subject’s
epistemic life by limiting their access to reasons. An epistemic agent should be considered
ignorant if her/his cognitive or affective habits or beliefs are inadequate to access some
area of inquiry; I refer to this model of ignorance as the cognitive model of ignorance
(CMI). Moral ignorance in this model is a kind of subjectivity that results from articulated
patterns of affective attunements, beliefs, and cognitive heuristics which manifest
selectivities and blind spots in a subject’s epistemic encounter with moral reasons in the
271
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world. Under CMI, an agent’s morally articulated patterns of affective attunements, beliefs,
and cognitive heuristics comprise what I call one’s epistemic toolkit because they shape
our encounter with the world. Thus, to be morally ignorant is to possess an epistemic toolkit
that supports a lived subjectivity which effectively blinds a person to certain reasons in the
moral landscape.
CMI is preferable to alternative views of ignorance for a few reasons. Knowledgedependent ignorance views, like that articulated by Code (1993 & 1995), claim that an
ignorant agent is described as such when he/she lacks the knowledge required to accurately
access some area of inquiry. The white male subject is seen as epistemically hindered from
or incapable of knowing about lived experiences associated with patriarchal or racial
oppression, as areas of inquiry, because he is the benefactor of those systems. He lacks
knowledge of the negative consequences of his privileged systems and thereby he does not
gain access to their oppressive structures. Under this model, this lack of knowledge results
in a lack of access to an important set of available reasons for action.
Clearly, a person cannot be justifiably said to have access to the quale of others or
to say that one knows the lived experiences of others. 272 However, it does not follow from
this that the socially privileged are incapable of coming to learn (i.e., acquire knowledge
of) things about the experiences of oppressed peoples. To claim otherwise is untenable
because such a position ignores the human capacity for empathic imagination, sympathetic
understanding, and narrative sharing. Granted, access may be more difficult, but it is not
prima facie denied to the socially privileged. It is conceivable that one could couple a
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sustained empathic engagement with the scholarly or narrative projects (i.e., such as
showing up in support of social movements) of marginalized populations in an effort to
make strides towards understanding the alienated lives of the oppressed, to see oppressive
conditions/structures as a moral failure of our society, and to take steps to change society
or oneself based on that knowledge. Projects like Cherríe Moraga’s and Gloria E.
Anzaldúa’s The Bridge Called my Back or Mishuana Goeman’s Mark my Words are prime
examples of resources available for such undertakings. Yet, such efforts are believed to be
ineffective under the knowledge-dependent view. Thus, I take this view to be unattractive
because it claims that one is epistemically cut off from more things than is the case.
Alternatively, experience-dependent ignorance views claim that one’s social
group identity is epistemically omnirelevant across contexts because identity defines one’s
epistemic standpoint. This model is often attributed to Sandra Harding (1991) and is
characterized by the idea that social identity just is the driving force behind our epistemic
lives. The ignorant agent here is defined as such when she/he possesses an underprivileged
set of experiences towards some target of inquiry thereby limiting one’s access to reasons
for action. Rather than lacking some knowledge set, the subject experientially acquires
ways of thinking or affective dispositions. As a result, “epistemic advantages and
disadvantages accrue to social and group identities per se rather than to identities only in
relation to a given context of inquiry.” 273
However, this model too closely entertains a version of epistemic identity
essentialism. In this view, a subject is going to be beholden to a set of rigid expectations
across contexts. In this way, a social identity becomes essential to the subject in the
273
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epistemic sense because it has become a defining feature of how that person experiences
the world regardless of context. This is problematic because it ignores the intersectional
nature of human ontology. That is, it takes the socially identified subject as ontologically
limited to one or two social positions and puts any deeper sense of subjectivity under
erasure. The black body is essentially black, the female body is essentially female, and the
black female body is essentially black and female in every context. Yet, a black female’s
public identification as a female can be more predominant in the formation of her
experiences with black men and her identity as black can do the same for her experiences
in white communities. Her experiences are not constituted the same way in all contexts,
and the constellation of her formative social identities will be both dynamic over time and
from context to context. The experience-dependent view problematically flirts with the
possibility that the subject is epistemically cut off from certain knowledge because of a
reductionary social ontology. This is problematic because it does not account for how
shifting spaces and contexts impact lived experience or relationally constructed
subjectivity.
In contrast, CMI’s strengths are, in my assessment, fourfold. First, it gives an
account of an epistemic standpoint as a function of socialization in the performative
standards for socially constructed identities in various contexts thereby recognizing the
intersectional nature of human ontology. Second, it acknowledges that those standards are
accidental across contexts thereby granting that individuals maintain a sense of individual
subjectivity in the larger scheme of a publicly assigned identity. Third, CMI theorizes that
ignorance is a pervasive yet resolvable feature of human existence in many cases because
every person, to some degree, inhabits an intersectional epistemic standpoint. Yet, CMI
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also allows for the possibility of overcoming said ignorance if one commits to reshaping
one’s patterns of affective attentiveness, ways of thinking, and belief-influencing premises.
It is worth noting that CMI inherits its sense of subjectivity and consciousness from
Hegel, Marx, and, in the contemporary sense, Patricia Hill Collins. Marx’s The German
Ideology proposes a kind of subjectivity wherein “Life is not determined by consciousness,
but consciousness by life… [individuals] developing their material production and their
material intercourse, alter, along with their real existence, their thinking and the products
of their thinking.” 274 As a claim about the epistemic structure of the human subject and the
order of our world, Marx’s life creating consciousness foreshadows the Hegelian-style
work of György Lukács 1968 History and Class Consciousness. Lukács points out that the
position of the proletariat in society and history formulates a standpoint, a node of lived
experience, which grants that population a kind of view from below. The view from below
allows for enhanced epistemic access to certain features of the social world; features which
go unseen and are perhaps difficult to see by the epistemically disadvantaged bourgeois
who were said to be imprisoned in a kind of warped immediacy. 275 The bourgeois, in an
uncritical and epistemically docile state, systematically lack access to reasons that are
accessible to the exploited proletariat.
Patricia Hill Collins continues this line of reasoning in the development of her
views on black feminist epistemology. In Black Feminist Thought, Collins synthesizes
feminist standpoint theory with post-structuralism in an effort to articulate, among other
things, a centrality thesis: that scholars from marginalized populations must be the core
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contributors to identity-based knowledges. Black feminist thought must be informed by
black feminists because that population is epistemically sensitive to the lived experience
of the black woman due to the fact that they have the right epistemic toolkits for the task.
Experiential centrality, thereby, reveals structures in the lived world which are opaque, but
not inaccessible, to others. What is more, Collins’s theoretical framework does not mix and
stir identity categories in the development of an epistemic standpoint. Rather, standpoints
become historically and structurally shaped by larger social narratives, heuristics, and by a
subject’s lived experiences. Thus, epistemic standpoints are cultivated by the web of power
relationships and one’s experiences articulate positions for understanding the lived world
while not invalidating other standpoints as lacking access to the features of that world. 276
Instead, the subject’s epistemic access to the world is always partial and always shaped by,
but not wholly determined by, the lived experiences of the subject’s identity.
It is also worth noting that, as a theory of cognition, CMI echoes Miranda Fricker’s
views in Epistemic Injustice. She writes “the virtuous agent’s perceptual capacity is
accounted for in terms of a sensitivity to morally salient features of the situation
confronting him.” 277 She goes on to say that this “sensitivity is underwritten by a set of
background assumptions about the trustworthiness of different social types in different
sorts of context.” 278 Admittedly, Fricker’s major focus in Epistemic Injustice is the
epistemology of testimony. However, she is also giving a description of the epistemic role
heuristics can play in an agent’s cognition of the world. Fricker argues that the epistemic
differences between the racist hearer’s rejection of and the non-racist hearer’s acceptance
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of testimony given by racially identified subjects follow from the heuristics developed
throughout one’s life. These heuristics create a cognitive framework which guides our
sense of value in the world and, thereby, leads us to experience the world as a canvas of
values and moral impressions. Similarly, Margaret Olivia Little’s feminist moral
epistemology (1995 & 1997) claims that the virtuously attuned agent possesses knowledge
of the moral terrain as a conception of how to live. She rightly claims that the characteristic
difference between a virtuous and non-virtuous person’s cognitive state is that the former
has this sort of broad conception whereas the latter does not. This means that the moral
landscape, as a space of reasons for action, is cognitively different for the virtuous and nonvirtuous person as a feature of each’s cognitive states. Little’s epistemic project engages
itself with the notion that one’s character states impact the way one experiences the world.
Taken together, Fricker and Little both hold that two subjects with two different sets of
background believes or affective dispositions regarding moral value will invariably come
to understand the same experiences as containing different moral content. CMI holds the
same.
4.4 Moral Ignorance and Moral Blindness
Charles W. Mills argues that white ignorance manifests under certain conditions
where the dominant social group of whiteness has a positive interest in seeing the world
inaccurately. In my language, a dominant social group has a positive interest in preserving
a social advantage which correlates with a positive interest in encountering certain
privilege-preserving reasons in the world rather than privilege-dismantling reasons. Mills’s
view, articulated by means of CMI, proposes an account of ignorance where the material
existence of the white subject shapes the very form of his/her consciousness. Mills’s
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account of white ignorance is an archetypal example of how one might utilize CMI to
interpret the epistemic resistance displayed by the socially privileged. He shows us how a
subjectivity sculpted by ignorance challenges the intuition that we always have an
overriding invested interest in seeing the world as it is or in seeing every salient reason in
the moral landscape.
His account of white ignorance also supports the claim that ignorance is not always
willful. One’s epistemic toolkit does not always contain willfully selected contents but
rather it carries historized content which often conforms to a social structure whose
effective project is to reinforce domains of ignorance in the subject -- Mills’s focus being
racial constructions of ignorance. 279 Ideology, so conceived as the superstructural region
of society, assembles the cognitive framework of the agent in a socialization process
thereby reinforcing self-policing behaviors, affective attunements, and thinking habits in
conformity with the dominant ideology. Ideologies themselves “have a materialist
genealogy and can be explained in terms of people’s “historical life-process.” 280
As such, Mills rightfully claims that white ignorance is an epistemic practice which
systematically shapes an agent's experience of reality. It does so to the extent that structures
of white supremacism prescribe “an epistemology of ignorance [as] a particular pattern of
localized and global cognitive dysfunctions producing the ironic outcome that whites will,
in general, be unable to understand the world they themselves have made.” 281 Stated in
terms of CMI, white subjects have maintained and adopted an ideology of domination
which systematically shapes one’s epistemic toolkit in ways which pathologically
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undercuts the white subject’s access a swath of reasons in the moral landscape. As a result,
the privileged white subject often faces a potent insensitivity to aspects of the world as
experienced by the oppressed; all done seemingly for the sake of preserving social
advantage or priority. He concludes that those infected by white ignorance 282 will come to
live in a “racial fantasyland” wherein ignorance is the “cognitive and moral economy
psychically required for conquest, colonization, and enslavement.” 283 These agents will
thereby come to see meritocracy as the prevailing law of the land even though there exists
overwhelming evidence showing that certain classes of the population are systematically
underprivileged and oppressed categorically by race, class, gender or sexuality.
As a result, the truths articulated by these lived realities of the oppressed are not
accessible reasons, observations that call for action or knowledge acquisition, for those
plagued by systemic forms of ignorance. As Mills describes it in The Racial Contract, one’s
cognitive model can distort reality in virtue of its historically generated content. He writes,
“concepts orient us to the world, and it is a rare individual who can resist this inherited
orientation. Once established in the social mindset, its influence is difficult to escape, since
it is not a matter of seeing the phenomenon with the concept discretely attached but rather
of seeing things through the concept itself.” 284 And this is the central concern of this paper,
understanding what it is like to see things through our moral conceptions as rendered by
our background beliefs and affective dispositions.
Abstracting from Mills’s example, those peoples who operate under a species of
ignorance so defined by CMI, be it white, male, or heteronormative ignorance, continue do
Mills himself claims that this infection isn’t limited to the white population and I expect that he would say the same about forms of
Male Ignorance and Heterosexual Ignorance.
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so because they (1) believe in the dominant view about the general nature of society that
represents basic forms of oppression and exploitation as basically just and (2) they possess
beliefs, cognitive heuristics, or affective sensitivity (i.e., an epistemic toolkit) which resists
countervailing evidence to their beliefs about this dominant view. 285 Stated otherwise, they
possess an epistemic toolkit prone to self-preservation of personal advantage by means of
perpetuating some form of ignorance. They are attached to this perspective of the world
and preserve that perspective for existential-preserving reasons. To reiterate, there is an
invested interest by those whose reasoning and affective dispositions align with CMI to
stay ignorant because it preserves their worldview. In these cases, we can see that people
either want “not to know” or are compulsory moved “not to know” even if they are not,
strictly speaking, willfully ignorant. 286
Now, it should be noted that Mills goes on to say the following: “I want a concept
of white ignorance broad enough to include moral ignorance -- not merely ignorance of
facts with moral implications but moral non-knowings, incorrect judgments about the
rights and wrongs of moral situations themselves.” 287 However, it is unclear as to whether
moral ignorance is a broader category than white ignorance or vice versa for Mills. I
suggest that moral ignorance provides the ground by which a subject can sustain a
multiplicity of ignorances. That is, moral ignorance is distinct from and required for other
forms of ignorance.
This seems correct given that CMI structurally points to the acquisition of deficient
moral affects, beliefs, or reasoning habits in one’s an epistemic toolkit as a precondition
Alcoff 2007, p. 48
Alcoff goes on to claim that this kind of unwilful ignorance is a side effect of what Horkheimer calls the Eclipse of Reason. We
might also see this as a kind of unwilful ignorance caused by what Marcuse would call one-dimensional thinking.
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for the possibility of identity-based ignorances like white ignorance. Such deficiencies
manifest as false standards in one’s epistemic toolkit for making sense of experience.
These can be false beliefs regarding the dignity of persons (e.g., taking someone to lack
personhood), false ways of thinking about the other or self (e.g., heuristics which impose
identity credibility deficits), false affective responses to the suffering of others (e.g., feeling
positively attracted to oppression perpetuating violence), false beliefs regarding the
existence of rigid social performative expectations (e.g., women must be submissive to be
attractive), and so on. Briefly put, where an epistemic toolkit preserves practices of
brutalization and domination over humanization and liberation, we should expect to find
some morally deficient tools for accessing salient reasons in the moral landscape.
Additionally, we should also be cautious of epistemic toolkits which enforce a pathological
one-dimensional form of consciousness, one unwilling to acknowledge any internal
contradictions in an epistemic toolkit and motivated by an existential attachment to one’s
perspective of the lived world.
To be clear, I am claiming that if you suffer from white ignorance, then you suffer
from moral ignorance. Moral ignorance makes possible other forms of ignorance, white or
otherwise. Again, moral ignorance is a kind of subjectivity that results from morally
articulated patterns of affective attunements and moral belief-influencing heuristics which
manifest selectivities and blind spots in a subject’s encounter with moral reasons in the
world. According to CMI, a subject’s encounter with the world and its moral dimensions
is a function of our consciousness’s articulation of those experiences by use of our
epistemic toolkit. This process reveals or conceals reasons for action in the experientially
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immediate sense and involves affect attunements, beliefs, and ways of thinking (i.e.
rational habits and heuristics).
Kant famously argued that perceptions without concepts are blind. I am inclined to
propose further that moral perceptions without concepts are blind, but also that moral
perceptions with concepts can blind. This turn of phrase succinctly articulates the idea that
moral beliefs, affects, and habits of thought in our epistemic toolkit serve as the cognitive
scaffolding by which one’s understanding renders experiences intelligible. The view of the
epistemic subject which grounds my observations about moral ignorance amounts to the
claim that between the perceiver and the perceived exists epistemic mechanisms which
render our encounters with the world into coherent experiences, thereby revealing reasons
to the epistemic subject. The unmediated “given” would be an incomprehensible bloom
and buzzing confusion without the various aggregates within our epistemic toolkit. Mills
seems to make a similar observation in “White Ignorance” where he writes “perceptions
are in general simultaneously conceptions, if only at a very low level.” 288
To summarize, our epistemic toolkit facilitates our understanding of the world
thereby allowing our experiences to become intelligible. With this epistemic framework in
mind, we would expect to find and do find, that those who possess epistemically disabling
toolkits (i.e., one which is access-undermining) will possess a kind of morally warped
experience of the world. 289 Mills’s work on white ignorance gestures at this general
phenomenon and ultimately concludes that the conceptual package associated with white

Mills 2007, p. 24
Please note, the phrase “perception of the world” shares conceptual similarities with “experience of the world” in this literature. As
such, Mills and others use the term here in such a way that it reasonable to see perception being used in a metaphorical sense to
gesture towards the experience of perceptual content rather than brute sensory experience. However, for now, I will remain agnostic as
to whether Mills and other CMI users are offering a theory of perception.
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supremacy “is driving the perception, with whites aprioristically intent on denying what is
before them.” 290 CMI and socialization’s epistemic impact shows us how a systematic
moral blindness is functionally connected to an agent's propensity for moral ignorance.
That is, our epistemic toolkit blocks our coming to see certain reasons in the moral
landscape and this inability to see is moral blindness, something too often maintained by
an existential attachment to seeing a world as familiar. 291
A provocative consequence of this line of reasoning suggests that racist, sexist,
oppressive gendered content, and so on in one’s epistemic toolkit results in a kind of false
consciousness. 292 There exists some kind of illusory experience of reality in virtue of one’s
moral blindness: one’s inability to encounter some set of reasons in the moral landscape.
If we define an illusion as those occurrences where one experiences the world not as it is,
then we should expect a reality warping and access-undermining epistemic toolkit to
consistently result in an epistemic agent viewing the world falsely because they are
experiencing it not as it is. Given this, I take it to be less contentious to claim that the agent
plagued by oppressive ideologies suffers from a kind of massive illusion or even a kind of
hallucination about the world because he/she already suffers from a morally deficient or
impaired epistemic toolkit, something Mills articulates as experiencing a “fantasyland.” If
one is morally blind to some set of reasons, then one is morally ignorant and if one is
morally ignorant then one’s epistemic toolkit systematically articulates a false
consciousness about the moral landscape. As a result, one suffers from a moral illusion
caused by moral blindness under a subjectivity of moral ignorance.

Mills 2007, p. 24
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“False consciousness” here amounts to a false view of the world in the Buddhist sense or, as Ahmed (2017, p. 62) puts it “we use
this term to show how there is something false about our consciousness of the world.”
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The claim here is that any form of ignorance which follows the CMI model, be it
white or male or heterosexual or other ignorances, is a symptomatic manifestation of a
deeper, more basic, form of moral ignorance. To drive this point home, one should note
that Mill’s’s notion of white ignorance is categorized by two features: First, a belief in the
dominant view about the general nature of society that represents basic forms of oppression
and exploitation as basically just and, second, a possession of cognitive norms by which to
resist countervailing evidence to their beliefs about this dominant view. I am merely
pointing out that adopting the dominant view about the general nature of society just means
to adopt a certain ideology. If one thinks in cognitive models of white ignorance, then one
takes up some ideology by virtue of having adopted certain moral commitments in one’s
epistemic toolkit. For example, if one affirms “all are created equal” as a deeply held
identity forming moral commitment at the expense of countervailing evidence in the real
world (as one does when infected by white ignorance) then one must also lack further moral
considerations towards the other and their dignity as persons with lived-experiences in
favor of a kind of one-dimensional and morally false consciousness. One can singularly
commit themselves to the dominant ideology that people are created equal and, thereby,
conscious experience warps to fit this attitude because of a moral ignorance about our
obligations to acknowledge the lived experiences of others on their terms. Moreover,
critical engagement with the world, under an oppressive socialization scheme, becomes
whittled down in favor of a dogmatist approach which feeds a vicious circle of selfreinforcement because we experience the world the way we take it to be. For, as Marcuse
wrote in One-Dimensional Man,
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“... the “inner” dimension of the mind in which opposition to the status quo can take root
is whittled down. The loss of this dimension, in which the power of negative thinking- the
critical power of Reason- is at home, is the ideological counterpart to the very material
process in which advanced industrial society silences and reconciles the opposition. The
impact of progress turns Reason into submission to the facts of life, and to the dynamic
capability of producing more and bigger facts of the same sort of life… There is only one
dimension, and it is everywhere and, in all forms,… the “false consciousness” of their
rationality becomes the true consciousness.” 293
4.5 Conclusion: The Need for a Fundamental Self-Reorientation Towards Values
The upshot here is that oppressive modes of socialization regularly cause subjects
to internalize normative expectations about the social world which, in turn, causes a
pathological blindness to moral reasons for liberating action. Interestingly, agents ensnared
by access-limiting epistemic toolkits due to oppressive socialization can still exercise
appropriate proceduralist practices defined by self-regulated and self-directed agency in
ways that are both competent and genuine. As Marcuse and Mills points out, the faculties
of the subject can assent to the “facts of life” as rendered by an one-dimensional or ignorant
way of experiencing the social world. The takeaway is that exercising one’s agency within
a social system of values, meanings, and reasonings allows one to make self-directed, selfregulated, genuine, and competent choices within that system. As a result, oppressed
morally blind subjects are classified as autonomous agents under the proceduralist view of
autonomy. One can be autonomous in this sense even though one cannot see beyond what
an oppressive system guides one to see.
Yet, this inability to access or the possibility of being cutting off from reasons in
the epistemic landscape, especially in the moral landscape, is itself the very phenomenon
which relational views of autonomy take as salient to an agent’s autonomy. Authors like
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Benson observe that agents can “misconstrue many of the reasons there are for them to act”
and the consequence is an impairment to one’s autonomy wherever this occurs as a result
of oppressive social structures. It is this link between the social structure and its impact on
the individual’s epistemic access my means of socialization which indicates that the
relational view of autonomy gets the picture right in these cases. The proceduralist view
overlooks this link.
The reader is asked to consider the epistemological relationship between an agent’s
judgments, her/his epistemic toolkit, and the space of reasons available to her. General
intuitions about illusions suggest that they should be avoided. When walking in a desert,
one does not want to see a mirage of an oasis; rather an actual oasis is preferable when
making life-saving judgments. The shadow-puppets of Plato’s cave were not real but
imperfect imitations of the real and, thus, rejected as sources of knowledge. Descartes’s
first meditation articulates a narrative whereby the author is plagued by the possibility that
all he experiences is merely an illusion crafted by a malicious demon; an argument that
must be resolved for the sake of securing knowledge. Nozick’s famous experience machine
suggests to us that the very idea of having a simulated, i.e. illusionary, experience just is
unpalatable for the very reason that it is not substantially connected to reality in a
meaningful way.
However, if these were accurate intuitions about our disposition towards illusions
or if veridicality is both epistemologically and psychologically preferable to illusion, then
why have so many people failed to cast off the illusionary world that has taken up residence
in the real? What force keeps race, class, and gender biases on the proverbial table given
that they entail a false consciousness of the world? The answer, I submit, is a combination
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of moral blindness caused by socialized moral ignorance and one-dimensional thinking.
Together, these produce a condition preserved by our existential attachment to our existing
worldview.
To be clear, moral ignorance should not be confused with the non-moralist or
amoralist position. Where the non-moralist rejects the very idea that morality exists at all
and the amoralist acknowledges the existence of moral imperatives but rejects the
bindingness of those claims, the agent plagued by moral ignorance can and often does
believe in some set of moral principles. The morally ignorant agent may even sincerely
aim to live a life according to those principles. However, there are two traits that mark
someone as a morally ignorant agent.
The first is that he/she possesses a set of deficient moral beliefs, affective
attunements, or habits of reasoning which mirror (in most cases) the kind of domination
model of social relationships where there is value found in dominating the other. The
morally ignorant agent can claim to have and be dialogically responsive to accurate, albeit
vague, moral claims like “people should be treated justly” and “I believe in the American
value of freedom.” However, the morally ignorant agent will consistently endorse
judgments about particular cases which contradict said beliefs by preserving structures of
domination. For example, they may endorse claims like “women just need to work harder
to earn better pay” or “black people just need to be less lazy” when confronted with
counter-evidence regarding equality in today’s world.
The second trait is the idea that the morally ignorant agent knowingly or
unknowingly resists efforts to detect or correct illusion producing aspects of their epistemic
toolkit. Where the knowingly ignorant agent resists as an act of active choice, the
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unknowingly ignorant agent is plagued by the deeply resistant nature of moral ignorance
itself since not knowing is signaled as permissible or where a false moral claim is endorsed
as true in the social milieu. Existential threat and personal attachment to their worldview
mark this kind of behavior.
Ultimately, as I use the term, the agent plagued by moral ignorance is one whose
overriding but deficient epistemic toolkit informs a false consciousness of the world and
who resists any efforts to acknowledge those defects or to reorient oneself. Taken together,
these features entail that the morally ignorant are plagued by a one-dimensional form of
thinking. It is to adopt a view of oneself that is simultaneously resistant to modes of
thinking differently but also a fundamental resistance to changing one’s affective
attunement to the world. Because of this and because the morally ignorant use a deficient
epistemic toolkit to render immediate perceptual experience intelligible, the morally
ignorant agent is plagued by moral blindness to moral reasons in immediate experiences
of morally pertinent situations.
Moral ignorance and blindness results, in what Marcuse called, a smooth
democratic unfreedom because one feels no need to refuse, to be skeptical, about the way
one encounters the world. This insight, I believe, informs Marcuse’s call for a new
sensibility in his Essay on Liberation. He writes,
“The new sensibility, which expresses the ascent of the life instincts over aggressiveness
and guilt, would foster, on a social scale, the vital need for the abolition of injustice and
misery and would shape the further evolution of the “standard of living” … it emerges in
the struggle against violence and exploitation where this struggle waged for essentially new
ways and forms of life: the negation of the entire establishment, its morality, culture;
affirmation of the right to build a society in which the abolition of poverty and toil
terminates in a universe where the sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful become
forms of existence and thereby the Form of the society itself.”
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From this, we see that the antidote to dehumanization and domination is a new form of
perceiving the world, one antithetical to moral blindness. If this is the goal of the ethical
life, then the possibility of moral ignorance, and subsequently moral blindness, seemingly
places certain moral obligations on the epistemic agent.
Those plagued by moral ignorance are resistant to correcting their defective set of
moral categories because they have an invested interest in remaining ignorant; they have
an interest in preserving a cognitive model that aligns with their deeply held identity
forming moral commitments and thereby suffer from one-dimensionality. Challenging
moral ignorance and moral blindness means that an agent must seek out some form of
transformative experience. In one sense, this experience can manifest as a prolonged and
gradual change over time in a person’s dispositional habits or character. Such
transformation happens, for example, during mindfulness training or during one’s
educational development. This kind of change, as a reshaping of one’s epistemic toolkit,
doesn’t happen overnight. In other cases, there may be a kind of transformative shock or
personal self-rupture wherein one feels turned inside out and fundamentally reoriented to
the world; becoming a parent may be an example of this for some but the thought is that
some form of existential crisis or shift occurs for the agent in these cases. Given this
distinction, we see that such transformations will come about as a result of both willful
effort or through our nonvolitional interaction with the world even though we want to
encourage people to be open to experiences that enable positive transformations and
resistant to those that enable negative ones. In either case, resistance to this kind of crisis
becomes the mark of the ignorant agent. Ultimately, however, it is not that white ignorance
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is to be broadly conceived as the parent to moral ignorance. Rather, it is the prevalence of
moral ignorance across the social milieu which makes white, male, heterosexual, and other
ignorances possible and systematically persistent. One’s deeply held and identity-forming
moral commitments come first; racism and sexism are the symptoms of a deeper cognitive
pathology, one perpetuated by an ideology of domination.
It is worth noting that Marcuse’s Essay on Liberation can optimistically shape how
we ought to approach the practical issue of moral blindness. In this essay, he makes it a
point to describe a new sensibility by calling for the development of a reformed aesthetic
environment. This reaffirmation of the life instincts in the form of liberated consciousness
would, he claims, be characterized by (1) a reframing of rational expressions regarding
what to produce and how it is to be produced, (2) a reframing of epistemic potentialities
for the protection and gratification of life, (3) an invalidation of the distinction between
logos and eros, and (4) the creation of a reality principle which is sublimated to the
beautiful life 294. This new sensibility would emerge in the struggle against violence and
exploitation by standing for social justice. A great refusal occurs where this new sensibility
allows one to see one’s self outside the personal horizons prescribed by society and it
expresses a commitment to the life instinct. It rejects states of aggressiveness or guilt and
manifests as an imaginative awareness of the transcendent possibilities of freedom which
“prepare the soul for this revolution” 295.
In One-Dimensional Man, published before Essay, Marcuse describes the process
of cognizing the world as a specific historical project. Uncritical, one-dimensional
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thinking, gives itself over to the historical project. He writes, “Neither the most refined
aesthetic sense nor the most exact philosophical concept is immune against history” 296. I,
thereby, see Marcuse’s new sensibility as the salve for relieving the pain and irritation of
our historically determined moral ignorance. By rejecting false needs and false views on
the obscene, Marcuse’s new sensibility replaces excess repression with an aesthetic ethos-an ethos which refuses to let society undermine the dignity of life by participating in a
refusal, perhaps a Great Refusal, of oppressive socialization.
Given the one-dimensional nature of moral ignorance and blindness in its resistance
to critique, it is an open question as to what role a new sensibility might play in the
epistemic liberation of individuals from the chains of moral ignorance. In a provisionary
sense, it seems reasonable to predict that a new sensitivity requires at least one feature: a
sensitivity to the dialectical nature of moral commitments. That is, a willingness in peoples
to be sensitive to counter-evidence and the cultivation of one’s self-image as a consistent
work in progress. In this way, Marcuse’s new sensibility becomes a kind of new senseability since a moral commitment to X would carry an epistemic commitment to
understanding the challenges of X’s manifestation in the lived world. It requires, what Mills
calls, a sensitivity to a non-ideal morality.
Given this, I expect the epistemic agent to possess a supervening commitment to
be compassionate and sensitive to others as moral works in progress. Compassion in this
sense requires a consistent engagement with the needs and lived realities of the other on
their terms, an expression of mutual recognition which, if actualized, can liberate us from
the oppressive forces of socialization under an ideology of domination. It could, perhaps,
296
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unshackle our efforts to be morally autonomous by revealing reasons-to-act beyond what
we currently encounter. In this way, the new sensibility affirms the life instinct by
acknowledging that to be alive is to be in a state of moral becoming and that the struggle
to make accurate moral commitments is a winding path. Receptive moral sense-ability is
the road and social justice is our destination.
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